Buelow v. Dickey

Decision Date20 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. 85-C-642,85-C-643.,85-C-642
Citation622 F. Supp. 761
PartiesRalph BUELOW, Petitioner, v. Walter DICKEY, Respondent, and Carol BUELOW, Petitioner, v. Walter DICKEY, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

John Schiro, Milwaukee, Wis., for petitioner.

Mary Batt, State of Wis. Dept. of Justice, Madison, Wis., for respondent.

DECISION AND ORDER

MYRON L. GORDON, Senior District Judge.

On January 10, 1984, Carol and Ralph Buelow were convicted in the state circuit court for Fond du Lac County of being parties to the crime of arson. On December 26, 1984, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions. State of Wisconsin v. Carol and Ralph Buelow, 122 Wis.2d 465, 363 N.W.2d 255 (Ct.App. 1984). On January 30, 1985, the Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the Buelows' petition for review of their convictions as untimely filed. On March 6, 1985, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied their motion for reconsideration.

The Buelows now seek federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. They allege that their convictions were obtained in violation of their sixth amendment rights to confront the witnesses against them and to have the assistance of counsel. For the reasons which follow, the writ will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 11, 1983, three months before they went on trial, the Buelows appeared before a state judge for judicial review of the public defender's refusal to represent them. The judge reviewed and rejected the Buelows' claim that they had placed title to their 600-acre farm in a valid trust, to whose assets they did not have access. He found that the trust was invalid, that the Buelows were not indigent, and that each owned sufficient assets to retain private counsel. The Buelows represented themselves at trial.

In the course of the investigation into the arson, Ms. Honey Lou Suttner gave two separate statements inculpating both herself and the Buelows. She gave the first of these statements to police and the second before a state circuit judge presiding over a "John Doe" hearing about two months later. At trial, the state produced and attempted to question Ms. Suttner. Ms. Suttner took the stand and was placed under oath, but refused to answer any questions on fifth amendment grounds.

After the prosecutor granted her testimonial immunity under sec. 972.08(1) Wis. Stats., the judge ordered her to testify, but she nonetheless persisted in her silence. The judge found her in willful contempt of court and remanded her to the county jail.

After holding her in contempt, the judge found Ms. Suttner unavailable and granted the prosecutor leave to have both of her statements read to the jury. The same individual who took her first statement, Detective Dobyns of the Fond du Lac Sheriff's Department, then read both statements to the jury in question and answer form. After he finished, Carol Buelow extensively cross-examined him. Although offered the opportunity to question Mr. Dobyns, Ralph Buelow declined to do so.

The two statements clearly implicated Ms. Suttner and the Buelows in the destruction of a Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) building. Though several other witnesses testified at trial, these out-of-court statements constituted the only evidence adduced by the state directly linking the Buelows to the arson charged. Ms. Suttner's refusal to testify prevented the Buelows from cross-examining her in the presence of the jury. The state courts treated Ms. Suttner as "unavailable" and found her statements to be reliable and trustworthy so as to satisfy the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.

The Buelows filed their petition for review with the Wisconsin Supreme Court on January 28, 1985, more than 30 days after the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had affirmed their convictions. Section 809.62(1) Wis.Stat., provides that parties must petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review within 30 days of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals. The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed their petition as untimely.

II. WAIVER

Under the law of waiver, when a procedural default bars litigation of a constitutional claim in state court, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2908, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506-07, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). I am persuaded that the Buelows' procedural default was the result of inadvertence and that their inability to cross-examine Ms. Suttner, if unlawful, was prejudicial to them. Nutall v. Greer, 764 F.2d 462, 465 (7th Cir.1985).

The fundamental importance of proper confrontation at trial, the significance of the challenged evidence, and the absence of other evidence corroborative of guilt, demonstrate that there was a real possibility of actual prejudice to the Buelows. The character and magnitude of the constitutional infirmities alleged in their habeas petitions thus warrant looking beyond the state procedural forfeiture involved in this case in order to examine the petitioners' contentions. See Riner v. Owens, 764 F.2d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir.1985).

III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Having shown sufficient cause and actual prejudice for their procedural default, the Buelows are entitled to present their constitutional claims to the federal courts for review on the merits. They argue, first, that Ms. Suttner was not unavailable as a witness in the constitutional sense, since she was not given an opportunity to consult counsel after being granted testimonial immunity and ordered to testify; and, second, that even if she was unavailable, neither of her out-of-court statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the confrontation clause.

A. Unavailability

The state produced Ms. Suttner at trial, where she was placed under oath, and sought to question her regarding her relationship with the Buelows. She refused to testify on fifth amendment grounds, in spite of a grant of testimonial immunity. The trial judge then ordered her to testify or be held in contempt, in accordance with state law. She persisted in her silence, defying the judge's order that she testify, was held in contempt, and declared unavailable.

A witness is not unavailable for purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement unless prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2543, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). But the law does not require the doing of a futile act. The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present the witness. Id.

Prosecutorial authorities in this case made every effort to obtain Ms. Suttner's live testimony and thus laid a proper predicate for admission of her two out-of-court statements. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 74, 100 S.Ct. at 2543. Her refusal to testify was no fault of their own, and nothing that they could reasonably be expected to remedy. Indeed, their production of Ms. Suttner and grant of testimonial immunity were the only means reasonably within their power to make her available for direct and cross-examination. For purposes of confrontation clause analysis, her unavailability to testify was established when she persisted in asserting her fifth amendment privilege, despite a prosecutorial grant of immunity, in defiance of an order by the trial court to testify or be held in contempt. United States v. Caputo, 758 F.2d 944, 952 (3rd Cir.1985); United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 819-20 (1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2653, 86 L.Ed.2d 271 (1985); see also United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 363, 364 (5th Cir.1981).

B. Reliability

The out-of-court statements read to the jury purported to identify the Buelows, one other male, and Ms. Suttner as the perpetrators of the arson which destroyed a building belonging to the Wisconsin DNR. Both statements described how the Buelows and the other male picked Ms. Suttner up in a pick-up truck one evening in late December 1981 and drove to the site of some buildings and sheds belonging to the DNR. Carol Buelow was driving. She dropped the other three individuals off near the buildings. After the fire had been started, she returned to pick them up. Ms. Suttner's statements also indicated that Ralph Buelow and the other male present belonged to a group called the Posse Comitatus, which did not like the DNR.

The statements further disclosed that Ralph Buelow and the other male broke into two of the DNR buildings, poured gasoline on the floors and furniture inside them, and hurriedly ran out of one just as it burst into flames. They indicated that the buildings out of which the men had run contained jeeps and cars. Ms. Suttner also disclosed that she was the designated lookout and, at the behest of the two men, remained outside while they prepared and ignited the fire.

Ms. Suttner gave the first of the two statements to police in a conference room of the Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Department. Present were Detective Dobyns of the Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Department and a Wisconsin Department of Criminal Investigations Fire Marshall. Prior to answering any questions, Ms. Suttner read and stated that she understood her Miranda rights. Nonetheless, she was not in police custody and had not been arrested for or charged with committing any crime at the time she gave her statement. In short, Ms. Suttner had volunteered to come forward and speak to the authorities. She had gone to the sheriff's department of her own free will and had not been threatened, promised anything, or pressured to assist in the investigation. She simply gave her statement and returned home the same evening approximately one-half hour later.

Ms. Suttner returned to the sheriff's department about a week later. She was not in custody or under any...

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  • Lowery v. Anderson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • 6 Julio 1999
    ...transactional immunity; Ohio v. Roberts did not require prosecution to take futile steps to secure attendance); Buelow v. Dickey, 622 F.Supp. 761, 763-64 (E.D.Wis.1985) (witness was unavailable where she refused to testify despite being held in contempt), rev'd on other grounds, 847 F.2d 42......
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    ...v. United States, 158 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir.1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 821, 67 S.Ct. 771, 91 L.Ed. 1272 (1947); Buelow v. Dickey, 622 F.Supp. 761, 766 (E.D.Wis.1985). ...
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    ...this case in order to examine the petitioners' contentions. See Riner v. Owens, 764 F.2d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir.1985). Buelow v. Dickey, 622 F.Supp. 761, 763 (E.D.Wis.1985). Having found that the Buelows showed sufficient cause and actual prejudice for their procedural default, the court revie......
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