Bueter v. Brinkman
| Decision Date | 17 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-0111-CV-725.,49A02-0111-CV-725. |
| Citation | 776 N.E.2d 910 |
| Parties | Ann P. BUETER, M.D., James F. Dupler, M.D., and Women's Health Partnership, Appellant-Defendants, v. Sandra BRINKMAN and Mark Brinkman, Appellee-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Mary H. Watts, James P. Strenski, Candace L. Sage, Bingham McHale, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Caroline A. Gilchrist, Baker & Gilchrist, Avon, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Ann P. Bueter, James F. Dupler, and The Women's Health Partnership (collectively referred to as "the doctors") appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion for preliminary determination of their statute of limitations affirmative defense to medical malpractice claims brought against them by Mark and Sandra Brinkman. We dismiss this appeal.
The doctors raise a sole issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial court properly denied the doctors' motion for preliminary determination. However, we find another issue dispositive: whether the trial court's denial was a final appealable order.
In May 1994, Sandra learned that she was pregnant and sought pre-natal care from the doctors. On January 22, 1995, Sandra was hospitalized with symptoms of what was later diagnosed as preeclampsia. On January 26, 1995, Sandra delivered her baby. Four days following delivery and after her discharge from the hospital, Sandra suffered two grand mal seizures and was taken to the hospital by ambulance. She was diagnosed with toxic eclampsia.
In March of 1995, the Brinkmans met with Bueter, and Bueter told them that it was not advisable for them to have more children because future pregnancies would be high risk with life-threatening complications for Sandra. Bueter recommended sterilization. Bueter also stated that until the Brinkmans complied with her advice, the doctors would not see Sandra as a patient and she would have to obtain her gynecological care elsewhere.
As a result of Bueter's advice, the Brinkmans decided not to have any more children, but for financial reasons opted not to undergo the sterilization procedure. In January of 2000, Sandra became pregnant despite the Brinkmans' use of birth control. On January 31, 2000, the Brinkmans met with physicians at St. Vincent Hospital in Indianapolis and were informed that Sandra had symptoms of preeclampsia when she was hospitalized in January 1995 prior to the birth of her child and that if she had received proper care at that time, it would not have progressed to toxic eclampsia. They were further informed that there are numerous ways to treat preeclampsia and prevent it from progressing into eclampsia. Finally, they were informed that the risk of preeclampsia does not increase in subsequent pregnancies with the same father, that it does not always recur in subsequent pregnancies, and that if it does, it can be treated.
The Brinkmans then filed with the Department of Insurance a proposed complaint for medical malpractice against the doctors on December 7, 2000. The complaint alleged that the doctors committed malpractice in four respects:
1. Failing to identify and treat Sandra's prenatal signs of preeclampsia;
2. Failing to identify and treat Sandra's continuing signs of eclampsia after she delivered her child and negligently discharging her from the hospital while she still exhibited those signs;
3. Failing to diagnose and treat Sandra's signs of eclampsia after her discharge from the hospital; and
4. Failing to appropriately counsel the Brinkmans about the potential risks and complications for future pregnancies.
Appendix of Appellants at 16. On February 28, 2001, the doctors filed in the trial court a motion for preliminary determination pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-18-11-1(a), seeking dismissal of the Brinkmans' proposed complaint on the ground it was precluded by the statute of limitations. After a hearing, the trial court denied the doctors' motion. The doctors then simultaneously filed in this court a notice of appeal and in the trial court a petition to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The trial court did certify its order, and the doctors then filed in this court under the cause number assigned when they filed their notice of appeal a motion to accept jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal. The motion to accept jurisdiction was denied on February 11, 2002. However, while the motion to accept jurisdiction had been pending, the doctors also filed a petition for extension of time to file the brief which would have been due pursuant to the notice of appeal seeking an extension of time until after this court ruled on the motion to accept jurisdiction and this petition was granted on February 25, 2002. Briefing was thereafter completed by both parties.
When the doctors filed their petition for extension of time to file their brief, they acknowledged that they had simultaneously initiated an appeal as if from a final order and a discretionary appeal from an interlocutory order. Our research reveals no cases which specifically state whether an order in an action for preliminary determination is interlocutory or final. However, there is language to suggest the order is an interlocutory one.
In a recent appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion for preliminary determination on the issue of the statute of limitations, this court stated that "[a] motion for preliminary determination, when accompanied by evidentiary matters, is akin to a motion for summary judgment...." Jacobs v. Manhart, 770 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). As a general rule, an order denying summary judgment is not a final appealable judgment. Keith v. Mendus, 661 N.E.2d 26, 35 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996),trans. denied. This is so "because no rights have been thereby foreclosed." Loving v. Ponderosa Systems, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 531, 534 (Ind.1985). A final judgment "disposes of all issues as to all parties, to the full extent of the court to dispose of the same, and puts an end to the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues." Hudson v. Tyson, 178 Ind.App. 376, 383 N.E.2d 66, 69 (1978) (quoting State ex rel. Neal v. Hamilton Circuit Court, 248 Ind. 130, 134, 224 N.E.2d 55, 57 (1967)). "A final judgment reserves no further question or direction for future determination." Thompson v. Thompson, 259 Ind. 266, 286 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1972). See also Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1) ().
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger
...Rule 14, then the limitations of Appellate Rule 14 would become meaningless. Allstate, 801 N.E.2d at 196; see also Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (refusing to apply Rule 66(B) to "rescue" an appeal). Additionally, this case is more compelling than Allstate because in t......
-
Cavallo v. Allied Physicians of Michiana, LLC
...one which “ ‘disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1) ); see also Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910, 912–13 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (quoting Hudson v. Tyson, 178 Ind.App. 376, 383 N.E.2d 66, 69 (1978) ) (“A final judgment ‘disposes of all issues as ......
-
Young v. Estate of Sweeney
...to dispose of the same, and puts an end to the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues." Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910, 912-13 (Ind.Ct. App.2002) (quoting State ex rel. Neal v. Hamilton Circuit Court, 248 Ind. 130, 134, 224 N.E.2d 55, 57 (1967)) (emphasis suppl......
-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan
...] where the trial court, as here, has expressly refused or denied certification. Id. at 1202. We agree. See also Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (refusing to apply Rule 66(B) to "rescue" an appeal). If we were to allow the use of Rule 66(B) to supplement our jurisdicti......