Buffalo Rapids Irr. Dist. v. Colleran
| Citation | 279 P. 369,85 Mont. 466 |
| Decision Date | 13 July 1929 |
| Docket Number | 6493. |
| Parties | BUFFALO RAPIDS IRR. DIST. v. COLLERAN et al. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Custer County; S.D. McKinnon, Judge.
Action by the Buffalo Rapids Irrigation District against Anna Colleran and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Loud & Leavitt, of Miles City, for appellant.
L. A Foot, Atty. Gen., S. R. Foot, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Rudolph Nelstead, of Miles City, for respondents.
The Buffalo Rapids irrigation district brought action to quiet title to approximately 720 acres of land lying in Custer county and within the irrigation district. The complaint alleges that plaintiff acquired the land in question by tax deed in 1926, and that thereafter the county levied and imposed taxes upon the land for the year 1927; that all property belonging to the plaintiff, "including the lands and premises herein described, is exempt from taxation," but that the taxes, "being of record constitutes and is a cloud upon plaintiff's title."
The county interposed a general demurrer to the complaint, which demurrer was sustained by the court, and, the plaintiff refusing to plead further, judgment of dismissal followed. The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment.
It is agreed by counsel for plaintiff and defendant that only one question is involved, "viz: Has Custer county the power to assess and levy a tax upon the land of the plaintiff, the plaintiff being an irrigation district organized under the laws of the State of Montana?" The answer to this question is to be found in our constitutional and statutory provisions on the subjects of irrigation districts and taxation.
Every irrigation district established under the laws of this state is declared to be a "public corporation for the promotion of the public welfare" (section 7169, Rev Codes 1921), and the purpose of the irrigation district law is declared to be to secure the irrigation of the lands of the state, "and thereby to promote the prosperity and welfare of the people" (section 7262, Id.), i e., a public purpose (O'Neill v. Yellowstone Irrigation District, 44 Mont. 492, 121 P. 283). But the mere fact that such a district is a public corporation created for the purpose stated does not necessarily exempt its property from taxation; if such property is to be exempted, it must be by virtue of the express pronouncement of the Constitution or legislative declaration permitted by the Constitution. Cook County v. Chicago, 103 Ill. 646; In re Swigert, 123 Ill. 267, 14 N.E. 32.
Our constitutional provision on exemption of property from taxation (section 2, art. 12) declares an exemption as to two classes of property, based upon ownership: First, "the property of the United States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, * * *" that is, as to these the provision is permissive and requires legislative action. Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258, 175 P. 878.
It will be noted that "public corporations" are included in neither of these classes, unless, as contended by counsel for the plaintiff, irrigation districts, as public corporations, fall within the designation "municipal corporations," or are such component parts of the state that it may be said that their property is the property of the state. The very fact that the framers of our Constitution wrote into the fundamental law an exemption of the public property enumerated is recognition of the principle that, without such exemption, it would be subject to taxation (City of Kalispell v. School District, 45 Mont. 221, 122 P. 742, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1101), and therefore the rule "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" applies.
It must be conceded that our legislative policy is to exact contribution for the support of the government from all subjects within the taxing power; this power "is never presumed to be relinquished unless the intention to relinquish is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms," and "every claim for exemption from taxation should be denied unless the exemption is granted so clearly as to leave no room for any fair doubt." Cruse v. Fischl, above.
Provisions for exemptions must be construed strictly; nothing is to be implied (Cruse v. Fischl, above); this rule applies to exemptions of public as well as private property ( Sanitary District v. Gibbons, 293 Ill. 519, 127 N.E. 691), and any one seeking immunity from taxation must show that his property belongs to a class which is specifically exempted (City of Kalispell v. School District, above).
The ever-mounting expense of government requires vigilance on the part of governmental officers and agencies, to the end that all persons and all property receiving the benefit and protection of the government should contribute their just proportion of that expense to the end that the burden of taxation shall not become unduly heavy upon those unable to escape its exactions; no small part of this vigilance should be exerted to prevent the broadening of exemptions beyond the contemplation of the framers of our Constitution. It has been appropriately remarked that Finley v. Philadelphia, 32 Pa. 381.
Where, then, does the property of an irrigation district fit into our constitutional provision so as to entitle it to exemption? It is neither the state, a county, city, or town ( Thaanum v. Bynum Irrigation District, 72 Mont. 221, 232 P. 528), and, in that opinion, it is emphatically declared that such a district is not a "municipality," for the term is synonymous with "municipal corporation," "and in this state only incorporated cities and towns are municipal corporations (Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 P. 30, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 963)."
However, while, technically speaking, the term "municipal corporation" can be applied only to incorporated cities and towns, the term has a broader meaning in common usage, and may, when the intention is clear to do so, be used to include counties, townships, parishes, boards of education, school districts, road, levee, and sanitary districts and the like, and even unincorporated towns and villages, "hence such expressions as 'municipal corporation-a city, county or town,' and 'a county, or any other municipal corporation."' 1 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) 392.
From the use of the term "municipal corporations" in connection with the terms "cities and towns," it is evident that the framers of the Constitution had in mind governmental agencies of some sort, other than cities and towns, as included within the term, and, in ascertaining the meaning of words in the Constitution, they will be presumed to have been used in the sense in which they were used generally at the time the Constitution was adopted ( State ex rel. Judith Basin County v. Poland, 61 Mont. 600, 203 P. 352), unless the context in which they occur requires that they be assigned a different meaning, or other provisions on the same subject limit, qualify, or enlarge their scope (State ex rel. Rowe v. Kehoe, 49 Mont. 582, 144 P. 163).
Further, while we had no irrigation districts at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and therefore it cannot be said that the framers had such public corporations in mind when they used the term "municipal corporations," the language of the Constitution must be taken as having been designed to meet the needs of a progressive society, and should not be strictly confined to its meaning as understood at the time the instrument was adopted. State ex rel. Fenner v. Keating, 53 Mont. 371, 163 P. 1156.
But "a word or phrase may have different meanings as it is employed in different connections * * * and the particular meaning to be attached to it in a given statute or constitutional provision is to be measured and controlled by the connection in which it is employed, the evident purpose of the Act, and the subject to which it relates." Thaanum v. Bynum Irrigation District, above.
The plaintiff district is entitled to have its property exempted only if, under the above rules, it can be said it clearly comes within the term "municipal corporations," or that it is such a subdivision, institution, or department of the state as to constitute its property the property of the state, or that, under some appropriate designation, within the second class mentioned in the constitutional provision, its property has been exempted by statute.
Our attention has not been called to, nor have we found, any case holding that agricultural lands within an irrigation district are exempt from taxation by reason of the fact that title thereto has passed to the district, although certain of the decided cases in sister states indicate that the courts consider irrigation districts as so closely related to the state as to bring them within their constitutional exemption provisions. These decisions are, however, not controlling, and are only persuasive in so far as the provisions under consideration are similar to our own, and the reasoning employed appeals to us as sound.
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