Buffington v. Buffington

• Decision Date: 07 October 1898
• Docket Number: 18,473
• Citation: Buffington v. Buffington, 151 Ind. 200, 51 N.E. 328 (Ind. 1898)
• Parties: Buffington v. Buffington, Executor
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

51 N.E. 328

151 Ind. 200

Buffington v. Buffington, Executor

No. 18,473

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 7, 1898

From the Dearborn Circuit Court.

Affirmed.

Stephen H. Stewart and Omar F. Roberts for appellant.

Charles F. Hayes and Thompson & Colt, for appellee.

OPINION

Hackney, C. J.

This was an action to quiet the title to certain real estate, and to subject the same to sale for the payment of the debts of the estate represented by the appellee. The appellant, the widow of the decedent, William C. Buffington, was alleged to have entered, prior to her marriage with the decedent, into an antenuptial contract with him, which contract, in order to complete the same, was, after said marriage acknowledged before a notary public. Said contract is as follows: "Know all men by these presents that whereas, William C. Buffington, of Dearborn county, Ind., and Martha J. Higbee, of Ohio county, Ind., are about entering into marriage, and that in view of such marriage the following contract and antenuptial agreement is entered into by and between the said parties, to wit: The said William C Buffington, on his part, agrees to maintain his said wife, Martha J. Higbee, in a manner suitable to his means and station in life, and he further agrees that he will release any and all interest in property owned by her, and that she can hold any and all personal property that she may bring to the house of said William C. Buffington, and that she have control of her said property without restraint; and the said Martha J. Higbee on her part agrees and contracts, in consideration of the foregoing, that she hereby releases any and all claims to the property of the said William C. Buffington, her intended husband; and, further, that they each reserve the power and right to dispose of and control their separate property, respectively, during marriage, and that the right of each is reserved to make wills, if they see proper, of their estate.

"In witness whereof, the said William C. Buffington and Martha J. Higbee have hereunto set their hands and seals on November 9, 1878. William C. Buffington (seal), Martha J. Higbee (seal)."

The instrument was acknowledged, the date not appearing, by William C. and Martha J. Buffington. The effect of this contract upon any interest which the widow would otherwise have had in the real estate of the decedent, and upon her claim to the statutory allowance of $ 500 are questions for decision, as presented in various forms.

The appellant's learned counsel insist upon a strict and narrow construction of the contract, so as to limit it to the control of property during wedlock, and so that any concessions in this respect, made by the appellant, were upon the consideration of the executory promise of the decedent to thereafter relinquish any interest in or control over her property for such period, such executory promise never having been complied with.

It is the firmly-established rule in this State that antenuptial contracts are not in such disfavor as to require rigid construction. On the contrary, they are favored by the law as promoting domestic happiness and adjusting property questions which would otherwise often be the source of fruitful litigation. No formality is required, and the rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 150 Ind. 636, 50 N.E. 756; McNutt v. McNutt, 116 Ind. 545, 2 L.R.A. 372, 19 N.E. 115, and authorities there cited. Looking to the contract with reference alone to the custody, control, and disposition of the property during wedlock, there was no occasion for the contract. In this respect the rights and duties of the parties were, by the law, as the contract would have made them. This conclusion is, of itself, strongly influential in determining that the parties were intending to contract with reference to the disposition of their property, respectively, upon the death of either. As far as may be, parties are presumed to contract with reference to ends which do not necessarily occur without contract. The clause in the contract whereby the appellant "releases any and all claims to the property of" her intended husband could not reasonably have spoken an intention to affect existing interests, for there were no present interests in her favor in his property. The clause in which each reserved the right to dispose of his or her property, by will very clearly...