Buford v. Wright
| Decision Date | 21 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:10CV00247 BSM |
| Parties | KEVIN MARTEL BUFORD, II, and DIANNA WALKER PLAINTIFFS v. ALBERT WRIGHT, Chief of Police, Luxora Police Department, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
The complaint and amended complaint [Doc. Nos. 2, 17] filed by plaintiffs Kevin Buford, II, and Dianna Walker (collectively "Plaintiffs") are dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Walker's remaining state law claim for political intimidation is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). All pending motions are denied as moot.
In 2010, plaintiff Dianna Walker, Buford's mother, ran for Mayor of Luxora, Arkansas. [Doc. No. 17 at 1]. During her campaign, she informed defendant Albert Wright, Chief of the Luxora Police Department, that if she won, she would not reappoint him as police chief. [Id. at 2].
On September 5, 2010, the Mississippi County Sheriff notified Chief Wright that a Luxora resident, Peggy Wright, reported the previous day that three men broke into her home, tied her up, and robbed her. [See Doc. No. 9 at 3, 6]. The men fled in Mrs. Wright's 1993 Chevrolet Corsica, and after a high speed chase, officers with the Caruthersville,Missouri, Police Department arrested Buford and two other men. [Doc. No. 2 at 4; Doc. No. 9 at 3, 7]. While detained in Missouri, Buford was served with warrants from Arkansas and later extradited. [Doc. No. 2 at 5].
On September 23, 2010, prosecutors filed a felony information in the Mississippi County, Arkansas Circuit Court charging Buford and two others with aggravated robbery, theft of property, and kidnaping. Buford remained in custody awaiting trial, but nine months later the victim died and prosecutors elected to nolle pros the charges.
When the charges were dismissed, Buford and Walker filed this lawsuit against a number of the public officials involved in Buford's arrest and prosecution. [Doc. Nos. 2, 17]. Buford essentially claims that he was the victim of official misconduct caused by a conspiracy to falsely imprison and maliciously prosecute him. Walker, Buford's mother who was running for mayor at the time Buford was arrested, essentially alleges that all of this official misconduct was the result of a conspiracy to prevent her from winning the mayoral election and terminating the chief of police.
Claims brought in forma pauperis are to be dismissed at any time that it is determined that they are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that isplausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
Pro se complaints are to be reviewed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When construed liberally, all allegations must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). But regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented or appearing pro se, his "complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions." See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
A claim has facial plausibility when a reasonable inference may be drawn that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility" of entitlement to relief. Id. at 557.
Plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint [Doc. Nos. 2, 17] are dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim for relief in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, the plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Van Zee v. Hanson, 630 F.3d1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 2011). Here, plaintiffs assert that defendants engaged in a conspiracy, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, official misconduct, neglect of duties, and political intimidation and by doing so, violated plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Doc. Nos. 2, 17.].
The notion that Buford's arrest and prosecution were concocted as part of a conspiracy to undermine Walker's mayoral campaign "lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 (). To start, plaintiffs' claims could be dismissed solely because they are frivolous. This is the case, because plaintiffs allege that the defendants, all of whom are Arkansas public officials, conspired to attack Buford in order to reduce the likelihood of Walker winning the mayoral election. [Doc. 17 at 17]. The problem is that plaintiffs totally ignore the fact that Buford was arrested after a high speed chase following an armed home invasion. [Doc. 17-1 at 17-18]. Not only was he in the car that fled the scene of the invasion but when the police finally stopped the car, they found a mask and gun in the car. Moreover, Buford was arrested by Missouri officers and then extradited back to Arkansas. Id.
In addition to being frivolous, plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action for the reasons set forth below.
Buford asserts that deputy prosecutor Catherine Dean violated his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was detained in the Mississippi County Detention Center for nine months before Dean chose to nolle pros his charges. [Doc. Nos.9, 17]. He also complains that, as part of a conspiracy with the other defendants, she would often have him appear before the judge without his co-defendants and make misleading statements to the court. [Id.]. Walker asserts that Dean violated her First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when she conspired with officials in Arkansas and Missouri and refused to investigate the validity of the allegations against Buford. [Id.].
Prosecutors are absolutely immune in civil suits for actions that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process[.]" Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (). Actions that are "undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of the [prosecutor's] role as an advocate for the state, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993); see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Decisions relating to the initiation and dismissal of cases are at the very heart of a prosecutor's function as an advocate for the state and absolute immunity will attach to those decisions. Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1268 (8th Cir. 1996). A prosecutor is also absolutely immune from a civil conspiracy claim when the prosecutor's alleged participation in the conspiracy is based on otherwise immune acts. Reasonover v. St. Louis County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir. 2006).
Dean's acts were part of her duties as an advocate for the state and are therefore protected by absolute immunity. Further, as to Buford's assertion that Dean was negligent in her duties as a deputy prosecutor, a negligent act of an official that results in theunintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property fails to implicate the due process clause. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Accordingly, all claims against Dean are dismissed.
Plaintiffs' chief complaint against Mayor Jackson is that he failed to adequately train and supervise Chief Wright. In a § 1983 cause of action, an official is liable for his own conduct and cannot be held liable for the misconduct of his subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior liability. Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010); Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2010); Vaughn v. Greene Cnty., 438 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2006). A supervisor may, however, be held liable for failing to adequately train or supervise a subordinate. Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 1994). To maintain their claim for failure to train, plaintiffs must show that (1) Luxora's training practices were inadequate; (2) the failure to train was a result of a deliberate and conscious choice by Mayor Jackson; and (3) the training deficiency actually caused them injury. See Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).
Plaintiffs fail to allege that Luxora's training practices were inadequate. They also fail to allege that any lack of training was the result of a deliberate or conscious choice by Mayor Jackson. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for failure to train or supervise, and the claims against Mayor Jackson are dismissed.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants conspired to deprive them of constitutional...
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