Buggs v. Ford Motor Co.
Citation | 113 F.2d 618 |
Decision Date | 28 June 1940 |
Docket Number | No. 6975.,6975. |
Parties | BUGGS v. FORD MOTOR CO. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Jacob Geffs, of Janesville, Wis., for appellant.
Carl Muskat, of Milwaukee, Wis., and Clifford B. Longley and Wallace R. Middleton, both of Detroit, Mich., for appellee.
Before EVANS, MAJOR, and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant to recover damages for the unlawful cancellation of a franchise to act as a Ford dealer in Janesville, Wisconsin. Under contracts with defendant, running back to October, 1913, plaintiff had served as a Ford dealer, until September 27, 1937. On this date defendant served a notice of written cancellation upon him, effective at once. The terms of the last written agreement of the parties provided for termination "at any time at the will of either party by written notice."
On a motion to dismiss, the trial court entered a summary judgment in defendant's favor dismissing plaintiff's complaint "on its merits."
Plaintiff predicates his right to damages on defendant's legal obligation not to cancel unjustly the franchise, which he traces to Wisconsin Statutes, 218.01 (3) (a) 17, enacted July 14, 1937. This act provides, among other things, for the suspension or revocation of a license of a manufacturer "who has unfairly, without due regard to the equities of said dealer and without just provocation, canceled the franchise of any motor vehicle dealer."
The legal questions argued on this appeal are many. Fortunately the factual issues are fewer and less controverted.
The Facts: Plaintiff alleges that he has held a Ford dealer franchise in Janesville, Wisconsin, since October, 1913; that the franchise has been renewed from time to time; the last renewal bears date of May 26, 1932; that he has equipped his garage to handle efficiently this agency and has expended $7600 in building a warehouse necessary for the assembling of Ford cars. He has purchased Ford parts, expended money and efforts in building up Ford trade believing that he would have the agency permanently; that he has put in over twelve hours a day in the work and has expended over $100,000, in building up the business. The contract of May 26, 1932, was a Ford standard dealer agency contract and contained a provision for termination as above stated. The defendant notified plaintiff, by registered mail, on September 25, 1937, that the agency was cancelled.
The defendant in its answer, in addition to claiming the absolute right to terminate, alleges that the plaintiff did not devote adequate time or attention to the agency, and alleges that it did not violate the subsections of the Wisconsin Statute — which statute it contends is not applicable, first, because it is not retroactive and second, because it grants plaintiff no cause of action for money damages.
Defendant moved for a summary judgment and supported its motion with affidavits of its officers setting forth its corporate set-up; the location, number of its agents, the volume of its business, its advertising methods and other facts which disclosed its policies and practices in reference to dealer agencies throughout the country.
The District Court granted defendant's motion; it made findings of fact and conclusions of law; dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on its merits. It made no finding on the constitutionality of the Wisconsin Statute. The court found the contract of May 26, 1932, to be a valid one, and gave to the defendant the lawful right to terminate the contract at any time without subjecting itself to liability for damages therefor. It also held that the statute had no retroactive effect; and that the statute created no cause of action for damages for violation thereof.
The legal questions are:
1. Is the Wisconsin statute (Wis.Stats. 218.01 (3) (a) 17) valid? Is it retroactive?
2. Is one aggrieved by the inexcusable cancellation of his dealer's contract entitled to maintain an action for damages because of this statute which provides for cancellation of the manufacturer's right to do business in the State of Wisconsin in case it inexcusably and unjustifiably cancels a dealer's agreement?
3. Was the last written agreement between plaintiff and defendant invalid because unilateral?
4. If invalid, were there valid contractual obligations binding on the parties on September 22, 1937, which made applicable the aforesaid Wisconsin statute?
Most sharply controverted is the question of the validity of the contract. Plaintiff contends that it lacks mutuality. In short, it is unilateral.
An examination of its terms, which are many, indicates that it was dictated by the manufacturer at Detroit, and drawn by its counsel with the avowed purpose of protecting the manufacturer to the utmost and granting, if any, few rights to, and the smallest possible protection of, the agent.
It is one which affords some support for the wisdom and the necessity of legislation which protects the weak against a strong party in situations like the instant one. The terms of this and other similar agreements had, no doubt, a causal bearing upon the passage of the legislation which the State of Wisconsin enacted in 1937. It cannot be ignored in considering the validity of such legislation.
Similar contracts have been before the courts on many occasions, and there are numerous decisions, entitled to weight and respect, which hold these contracts to be void for lack of mutuality. The case which most strongly supports plaintiff's position is Ford Motor Company v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001, a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit. This decision in turn relies on Huffman v. Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., 8 Cir., 262 F. 116. Likewise, two decisions of this court, Velie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., 7 Cir., 194 F. 324, and Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 7 Cir., 201 F. 499, join in condemning agreements which are loaded with express obligations of one side and silent as to the obligations of the manufacturer. Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 7 Cir., 75 F.2d 447, is another case (by this court) which followed the above-cited cases, and found the agreement there set forth to lack mutuality. Cited below are many cases which contain discussions of this question.1
Such disagreement as seemingly exists in the decisions may be partly attributed to the differences in the terms of the agreements under attack.
We are convinced that the agreement before us is not unilateral and is valid.
Going at once to the most important paragraphs of the contract and the ones upon which defendant must chiefly rely to support its contention that the agreement is valid, we find the following:
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