Buhler v. Dep't of Agric.

• Decision Date: 21 June 1938
• Parties: BUHLER v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS et al.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

229 Wis. 133

280 N.W. 367

BUHLER

v.DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS et al.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 21, 1938.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane County; August C. Hoppmann, Judge.

Reversed.

Action brought by the plaintiff, Louis Buhler, Sr., against the defendant, Department of Agriculture and Markets, to vacate and set aside an order made by the Department on December 30, 1937, by which the plaintiff was denied a license for 1938 as a milk dealer under sec. 100.03, Stats. Subsequently the State of Wisconsin was joined as a defendant. The Department filed an answer denying that plaintiff was entitled to the vacation of the order. Upon a trial of the action on the pleadings and a return made by the Department under sec. 102.23, Stats., the court concluded that there were no legal findings in support of the order and therefore entered judgment vacating it. The defendants appealed from that judgment.

FOWLER, J., dissenting.Orland S. Loomis, Atty. Gen., R. M. Orchard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fred M. Wylie, Sp. Counsel, of Milwaukee and Ralf T. Runge, of Madison, for appellants.

Wilbershide, Baumblatt & Storms, of Racine, for respondent.

FRITZ, Justice.

[1][2][3][4] During 1936 and 1937 the plaintiff, Louis Buhler, Sr., was a retail milk dealer under licenses issued by the defendant, Department of Agriculture and Markets (hereinafter called the Department). On November 24, 1937, a complaint was served on the plaintiff in which the Department charged that,-

“2. Said Louis Buhler, Sr., has violated the provisions of General Order 56g7 of the Department of Agriculture and Markets,applicable in the Racine regulated milk market by failing to pay producers for milk and cream delivered to him by such producers in the months of August, September, and October, 1937, at the prices required by said general order, and also by failing to pay such producers for milk and cream delivered to him by them in said months at the times required by said general order.

“3. Said Louis Buhler, Sr., is unfit and unequipped by reason of insufficient financial resources and responsibility for the business of a milk dealer.

“Wherefore the department gives notice of a hearing *** to determine the truth of the foregoing allegations and to determine what order shall be issued if said allegations prove to be true.”

In answer thereto Buhler denied that he had failed to pay for deliveries by producers at the prices required by the general order; but admitted that he had failed sometimes to pay therefor within the period prescribed by the order. He denies that he was unfit and unequipped by reason of insufficient financial resources and responsibility to be a milk dealer, and alleged that he had incorporated and would shortly arrange to get over $9,000 additional capital into the business. Before there was a hearing pursuant to the complaint Buhler applied for a new license for 1938, and at a hearing on December 8, 1937, he and the Department stipulated that the hearing on the application to revoke his 1937 license should govern the Department in determining whether a license should be issued for 1938. After a final hearing on December 28, 1937, the Department signed and entered the following findings, conclusions and order on December 30, 1937, to-wit:

“Proceedings having been had under section 100.03 (4) (c) of the statutes, upon notice, complaint and hearing, upon application of Louis Buhler, Sr., (Mari-Gold Dairy) for dealer license under section 100.03 of the statutes.

“Now, therefore, upon such proceedings and upon the evidence therein, the Department makes the following

“Findings and Conclusions

“The allegations of the complaint are established and the applicant is unfit and unqualified for the business.

“Wherefore, upon the proceedings and the evidence and the foregoing findings and conclusions, the Department issues the following

“Special Order

“The application of Louis Buhler, Sr., (Mari-Gold Dairy), 1009 Monroe Avenue, Racine, Wisconsin, for 1938 dealer license under section 100.03 of the statutes is denied.

“Madison, Wisconsin, December 30, 1937.

“By the Department:

“Charles L. Hill, Chairman.

“R. Schultheiss, Commissioner.”

That order was vacated and set aside by the court in this action on the ground that “there are no legal findings whatever” as basis therefor; and that as the statute required the Department to issue licenses to applicants who are “fit and equipped” for the business, it was without power to deny a license upon a finding that an applicant was “unfit and unqualified”. The statutory provisions applicable to the issuance, denial or revocation of such a license, and to the powers, findings of fact and orders of the Department, and the judicial review thereof, are as follows:

“(4)(a) No person shall engage in business as a dealer without a license therefor under this section ***.

“(b) *** All licenses shall expire on December thirty-first in the year for which issued.

“(c) The department shall issue license to each person making proper application and who is fit and equipped for the business. License may be denied, suspended or revoked by special order after notice and hearing as provided in section 93.18, when the applicant or licensee is unfit or unequipped for the business.

“(d) Under paragraph (c) the department shall consider, in addition to other matters, the character and conduct, including past compliance or noncompliance with law, of the applicant or any person to be connected with the business, and the financial responsibility of the applicant. The department may at any time require an applicant or licensee to file with it a surety bond conditioned for the prompt delivery of the price to producers.

*************

“(7) All questions of fact under this section shall be determined by the department, in written findings, and the provisions for judicial review of orders or regulations made under this section shall be as prescribed in chapter 102 in so far as the provisions thereof are applicable.”

It is true that in so far as there can be deemed to be any finding of fact in the Department's so-called “findings and conclusions”, upon which its special order denying the license is based, the findings are so general,-instead of specific,-in form, and but mixed conclusions of fact and law to such an extent, that they do not fairly or reasonably comply with the requirement in subsec. (7) of sec. 100.03, Stats., that “all questions of fact under this section shall be determined by the department, in written findings.” As the learned Circuit Judged rightly stated in his decision,-

“Unfortunately the record is in a deplorable condition. *** No record dealing with human rights should be in the condition this record is in. While it is not expected that hearings held by state commissions and state departments shall measure up to the strict rules demanded in judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the findings made by the state commissions and state departments are just as far reaching within their respective fields as are the judgments of courts. Furthermore, it must always be remembered that a litigant has the same right to a full, fair and orderly hearing before a state commission or a state department as in a court of justice. A denial of a right or a loss of property is just as much and as serious a denial of legal right, or legal loss, whether it results from a hearing held before a state commission or a state department, or whether it results from a hearing held in a court room. The necessity for a full, fair and orderly hearing before a state commission or a state department is all the more required because it forms the sole basis of the findings by such commission or such department, and such findings are binding upon this court and the Supreme Court, if there is any credible evidence to sustain such findings.”

The importance of and necessity for specific and adequate findings as to all disputed ultimate facts essential as basis for decisions and orders made by administrative departments or commissions, as well as by judicial tribunals has been repeatedly emphasized by this court in a number of cases. See Tesch v. Industrial Commission, 200 Wis. 616, 229 N.W. 194;State ex rel. Progreso D. Co. v. Brokers Board, 202 Wis. 155, 231 N.W. 628;United Shoe Workers v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board, Wis., 279 N.W. 37;Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., Wis., 279 N.W. 673, decided May 17, 1938. For the reasons stated therein, the practice prescribed should be fairly and fully complied with by every department and commission, as well as judicial tribunal, in deciding any matters within its jurisdiction in relation to rights, duties or obligations of parties thereto. This court's criticisms (in such cases as Milwaukee Nat. Bank v. Gallun, 116 Wis. 74, 92 N.W. 567;Burke v. Sidra Bay Co., 116 Wis. 137, 141, 92 N.W. 568;Chippewa Bridge Co. v. Durand, 122 Wis. 85, 91, 92, 99 N.W. 603, 106 Am.St.Rep. 931;Closuit v. John Arpin Lumber Co., 130 Wis. 258, 261, 262, 110 N.W. 222) of findings in such general form as “all allegations of the complaint are proved” etc., and the absence of specific findings as to the essential ultimate facts in dispute, are as applicable to findings made by official administrative agencies as they are to findings made by courts. However, it has also been frequently held that absence of such specific findings does not necessarily constitute reversible error, and that such findings through general in form may nevertheless be sufficient to support the adjudication. Wrigglesworth v. Wrigglesworth, 45 Wis. 255; Milwaukee Nat. Bank v. Gallun, supra; Farmer v. St. Croix Power Co., 117 Wis. 76, 93 N.W. 830, 98 Am.St.Rep. 914; Chippewa Bridge Co. v. Durand, supra; Wallis v. First Nat. Bank, 155 Wis. 533, 145 N.W. 195;Finkelstein v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 217 Wis. 433, 438, 259 N.W. 254.

In the case at bar the appellants contend that if findings in the...