Buice v. Dixon
| Citation | 157 S.E.2d 481,223 Ga. 645 |
| Decision Date | 21 September 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 24284,24284 |
| Parties | M. M. BUICE et al. v. P. K. DIXON, Member of Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of ClaytonCounty et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Wesley G. Bailey, II, Jonesboro, for appellants.
John R. McCannon, Jonesboro, for appellees.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
M. M. Buice and Mack A. Carnes, citizens and taxpayers of Clayton County, brought an action in the Superior Court of Clayton County against P. K. Dixon, James A. Duncan and Tommy Vaughn, as members of the board of commissioners of roads and revenues of said county and two named auditors. The petition alleges that said members of the board of commissioners of roads and revenues are required by Sec. 14 of Ga.L.1966, p. 2723, Ga.L. 1967, p. 3058, to have conducted an annual audit of the financial affairs, books and records of said county as therein provided; that the auditors are required to submit a complete and final report and audit in accordance with said section to said board of commissioners not later than 120 days after the close of the fiscal year; that the fiscal year closed on December 31, 1966; that the time has expired within which such complete and final report was to have been submitted; and that said commissioners and auditors of said county have failed and refused to comply with these laws. The prayers are for process; that the court find the members of said board have not faithfully discharged the duties of their office, that they have failed to carry out the provisions of said statutes to the best interest of said county; that the court forfeit the bonds of the defendants; that the commissioners be directed to discharge the named auditors for nonperformance of duties; that the court direct the appointment of a county auditor with instructions to audit all records and comply with said laws; that the defendants be taxed for court costs; and for general relief. The defendants filed a general demurrer to the petition attacking Section 14 of the Act of 1966, as amended in 1967, on the ground that it violates the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution (Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III, Code Ann. § 2-103). The trial court sustained grounds 3 and 4 of the demurrer and the exception is to said rulings only. Held:
Section 2 of the Act of 1966 struck section 14 of the original Act of 1955 (Ga.L.1955, p. 2064, as amended) creating a board of commissioners of roads and revenues for Clayton County and substituted in lieu thereof a new Section 14 providing for the audit of said county's financial affairs annually and the procedure to be followed therein. Subsection 14(f) of the Act of 1966 provides: 'In the event the board of commissioners of roads and revenues should fail or refuse to perform the duties set out above, then, in that event, upon the application of any taxpayer of Clayton County to the Judge of the Superior Court of Clayton County, the Judge of the Superior Court after hearing all facts from all parties concerning the issues raised in the application may issue any order he deems necessary.' Section 14(f) was not changed by the 1967 amendment. Ground 3 of the demurrer of the defendants alleges that Sec. 14(f) of the Act of 1966 violates the due process clause of the Constitution of Georgia (Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III, Code Ann. § 2-103) in that the section referred to does not provide for notice to the defendants, for service upon the defendants, nor does it place them upon notice so that they may adequately prepare a defense for any charges brought against them as is contemplated by the Constitution. Ground 4 asserts that said Section 14(f) violates the due process clause in that it is so vague and indefinite that it would allow the judge of the superior court to 'issue any order he deems necessary'-this being a phrase so broad in scope as to defy the most learned legal mind-that the defendants herein could thereby be subjected to extreme cruel and inhumane punishment, intimidated and stripped of all their rights, authority, and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Georgia.
It is an established rule that all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature and that it cannot be lawfully set aside by the court unless the alleged conflict with the Constitution is plain and palpable. Mayes v. Daniel, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535; Robitzsch v. State, 189 Ga. 637(2b) 7 S.E.2d 387). "(A) legislative body should always be presumed to mean something by the passage of an act' and an act should not be so construed as to render it 'absolutely...
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In re C. H.
...that "all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature" (punctuation omitted)); Buice v. Dixon, 223 Ga. 645, 647, 157 S.E.2d 481 (1967) ( "[I]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that all statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full k......
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...a question of fact which does not overcome the presumption that the statute is constitutional. See generally Buice v. Dixon, 223 Ga. 645, 646–647, 157 S.E.2d 481 (1967). Accordingly, we find that OCGA § 49–4–146.1(b)(2) as applied in this case is not unconstitutionally vague and we affirm t......
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