Builders Ass'n of Metro. Pittsburgh v. City of Pittsburgh
| Decision Date | 03 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-706-RJC |
| Parties | BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN PITTSBURGH, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, COREY LAYMAN, in his official capacity as Zoning Administrator of the City of Pittsburgh, KAREN ABRAMS, in her official capacity as Director of City Planning of the City of Pittsburgh, and SARAH KINTER, in her official capacity as Director of Permits, Licenses, and Inspections of the City of Pittsburgh, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Before the Court is Defendants, City of Pittsburgh, Corey Layman Karen Abrams, and Sarah Kinter's, in their official capacities, (collectively, “the City”) Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Also before the Court is a Motion to Intervene filed by Lawrenceville United, the Bloomfield Development Corporation the Polish Hill Civic Association, the Hill District Consensus Group, and the Fair Housing Partnership of Greater Pittsburgh (collectively, “Intervenors”). The Motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff, Builders Association of Metropolitan Pittsburgh (“BAMP”) filed its Complaint on May 12, 2022. (ECF No. 1). On August 15, 2022, the City filed its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29) and its Brief in Support. (ECF No. 30). On October 31, 2022, BAMP filed its Opposition to the City's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 44) and its Brief in Opposition. (ECF No. 45). The City filed its Reply Brief on November 18, 2022. (ECF No. 48).
The Intervenors filed their Motion to Intervene on August 15, 2022, (ECF No. 31) along with Exhibits (ECF No. 32) and their Brief in Support. (ECF No. 33). Along with their Motion to Intervene, the Intervenors filed their proposed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) and their Brief in Support of their proposed Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 35). BAMP filed their Brief in Opposition to the Intervenors' Motion to Intervene on August 25, 2022. (ECF No. 36). The Intervenors filed their Reply Brief on September 1, 2022. (ECF No. 39).
Broadly speaking, BAMP alleges that that the IZ-O, Inclusionary Housing Zoning Ordinance (“IZO”) enacted by the City on May 2, 2022, is unconstitutional. BAMP is a non-profit trade association “with a membership comprised, in part, of businesses that specialize in residential construction and development, including at times on land owned by such businesses, in and around the City of Pittsburgh and Western Pennsylvania.” Compl. ¶ 4.
BAMP alleges that the IZO creates “Inclusionary Zoning Districts” in certain areas of the City, including Lower, Central, and Upper Lawrenceville, Bloomfield, and Polish Hill. Compl. ¶ 30. BAMP further alleges that the IZO applies to both new constructions and substantial improvements to buildings that contain:
BAMP alleges that for the above identified subject properties, ten percent of all units must be set aside as “Inclusionary Units” that will be rented or sold at below-market prices. Id. at ¶33. BAMP further alleges that the IZO requires the Inclusionary Units be equal to the market rate units in all ways and that the core amenities must be shared with no additional charges or restrictions to the individuals renting or purchasing the Inclusionary Units. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. BAMP makes further allegations concerning the requirements and application of the IZO that are not relevant to the instant motion.
BAMP alleges that the IZO violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at ¶¶ 50, 73. Further, BAMP alleges that the IZO violates both Article IX, sec. 2 (“the Home Rule Law”) and Article VIII, sec. 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at ¶¶ 85, 95.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the “court's ‘very power to hear the case.'” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mortensen v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). The party asserting the existence of federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction over the subject matter actually exists. Brown v. Tucci, Civil Action No. 12-1769, 2013 WL 2190145 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2013) (citing Development Finance Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995)).
There are two types of Rule 12(b)(1) motions. A “facial” attack assumes that the allegations of the complaint are true, but contends that the pleadings fail to present an action within the court's jurisdiction. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
In reviewing a facial attack, “the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 243 (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a facial attack calls for a district court to apply the same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.
Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). A “factual” attack, on the other hand, argues that, while the pleadings themselves facially establish jurisdiction, one or more of the factual allegations is untrue, causing the case to fall outside the court's jurisdiction. Id. In such a case, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations” and the court must evaluate the merits of the disputed allegations because “the trial court's ... very power to hear the case” is at issue. Id. With a factual attack, the Court is free to consider evidence outside the pleadings and weigh that evidence. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 n.3; see also Gould Elecs., Inc. v. U.S., 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). “[T]he existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 n.3 (quoting Mortenson, 549 F.2d at 891).
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will likely prevail on the merits; rather, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court of the United States has explained:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that “a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). The court explained:
First, it must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, it should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) . Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that...
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