Bulala v. Boyd, 890900
| Citation | 389 S.E.2d 670,239 Va. 218 |
| Decision Date | 02 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 890900,890900 |
| Parties | R.A. BULALA, M.D., et al. v. Helen C. BOYD, et al. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Ronald D. Hodges (Phillip C. Stone, Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, Harrisonburg, on brief), for appellant R.A. Bulala, M.D.
No brief or argument for appellant Com.
William O.P. Snead, III, Andre M. Rybicki, Fairfax (J. Randolph Parker, Tucker & Parker, on brief), for appellees.
Present: CARRICO, C.J., COMPTON, STEPHENSON, RUSSELL, WHITING and LACY, JJ., and POFF, Senior Justice.
Justice RUSSELL delivered Parts I, II, III, IV, VII, and VIII of the opinion of the Court.
Justice COMPTON delivered Parts V and VI of the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice CARRICO, and Justices STEPHENSON, WHITING, and LACY join.
Pursuant to Rule 5:42, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, on 1. Where there are two or more plaintiffs entitled to recover damages arising from the same act or acts of medical malpractice, does § 8.01-581.15 apply individually to each plaintiff or overall to two or more such plaintiffs? If the statute does apply to all or any combination of plaintiffs' claims, how is it to be apportioned among them?
July 28, 1989, certified to this Court six questions of Virginia law, which we accepted by order entered September 25, 1989. The certified questions are stated as follows:
2. Does § 8.01-581.15 apply to damages for the infliction of emotional distress arising from some act or acts of medical malpractice?
3. Does § 8.01-581.15 apply to an award of punitive damages for an act or acts of medical malpractice?
4. Does Virginia law allow recovery for the loss of enjoyment of life when death results from an act or acts of medical malpractice?
5. Does Virginia law allow Veronica Boyd to recover damages for her lost earning capacity based upon the evidence presented in this case?
6. What is the effect, under Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-21, 8.01-25, and 8.01-56, of Veronica Boyd's death after verdict but before judgment in this case?
The facts, which are substantially undisputed, are set forth in the opinion of the federal court, Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir.1989). A brief summary will be sufficient for our purposes. R.A. Bulala, M.D., an obstetrician and gynecologist, had a physician-patient relationship with Helen C. Boyd during Mrs. Boyd's pregnancy. Mrs. Boyd's child was expected in late February 1982, but on the morning of January 31 Mrs. Boyd was admitted to Clinch Valley Community Hospital in active labor. A nurse called Dr. Bulala at his home about 4:00 a.m. to notify him of Mrs. Boyd's admission, but Dr. Bulala chose to remain at home, about 20 minutes from the hospital, leaving Mrs. Boyd to be monitored by the nursing staff. Dr. Bulala had a standing order at the hospital that, in the absence of complications, he was not to be summoned until labor reached the "crowning" stage, meaning that stage at which the child's head comes into view. For that reason, the nurses did not call Dr. Bulala when Mrs. Boyd reached the second stage of labor, around 7:00 a.m.
About 7:45 a.m., the nurses discovered that the fetal heart rate had dropped far below normal, indicating an acute oxygen insufficiency. The danger to the unborn child had probably existed for an hour, but had not been discovered because of inadequate monitoring. About 8:00 a.m., a nurse called Dr. Bulala at home, and informed him of the complications. The nurses immediately took Mrs. Boyd to the delivery room, where she gave birth to a child, Veronica Lynn Boyd. As a result of the asphyxiation, Veronica suffered grave and permanent birth defects. Dr. Bulala arrived after the birth.
Veronica lived only from January 31, 1982 until March 10, 1985. She died after the verdicts were returned in the trial court, but before judgment was entered. Uncontroverted expert testimony established that Veronica was afflicted with cerebral palsy, would never be able to walk, would never mentally develop beyond the level of a one-year-old child, and, if she had survived, would have required institutional care all her life.
Helen C. Boyd, Roger E. Boyd, her husband, and Veronica, by her parents and next friends, brought this civil action against Dr. Bulala by complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. The case was transferred to the Western District of Virginia, Charlottesville Division. The mother's claim was based upon medical malpractice, alleging bodily injury including perineal tearing due The case was tried by jury over a period of six days. On January 21, 1985, the jury returned the following separate verdicts against Dr. Bulala:
to the defendant's failure to perform an episiotomy. In addition, Mrs. Boyd claimed damages for mental anguish arising from the birth of her profoundly impaired child. The father claimed damages arising from emotional distress. The child's claim was based upon her personal injuries. Veronica contended that she, as well as her mother, was Dr. Bulala's patient and that her claim also arose out of medical malpractice. The three plaintiffs did not claim separate awards of damages. Rather, their complaint concluded with an ad damnum clause demanding $6,800,000 compensatory damages and $800,000 punitive damages for the three plaintiffs jointly.
(1) For Veronica Boyd
Compensatory damages -- $1,850,000
(2) For Veronica Boyd
Punitive damages -- 1,000,000
(3) For Helen Boyd
Compensatory damages -- 1,575,000
(4) For Helen Boyd
Punitive damages -- 1,000,000
(5) For Roger Boyd
Compensatory damages -- 1,175,000
(6) For Helen and Roger Boyd
(medical expenses until Veronica reaches 18 years of age) -- 1,700,000
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Total verdicts $8,300,000
At the conclusion of the trial, Dr. Bulala moved the court, among other things, to reduce the verdicts to $750,000, the maximum amount recoverable under the medical malpractice cap contained in Code § 8.01-581.15. The plaintiffs argued that Code § 8.01-581.15 was unconstitutional. While the district court had this motion under consideration, Veronica Boyd died. Dr. Bulala moved for a new trial, asking that Veronica Boyd's action for personal injuries be converted into an action for wrongful death pursuant to Code §§ 8.01-25 and 8.01-56.
On November 5, 1986, the district court issued its opinion, Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F.Supp. 781 (W.D.Va.1986), holding that the medical malpractice cap of § 8.01-581.15 infringed the right of jury trial guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. The court overruled Dr. Bulala's motions and entered judgment in the full amounts awarded by the jury. The Commonwealth of Virginia and the United States, by leave of court, appeared as amici curiae and filed briefs requesting reconsideration of the court's ruling. On November 12, 1987, the district court issued its opinion denying the motions to reconsider, Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F.Supp. 915 (W.D.Va.1987).
Five days later, Dr. Bulala moved the court to amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), on the ground that the plaintiffs had, in 1982, brought a medical malpractice action in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, Virginia, on the same facts, against Dr. Bulala and Humedicenter, Inc., had settled with Humedicenter for $650,000 and had nonsuited Dr. Bulala. The district court granted the motion, crediting the $650,000 against the four verdicts for compensatory damages in the same proportion each verdict bore to the sum of the four. Boyd v. Bulala, 678 F.Supp. 612 (W.D.Va.1988). The court entered final judgment on the verdicts, as amended, by order entered February 2, 1988.
Dr. Bulala's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit raised, among others, the question of the constitutionality of the medical malpractice cap contained in Code § 8.01-581.15. During the pendency of the appeal, however, this Court, in Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989), upheld the constitutionality of the Medical Malpractice Act. The United States Court of Appeals concurred with this Court's conclusion that the medical malpractice cap offends no provision of the Federal Constitution, followed this Court's determination in Etheridge that the cap offends no provision of the Virginia Constitution, decided certain issues, and certified to this Court the questions of law stated above. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir.1989).
The United States Court of Appeals decided the following state-law questions: (1) A jury instruction on agency was proper. There was evidence to support the plaintiffs'
contention that the nurses acted under Dr. Bulala's direction, rendering him vicariously liable for their negligence. (2) Roger Boyd, the father, was entitled to recover damages for emotional distress arising from the birth of his impaired child. Recognizing that Virginia law does not ordinarily permit such damages in the absence of physical injury, the Court of Appeals determined that the case fits within an exception to the physical-injury requirement created by our decision in Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982). 1 (3) There was sufficient evidence of negligence on Dr. Bulala's part " 'so willful or wanton as to evince a conscious disregard' of plaintiffs' rights," to warrant submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d at 1198 (quoting Booth v....
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