Bulfin v. Rainwater
| Decision Date | 12 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:20 CV 689 JMB |
| Parties | ERIN BULFIN, Plaintiff, v. BECKY RAINWATER, et al., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. EDWARD NEA, Third-Party Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Edward Nea's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. The issues are fully briefed.1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Plaintiff Erin Bulfin alleges that she made arrangements with St. Louis County's Animal Care and Control (ACC) to quarantine her dog Daisy for ten days after Daisy allegedly bit someone. Her husband Edward Nea took Daisy to ACC and completed paperwork. Instead of quarantining Daisy, however, defendants euthanized her. Plaintiff filed suit against St. Louis County; ACC's director Vanessa Duris; ACC employees Becky Rainwater, Renita Hawkins, andMaryanne Willis; and contract veterinarian Philip Wagenknecht. Defendants claim that plaintiff's husband Edward Nea approved euthanizing Daisy and bring third-party claims for contribution and fraud against him. In the event that their claims are dismissed, defendants alternatively seek joinder of Mr. Nea pursuant to Rules 19, 20, or 21, Fed.R.Civ.P. Nea moves to dismiss, arguing that contribution is not available for plaintiff's claims and that the defendants' fraud claim is not pleaded with particularity as required by Rule 9, Fed.R.Civ.P.
According to allegations in plaintiff's complaint, her dog Daisy allegedly bit someone on December 26, 2019. The next day, plaintiff called ACC to get information regarding mandatory quarantine. She spoke with someone2 who confirmed that Daisy had to be quarantined for 10 days. Plaintiff was told she could quarantine Daisy at ACC, a veterinarian, or a boarding facility. Plaintiff was not told that she also had the option of quarantining Daisy at home. She sought and received assurances that Daisy would not be euthanized during the 10-day quarantine.
A few hours after plaintiff called the ACC, Nea took Daisy to the ACC shelter to be quarantined. When he arrived, Nea spoke with defendant Hawkins.3 He expressly stated that Daisy was to be quarantined and that he did not want Daisy euthanized. Ms. Hawkins assured Nea that Daisy would not be euthanized and that he and plaintiff could visit Daisy during the quarantine. Defendant Willis scanned Daisy's microchip, which disclosed that "Erin Nea" was Daisy's registered owner and provided the owner's phone number.4 No one asked Mr. Nea any questions regarding his relationship to Erin Nea or Daisy. No one contacted Erin Nea at the registered phone number.
Defendant Hawkins completed a form entitled "Animal Bite/Injury Reporting Form." She entered January 6, 2020, as the conclusion of the 10-day quarantine period. She also completed a form entitled "St. Louis County Department of Public Health - Animal Care & Control." The form included provisions that inaccurately stated that the animal had not bitten anyone within the last ten days and that the person relinquishing the animal was its owner or custodian. Defendant Hawkins checked a box marked "(ORE) OWNER REQUESTS EUTHANASIA" (the "ORE box"). She did not discuss the significance of this checkmark with Mr. Nea before asking him to sign in three places and he did not read the form before he signed it. Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that defendant Rainwater was in an adjacent office where she could see and hear the interaction between Nea and Hawkins. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Rainwater reviewed the documents Hawkins completed.
Defendant Rainwater told defendants Wagenknecht and Duris that Daisy had been surrendered as a "bite case." Defendant Wagenknecht euthanized Daisy shortly after Nea left her at the ACC facility.
Late on December 27, 2019, plaintiff learned that she had the option of quarantining Daisy at home. The next morning, she went to the ACC shelter to pick her up. When she arrived, defendant Rainwater told plaintiff that Daisy had been euthanized the day before and that a specimen had been sent to the State veterinarian for analysis. No one notified the microchip identification company that Daisy had been euthanized and, as a result, plaintiff received multiple emails telling her that her dog had been found and could be picked up at ACC.
Plaintiff alleges that, in July 2019, defendant St. Louis County released the results of an audit of ACC. The audit was highly critical of ACC's policies and practices regarding owner requested euthanasia, and recommended that St. Louis County immediately stop having owners ofsurrendered animals check and initial the ORE box. The audit made other recommendations regarding surrendered animals that plaintiff alleges were not followed in this instance.5
On May 26, 2020, plaintiff filed suit, asserting against the individual defendants claims for unlawful seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988,6 malicious trespass to personalty pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.330,7 conversion,8 intentional infliction of emotional distress,9 and negligent infliction of emotional distress.10 She additionally asserts claims for veterinary malpractice pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. §340.285 against defendants Duris and Wagenknecht11 and a claim for failure to intervene pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1988 against director Duris.12 Finally, she asserts § 1983 claims against St. Louis County for unlawful pattern, practice or custom; and failure to train, supervise, or discipline.13
On March 23, 2021, defendants filed a third-party complaint against Edward Nea, seeking contribution under a theory of common-law negligence (Count I) and bringing a separate claim for fraud (Count II). They allege the existence of Ms. Bulfin's lawsuit against them, that Nea held himself out as Daisy's owner when he surrendered her, and that he demanded that she be euthanized. Nea moves to dismiss the third-party complaint.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint mustcontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief "must include sufficient factual information to provide the 'grounds' on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, even if it appears that "actual proof of those facts is improbable," and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The principle that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ().
Under Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." Rule 9(b)'s "particularity requirement demands a higher degree of notice than that required for other claims," and "is intended to enable the defendant to respond specifically and quickly to the potentially damaging allegations." U.S. ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). To satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), the complaint must plead such facts as the time, place, and content of the defendant's false representations, as well as the details of the defendant's fraudulent acts, including when the acts occurred, who engaged in them, and what was obtained as a result. Id. Under Rule 9(b), aplaintiff must plead "such matters as the time, place and contents of false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what was obtained or given up thereby." In other words, the party must typically identify the "who, what, where, when, and how" of the alleged fraud. Id. The level of particularity required depends on, inter alia, the nature of the case and the relationship between the parties. BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Id. "Conclusory allegations that a defendant's conduct was fraudulent and deceptive are not sufficient to satisfy the rule." Id. (citation omitted).
Third-party defendant Nea argues that: (1) as a matter of law, there is no right to third-party contribution for § 1983 claims; (2) Missouri's intentional misconduct rule bars contribution arising from intentional torts; (3) defendants failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to support a claim for contribution for negligence or negligent misrepresentation; and (4) defendants failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff can hold a defendant liable for a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. While the statute provides for the liability of a constitutional tortfeasor, it is silent on whether that tortfeasor can seek contribution or indemnification from others. Dudley v. City of Kinston, No. 4:18-CV-00072-D, 2020 WL 6889200, at *3 (E.D....
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