Bulger v. Curtis
| Decision Date | 16 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-10476-BC.,00-10476-BC. |
| Citation | 328 F.Supp.2d 692 |
| Parties | Gregory R. BULGER, Petitioner, v. Bruce CURTIS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
David A. Moran, Detroit, MI, for Petitioner.
Brenda E. Turner, Laura G. Moody, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
Petitioner Gregory Bulger, a state prisoner presently confined at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner pleaded guilty in the Saginaw County Circuit Court on July 10, 1995 to possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine and possession of marijuana. He was subsequently sentenced to six to twenty years of imprisonment on the cocaine conviction and a concurrent jail sentence on the marijuana conviction. In his pleadings, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the assistance of counsel in seeking leave to appeal his convictions in violation of his federal constitutional rights. The Court agrees that the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated, and further finds that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision holding otherwise was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the Court will conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and direct the State of Michigan either to appoint counsel to assist the petitioner in his pursuit of leave to appeal his convictions or release him from its unlawful custody.
On July 10, 1995, in the Saginaw County Circuit Court, the petitioner pleaded guilty to counts I and V of a criminal information filed against him charging him with possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine (count I) and possession of marijuana (Count V). He also pleaded guilty to being an habitual offender, third offense. In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss counts II, III, IV, and VI of the information. See July 10, 1995 Plea Hearing Tr. at 4. At the plea hearing, the defendant, under oath, stated that he understood the nature of the charges made against him, he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty to the charges, he understood the possible sentence that could be imposed as a result of his guilty plea, and he was waiving his right to jury trial. The following colloquy then took place between the court and the petitioner:
The Court: Do you understand that since you are voluntarily pleading guilty, that any appeal from the conviction and sentence pursuant to your plea of guilty will be by Application for Leave to Appeal and not as a matter of right; in other words, the appellate court is not obligated to hear your appeal if they choose not to do so?
Defendant: Yes.
On August 17, 1995, the petitioner was sentenced to six to twenty years with 145 days credit on count I, and a concurrent term of 145 days in the county jail with credit for time served on count V. The court stated the following at the sentencing hearing:
You're entitled to an appellate review of your conviction and sentence. If you cannot afford to hire an attorney to represent you on appeal, the Court will appoint an attorney and furnish the attorney with the portions of the transcript and record that the attorney needs.
Request for the appointment of an attorney must be made in writing, sent directly to me at my address here in the courthouse within 42 days.
I'm handing your attorney written notice of your right to timely appeal, ask that you sign same indicating you received your appeal rights
August 17, 1995 Sentencing Hearing Tr. at 7-8.
Following sentencing, the petitioner timely requested the appointment of appellate counsel, alleging that he could not afford to hire an attorney of his own choosing because he lacked the financial resources to do so. The trial court denied the request because his conviction was the result of a voluntary plea of guilty. People v. Bulger, No. 95-10587-FH-5 (Saginaw Co. Cir. Ct. Sept. 18, 1995). The petitioner and thirteen other indigent Saginaw County defendants who had been convicted on their respective guilty pleas filed a complaint against the trial court in the Michigan Supreme Court. That court dismissed the complaint, but remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to appoint counsel for the limited purpose of filing a motion with the trial court concerning whether the petitioner and the other complainants were entitled to the appointment of appellate counsel. Bulger v. Judges of Tenth Cir., 562 N.W.2d 200 (Mich.1997).
On remand, the trial court appointed the State Appellate Defender Officer to represent the petitioner on his motion and any related appeals. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court again denied the petitioner's request for appointed appellate counsel, finding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require appointment of appellate counsel. People v. Bulger, 95010587-FH-5 (Saginaw Co. Cir. Ct. Jan. 8, 1998). The petitioner filed an appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration in light of an intervening Michigan appellate decision. People v. Bulger, No. 209031 (Mich.Ct.App. July 21, 1998).
The petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was granted. In a 4-2 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court held that indigent defendants who plead guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo contendere do not have a federal constitutional right to counsel for the purpose of appealing their plea-based convictions or sentences to the Michigan appellate courts. The Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Michigan Court of Appeal's order of remand and instructed the petitioner to proceed with his appeal without the assistance of appointed appellate counsel. People v. Bulger, 462 Mich. 495, 614 N.W.2d 103 (Mich.2000). The petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Bulger v. Michigan, 531 U.S. 994, 121 S.Ct. 486, 148 L.Ed.2d 459 (2000).
The petitioner then filed through counsel the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus on December 13, 2000 asserting that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel when the Michigan courts refused to appoint counsel to assist him in seeking leave for review of his guilty-plea-based convictions in his first appeal to the state intermediate appellate court. The respondent filed an answer to the petition on June 7, 2001 asserting that it should be denied for lack of merit. The petitioner filed a reply to that answer on June 15, 2001, and the respondent answered that reply on June 26, 2001.
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), govern this case because the petitioner filed this habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). That Act "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering applications for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, ___, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2534, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003).
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir.1998). Mere error by the state court will not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court's application of federal law "must have been objectively unreasonable." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2535 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); internal quotes omitted). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir.1995) ().
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. ...
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
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