Bullard Company v. General Electric Company
Decision Date | 28 June 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 9866.,9866. |
Citation | 348 F.2d 985 |
Parties | The BULLARD COMPANY, Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Theodore S. Kenyon, New York City (Robert E. Taylor, Charlottesville, Va., George E. Faithfull, James H. Callahan, New York City and Paul M. Geist, Bridgeport, Conn., and Taylor, Camblos, Michie & Callaghan, Charlottesville, Va., on brief), for appellant.
Laurence B. Dodds, Little Neck, N. Y., and Melvin M. Goldenberg, Washington, D. C. (Leonard G. Muse, and Woods, Rogers, Muse & Walker, Roanoke, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before BRYAN and BELL, Circuit Judges, and LEWIS, District Judge.
Its two patents1 upon devices for control of an automatic machine tool were infringed, The Bullard Company complained to the District Court, by the General Electric Company.2 Denying the accusation, the latter counterclaimed for a judgment declaring the patents invalid. Decision went for GE solely on non-infringement, without any declaration upon the patents. On Bullard's appeal we affirm.
The patents comprise combination claims only. The master to whom the cause had been referred sustained the patents, and on the finding that GE's mechanism embraced, as equivalents, all of the essential elements of the patents, he held GE to be an infringer. Without passing on the validity of the patents, the District Judge set aside the holding of infringement because, unlike the master, he concluded that GE's electronic means was not an equivalent of the patents' mechanical means of operation.
We do not consider the master's appraisal of the patents or resolve this issue of equivalents, for we think his finding that GE's machine contained all of the vital elements of Bullard's claims is not supported by the evidence and thus clearly erroneous. F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Because of this failure of the proof we find infringement has not been established.
The Bullard patents successively covered a device which exoterics could describe in the following manner. Its function is to direct and control a machine tool (the movable member) employed in making a part or parts of any mechanical equipment automatically. Further, this direction and control are applicable to general purpose machine tools as contrasted with tools usable for producing only a single item or unit, though repeatedly. Because the device may direct the tool in variable courses it is said to embody an intermittent control. It may be set, in advance, to send the tool into the performance of predetermined missions and, upon completion of one, to enter upon another and so on in sequence without overlapping or resetting. The paths to be travelled by the tool are programmed in the control device by inserting dogs or stops in the slots of a function or selecting drum or like means, and thereafter the dogs or stops, as the drum rotates, engage and activate the appropriate components to set in motion the desired point to point action of the tool. A sample piece of work must first be laid out, and its pattern run off manually, on the machine to ascertain the proper positioning of the dogs for automatically carrying out the intended job.
While the device in each of the patents is automatic, in No. 183 the operation is principally mechanical, while in No. 792 it is largely electronic. The main difference is the use of the motive power in stopping the progressive movement of the tool — to complete one step and ready ("index") it to undertake the next. This is done in 183 by the use of a companion piece which contacts an aptly positioned dog on a stop or detector drum to terminate that particular movement of the tool, thereupon signalling the function drum to turn to and obey the next set command. In 792 the stopping is achieved through electric circuit impedances.
The novel element, in the master's view, is the machine's "feed-back" ability, that is its relay to the function drum that it has reached its prescribed end-point and to set it on the next cycle. On this he says:
"A detailed consideration of Patent \'183 leads to the conclusion that the inventive idea of the patent is a method using feed-back of data and comparison of fed-back data with control data for controlling the operation of a machine on an automatic, intermittent, or point-to-point, universally flexible basis, controlling the performance of the machine in the ways in which a human operator would or could control it."
Again:
The accused GE device, known as GENPC, is described by the master in noting its differences from Bullard:
The master held with Bullard throughout, finding the feed-back principle of both its patents as new and as simulated by GE. His reason for finding infringement is thus stated:
The District Judge apparently distinguished GE from Bullard exclusively on the ground that GE's machine was an adaptation in its operation of electronics in the place of mechanics or partial electronics, representing a radical departure from the Bullard idea. On this premise he concluded that GE's device was not within the range of equivalents of Bullard, and so, GE had not infringed Bullard. GE, however, to sustain its argument of non-infringement, rests on the failure of Bullard to show an imitation by the NPC of the combination patented in 183 and 792.
It is unnecessary in this case, as we have already observed, to decide whether electronic is an equivalent of...
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