Bullard v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 13 March 1986
• Citation: 499 N.Y.S.2d 880,118 A.D.2d 447
• Parties: Ruthann BULLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 880

499 N.Y.S.2d 880

118 A.D.2d 447

Ruthann BULLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division First Department.

March 13, 1986

L.J. Lamatina, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant. F. Leoussis, New York City, for defendant-respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Wallach, J.), entered on October 25, 1984, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Richard Wallach, J., at Special Term, without costs and without disbursements.

All concur except KASSAL, J., who concurs in a memorandum as follows:

Special Term properly denied appellant's application for leave to file a late notice of

                claim, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5).  To conclude otherwise on this record would emasculate the standard enacted by the Legislature.  On October 29, 1982, appellant's son, Stacey, was on the subway tracks at 135th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue, when he was electrocuted, struck by a passing train and killed.  Shortly prior to this occurrence, at about 7:30 the same evening, he had been seen engaging in bizarre behavior, running and jumping up and down on St. Nicholas Avenue, walking in front of vehicles and crawling under a vehicle stopped at a traffic light.  A railroad clerk observed him come into the subway station and fall backwards over a turnstile, striking his head, before he "entered" the subway tracks.  He was pronounced dead on arrival at Bellevue Hospital and the matter was referred to the police missing person's unit to investigate and ascertain his identity.  The investigation was unsuccessful and he was buried anonymously in Potter's Field on November 11, 1982.  Appellant seeks to recover damages for her mental suffering resulting from the City's failure to notify her of her son's death and his subsequent burial in Potter's Field.  When Stacey did not return home on October 29 and 30, 1982, after expiration of the required 24-hour waiting period, appellant filed a missing person's report on October 31, 1982.  However, it was not until July 11, 1983, more than eight months later, that she was advised of her son's death and place of burial.  Although she claims that the news of his death was devastating, she, nevertheless, did report to her office the next day, July 12, and went to see her employer's medical director.  Some months later, she consulted an attorney at Legal Aid and was advised that her salary level made her ineligible for legal assistance.  In December 1983, she was referred by the NAACP to an attorney, whom she retained in January, 1984.  Between January and April 1984, her attorney actively represented her by attempting to secure the police department records of the investigation under the Freedom of Information Law.  However, no notice of claim was ever filed.  She retained her present counsel in August or September 1984 and a motion for permission to file a late notice of claim was made one month later, by order to show cause issued October 3, 1984.  Special Term denied the application, finding the proof adduced insufficient to substantiate the claim that plaintiff's mental condition prevented service of a notice of claim.  I agree but, in my view, application of well-settled legal principles to the facts in this case warrant further elaboration and treatment.  On an application for permission to file a late notice of claim against a government authority, it has been consistently held that the party seeking relief must give a satisfactory explanation for the delay (Matter of Morris v. County of Suffolk, 88 A.D.2d 956, 451 N.Y.S.2d 448, affd. 58 N.Y.2d 767, 459 N.Y.S.2d 38, 445 N.E.2d 214;  Rodriguez v. City of New York, 86 A.D.2d 533, 446 N.Y.S.2d 50;  Matter of Persi v. Churchville-Chili Central School District, 72 A.D.2d 946, 422 N.Y.S.2d 232).   Here, there was an unexcused delay of more than one year and three months in furnishing the required notice
                

MENTAL CAPACITY

In moving for relief, appellant claimed that when she learned of her son's death, she became "severely depressed and confused," was "not able to maintain my train of thought for any length of time" and "have alot [sic] of trouble sleeping at night." Undoubtedly, a tragic loss under these circumstanc is emotionally upsetting and may cause depression. But, without further factual proof, it does not rise to the level of "mental incapacity". Unquestionably, depression may range from severe and immobilizing, on the one hand, to mild and non-debilitating, on the other. However, the short, two-paragraph statement from her employer's medical director, Dr. Brayton, is palpably insufficient in that it is a general statement without specifics. He briefly reported that appellant was "distressed and grieving over the death of her son" and that she was referred to a counselor and a psychiatrist for treatment. The record, however, does not include a statement from either of these professionals as to whether treatment was ever rendered, and, if so, what it consisted of and their diagnoses. The absence of any definitive medical opinion by Dr. Brayton is somewhat perplexing, especially in view of appellant's claim in her affidavit that she had been "seeing" Dr. Brayton, who was her employer's psychiatrist. Appellant has not disclosed the name of the psychiatrist to whom she was allegedly referred by Brayton, nor does Brayton state that he in fact treated her. While Dr. Brayton opined that depression will "frequently" result in an inability to make decisions, no opinion was offered specifically dealing with plaintiff's condition or indicating that it incapacitated her for any period of time, thereby preventing her from filing a notice of claim. Clearly, the physician's statement does not set forth the extent of plaintiff's disabling condition with sufficient particularity so as to enable us to conclude that she was actually "incapacitated" within the terms of the statute. It does not contain "enough information from which the extent and duration of petitioner's disability can be ascertained" (Matter of Klobnock v. City of New York, 80 A.D.2d 854, 436 N.Y.S.2d 769). Nor does it establish that she was "disabled for such a substantial period of time following the accident so as to prevent [her] filing a timely notice of claim." (Ibid.) Rodriguez v. City of New York, supra, also involving a one year delay, is instructive. In that case, we affirmed an order denying leave to serve a late notice after finding the supporting affidavit "superficial" and insufficient to explain the delay or whether any medical attention was sought during the one year period:

"Upon the superficial affidavit submitted by the plaintiff, this court is left to speculate as to exactly what the plaintiff did and to whom he spoke during that period of delay. The plaintiff's silence on this point is totally unsatisfactory."

While I sympathize with the appellant on her great loss and the plight of all those in a similar situation who seek to file late notices of claim, the Legislature has prescribed firm standards and we may not disregard the clear language of the statute. The fact that plaintiff was unaware that the law imposed a requirement that a notice of claim be filed within a certain period of time is insufficient as a legal excuse (Figueroa v. City of New York, 92 A.D.2d 908, 460 N.Y.S.2d 119). Thus, the claim here that she was...