Bullock v. Gulf & Western Mfg.

• Decision Date: 16 November 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 61592
• Citation: 340 N.W.2d 294,128 Mich.App. 316
• Parties: John BULLOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GULF & WESTERN MANUFACTURING, Defendant-Appellee. 128 Mich.App. 316, 340 N.W.2d 294
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 294

340 N.W.2d 294

John BULLOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GULF & WESTERN MANUFACTURING, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 61592.

128 Mich.App. 316, 340 N.W.2d 294

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 3, 1983.

Decided June 24, 1983.

Released for Publication Nov. 16, 1983.

[128 MICHAPP 317] Cockrel, Cooper & King by Anthony J. Vigliotti, and David J. Cooper, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Vandeveer, Garzia, Tonkin, Kerr & Heaphy, P.C. by Ivin E. Kerr, and Gromek, Bendure & Thomas by Mark R. Bendure and Daniel J. Wright, Detroit, of counsel, for defendant-appellee.

[128 MICHAPP 318] Before BEASLEY, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and WAHLS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial in this products liability action, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

On October 26, 1976, plaintiff was injured when a ram descended upon his left hand as he was changing a broken punch in the course of his employment as a press operator at Detroit Steel Products (hereafter referred to as DSP). The machine involved was a Bliss 23M punch press, which was manufactured and sold in July of 1947. Defendant Gulf & Western is Bliss's successor company. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had manufactured an unsafe product and had negligently failed to warn him of its danger.

At trial, plaintiff challenged the safety design of the Bliss press on the ground that it required a safety device (guard) which was not provided by defendant. Plaintiff further alleged that the electrical interlock guard which was supplied by DSP was not adequate; defendant should have provided a mechanical interlock guard when it manufactured and delivered the press. Plaintiff alleged that his injury was foreseeable and that it was economically and practically feasible for defendant to have provided a mechanical interlock guard in 1947 when the press was manufactured.

At the close of proofs, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff had failed, as a matter of law, to establish a prima facie showing of a defect in the punch press attributable to defendant or that the absence of warning labels was a cause of plaintiff's injury. Defendant asserted that the press was harmless when it left [128 MICHAPP 319] defendant's control and that the hazard underlying plaintiff's injury was created by DSP, the user, when it added necessary components to create a point of operation. Defendant concluded that it would be unreasonable to impose upon it a duty to safeguard the point of operation. The trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on both the defective product and failure to warn theories.

We address first plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of defendant on the issue of whether there was a defect in the power press manufactured by defendant which caused plaintiff's injuries.

In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether the evidence establishes a prima facie case against the defendant. The motion should be granted only when there is no question for the trier of fact; that is, where all reasonable men would agree that there has been an essential failure of proof. Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich.App. 708, 712, 202 N.W.2d 727 (1972), lv. den. 388 Mich. 812 (1972); Caldwell v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 231 N.W.2d 46 (1975).

In products liability cases, in order to avoid a directed verdict in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff is obligated to produce evidence reasonably leading to the conclusion that the defendant supplied a product which was defective and that this defect caused the plaintiff's injury. Snider, supra, 42 Mich.App. p. 713, 202 N.W.2d 727; Caldwell, supra, 394 Mich. pp. 410-411, 231 N.W.2d 46.

When the plaintiff bases his or her claim on a negligence theory, as opposed to one sounding in implied warranty, he or she must make out a prima facie case establishing that the manufacturer[128 MICHAPP 320] breached its duty to use "reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances in planning or designing his product so that it is reasonably safe for the purposes for which it is intended". Farr v. Wheeler Manufacturing Corp., 24 Mich.App. 379, 386, 180 N.W.2d 311 (1970), lv. den. 385 Mich. 773 (1971).

Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, we fully agree with the trial judge that a directed verdict was proper. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence reasonably supporting the conclusion that the press supplied by Bliss was defective. Nor, for that matter, did plaintiff establish that his injury was caused by any defect in the press. There was no prima facie case which required submission to the jury.

Initially, we note that plaintiff is incorrect in asserting that the trial judge held that Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 411 Mich. 712, 311 N.W.2d 725 (1981), had abrogated the manufacturer's duty to exercise care for safety in designing its products. The trial judge merely stated that Fredericks was a part of the rationale for her decision.

Plaintiff is correct in stating that, for the most part, Fredericks deals with the issue of negligent entrustment in the context of an employee injured while operating a power press during the course of his employment. Defendant in that case was the owner of the die set being used at the time of injury. The plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently entrusted the die to his employer without a safety guard, and that the unguarded die was "defective". After holding that plaintiff did not prove negligent entrustment, however, the Court added:

"As an alternative to negligent entrustment plaintiff [128 MICHAPP 321] contends that an unguarded die is unreasonably dangerous and should, therefore, be considered 'defective', giving rise to products liability on the part of the supplier for personal injuries sustained by its use. Plaintiff argues that his injury was a result...