Bullock v. Harpole, 40781

• Decision Date: 12 May 1958
• Docket Number: No. 40781,40781
• Citation: 233 Miss. 486,102 So.2d 687
• Parties: George BULLOCK v. Bill HARPOLE, Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 687

102 So.2d 687

233 Miss. 486

George BULLOCK v. Bill HARPOLE, Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary.

No. 40781.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 12, 1958.

Paul D. Montjoy, Greenwood, Vincent F. Kilborn, Mobile, Ala., for appellant.

Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by J. R. Griffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

KYLE, Justice.

This case is before us on appeal by George Bullock, appellant, from a final order of the Honorable Arthur Jordan, presiding judge of the Circuit Court of Sunflower County, denying the relief prayed for in the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The record shows that the appellant was indicted at the February 1956 term of the Circuit Court of George County, for the crime of rape. The indictment was returned on February 15, 1956, and on that date the court appointed W. T. Bailey, a duly licensed attorney and a member of the Bar of George County, to represent the appellant in the trial of the case. The appellant was arraigned on February 20, 1956, and entered a plea of not guilty, and the trial was set for February 23, 1956. On that date the appellant appeared in open court with his attorney and withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the indictment returned against him. The plea of guilty was accepted by the court and a judgment was entered sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.

The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed on June 17, 1957, against the Superintendent of the State Penitentiary.

The petitioner alleged in his petition that he was being held and incarcerated by the said Superintendent by virtue of a commitment issued out of the Circuit Court of George County pursuant to the above mentioned judgment, and that his imprisonment was illegal, in that he had not been legally adjudicated guilty of rape upon the plea of guilty and the court was not empowered to fix the punishment of the petitioner upon a plea of guilty, for the reason that the sole power of fixing the punishment in such case was by the terms of the statute vested in the jury. The petitioner further alleged that the sentence imposed by the court was not authorized by law for the reason that the petitioner at the time the indictment was returned and at the time of the purported sentence was a minor 15 years of age; and that it was the duty of the court, upon the acceptance of the plea of guilty, to remand the petitioner to the Youth Court pursuant to the Youth Court Act of 1946 for further proceedings under that act. The petitioner further alleged that the indictment upon which he was sentenced was in contravention of Section 26 of the State Constitution. Finally, the petitioner alleged that the plea of guilty was not entered by him of his own free will, but under duress, fear and promise of reward, and after he had been advised by his counsel that the only alternative to escape the death penalty was to enter such plea of guilty.

The petitioner attached to his petition copies of the indictment, the orders of the court, and memoranda shown on the docket of the trial judge; also a copy of his birth certificate, and an affidavit signed by the petitioner, in which he stated facts substantially as follows: That after the case had been set for trial on February 23, 1956, petitioner was advised by his attorney, W. T. Bailey, that the attorney had asked the trial judge to continue the case in order that the attorney and his client might have ample time in which to prepare the case for trial, but the judge had refused to grant such continuance; that petitioner was further advised by his attorney that in his opinion it would be best for petitioner to request permission to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty; and that petitioner agreed to enter the plea of guilty only after he had talked to his attorney and after James Finch, another attorney, had told him that it would not be possible for him to represent him during the trial, that the community was badly prejudiced against him, and that he believed that if the petitioner chose to go to trial the jury would not hesitate to give him the extreme penalty. The petitioner also stated in his affidavit that he was not guilty of the crime charged against him; that he entered the plea of guilty because he was afraid to do otherwise; and that James T. Strickland, another attorney, told him that if he would plead guilty, he would get him out of prison within six months.

The petitioner offered no other evidence in support of his petition.

The Circuit Judge of Sunflower County found that the petitioner, at the time he entered a plea of guilty to the charge of rape was fully cognizant of his rights and was ably defended by counsel; that his plea was entered by agreement with the district attorney; and that no objection was raised to the course thereafter pursued by the court until the filing of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this cause. The circuit judge found that the judgment of the Circuit Court of George County, under which the petitioner was committed, was a valid judgment, and the petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed for.

The main point argued by the appellant's attorneys as ground for reversal of the order dismissing his petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is that the Circuit Court of George County had no jurisdiction to render a judgment fixing the punishment of the appellant at life imprisonment in the State Penitentiary in the absence of a jury verdict fixing the punishment at life imprisonment; and the appellant's attorneys cite in support of their contention on this point Dickerson v. State, 202 Miss. 804, 32 So.2d 881.

We have given careful consideration to the argument made on behalf of the appellant on that point; and in our opinion the point is not well taken. The Circuit Court of George County had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner and of the subject matter, and we think the court had the power to render the judgment which it did render.

This case is entirely unlike the Dickerson case. The Dickerson case was before this Court on direct appeal from a judgment imposing a death sentence upon the defendant, who had been indicted and tried and convicted of murder. The defendant's guilt was so conclusively shown as to leave him no possible avenue of escape so far as the facts were concerned. But the defendant assigned three grounds for a reversal of the judgment. Only one of the grounds was discussed by this Court in its opinion affirming the death sentence, and that was, that the defendant had offered to plead guilty and had insisted that the plea be entered, and that the trial judge had no authority to do otherwise than to accept his plea as offered, since it was offered without reservation. But the Court held that there was no error in the trial judge's refusal to accept the...