Bullock v. PCL Indus. Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1:13-cv-01233-LJO-JLT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | BENNIE LEN BULLOCK, Plaintiff, v. PCL INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant. |
(Docs. 24)
Pro se plaintiff Bennie Len Bullock ("Mr. Bullock") brings this action against his former employer PCL Industrial Services, Inc. ("PCL"). Mr. Bullock alleges that PCL fraudulently induced him to sign an agreement of separation. Pending before the Court is PCL's motion to dismiss Mr. Bullock's second amended complaint ("SAC"). For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS PCL's motion to dismiss without leave to amend.
Mr. Bullock is African American. He was previously employed by PCL as "fire watch" and performed his job in a satisfactory manner.
On January 22, 2012, Mr. Bullock was at his fire watch post when the Safety Representative for a PCL client approached him asking for the "Job Hazard Analysis" ("JHA"). The Safety Representative reviewed the JHA and ultimately concluded that it failed to provide sufficient details. The Safety Representative told Mr. Bullock that he wanted the wording to be more specific and asked Mr. Bullock to convey this information to the crew during the safety meeting the following day.
The following day at the safety meeting, the JHA was discussed again. When Mr. Bullock tried to convey the message that the wording in the JHA needed to be more specific, he was rebuffed by the Foreman, Carlyse Gibson, ("Foreman Gibson") and members of his crew. Although Foreman Gibson and his crew rebuffed Mr. Bullock's attempts to speak, the "foreign nationals and Mexicans" were allowed to give input two or three times. Doc. 4.
Later that day, Mr. Bullock approached Foreman Gibson and stated, "You are the leader." Foreman Gibson interrupted Mr. Bullock and stated, "Don't talk to me in that manner and go see the Superintendent." Mr. Bullock was then terminated from his position with PCL.
On January 23, 2013, Mr. Bullock called PCL's "Mexican Project Manager," Mr. Joseph Arismendez (Project Manager Arismendez) to inform him that the Superintendent had fired him. Project Manager Arismendez asked Mr. Bullock to attend a meeting at PCL's headquarters in Bakersfield, California. At the meeting, in addition to Project Manager Arismendez and Mr. Bullock, there were two human resource representatives present, both of whom were also of "Mexican" decent. At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Bullock informed Project Manager Arismendez that he was interested in taking legal action against PCL for wrongful termination. Project Manager Arismendez dissuaded Mr. Bullock from discussing that at the meeting. Mr. Bullock was then presented with an agreement of separation by one of the human resource representatives. The separation agreement stated that Mr. Bullock was being terminated because "he was not a good cultural fit for PCL." Mr. Bullock was told by the human resource specialist present that this separation agreement would not impact Mr. Bullock's unemployment benefits. Doc. 22.
Pursuant to the human resource specialist's advice, Mr. Bullock signed the separation agreement and was provided $10,000 in exchange for releasing PCL of any and all claims, including Title VII claims, arising out of his employment or his termination. The Agreement of Separation statesspecifically, "This agreement to waive claims specifically includes all claims, including claims of discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, sexual preference, disability, handicap, or veteran status which Employee may have under the terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Doc. 4. p.7.
After signing the release, Mr. Bullock applied for unemployment benefits in the state of Texas. On February 23, 2012, the Texas Workforce Commission ("Commission") requested information from PCL regarding Mr. Bullock's request for benefits. In response, PCL provided the Commission a copy of what it claimed was the separation agreement, which stated that Mr. Bullock was terminated because he was "not a good cultural fit for PCL due to insubordinate behavior with a supervisor." The "due to insubordinate behavior with supervisor" language was handwritten, instead of typed like the rest of the information on the form. At the bottom of the form appears an addition handwritten note which reads, The additional handwritten comments were signed by the author as well as a witness and dated February 23, 2012. Mr. Bullock and a PCL representative had previously signed the separation agreement on January 23, 2012. As a result of the letter, Mr. Bullock was denied unemployment benefits.
Mr. Bullock calculated that he would have received $10,080 in unemployment had he not signed the separation agreement. Mr. Bullock also asserts that he lost money moving his family to accept the job with PCL. Doc. 27.
On July 9, 2012, Mr. Bullock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").2 In Mr. Bullock's EEOC charge, he alleged discrimination based on race and that he was discharged because he was told that he was not a "cultural fit." On May 31, 2013, the EEOC determined that based on its investigation it was unable to conclude whether astatutory violation occurred and issued a right to sue letter. After receiving this letter, Mr. Bullock was again in contact with the EEOC. He sent them a letter and an email requesting reconsideration of his case in June 2013. On July 8, 2013, the EEOC denied Mr. Bullock's reconsideration request and informed him that they would take no further action regarding his matter.
On August 8, 2013, Mr. Bullock filed a pro se complaint against PCL in this Court. Doc. 1. The Court screened the complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend for failure to allege sufficient facts in support of his claims. Doc. 3. On September 19, 2013, Mr. Bullock filed an amended complaint. Doc. 4. On January 17, 2014, PLC filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint ("FAC") to which Mr. Bullock responded on January 24, 2014. Docs. 9 and 13. On February 7, 2014, Plaintiff moved to have counsel appointed for him, which motion the court denied on February 11, 2014. Docs. 15 and 16. On February 13, 2014, this Court granted PLC's motion to dismiss with leave to amend. Doc. 20.
On March 12, 2014, Mr. Bullock filed his SAC pro se. Doc. 22. On April 3, 2014 PCL responded with a motion to dismiss. Doc. 23. Mr. Bullock filed his response on May 9, 2014, at which point he also filed a second motion to appoint counsel. Docs. 27 and 28. The Court denied Mr. Bullock's motion to appoint counsel on May 19, 2014. Doc. 31. In light of the Court's decision to deny Mr. Bullock's request for counsel, the Court granted Mr. Bullock additional time to submit an amended opposition to the pending motion to dismiss.
A federal district court is a court of limited jurisdiction and therefore may only adjudicate those cases authorized by the Constitution or a valid statutory grant of jurisdiction. "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)(citation omitted). As the elements of jurisdiction are not merely pleading requirements but an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, "each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 561 (1992). Rule 12(b)(1) permits a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) "If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack, i.e., the defendant contends that the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made." Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 F. Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9th Cir.1992). "For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts the allegations in the complaint as true; construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the opposing party;, and resolves all doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege enough facts to state a claim of relief that is...
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