Bullock v. Wooding
| Decision Date | 11 September 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 222.,222. |
| Citation | 123 N.J.L. 176,8 A.2d 273 |
| Parties | BULLOCK v. WOODING et al. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Certiorari proceedings by Allie Bullock, prosecutrix, against J. Arthur Wooding, Clerk of the City of Long Branch, N. J., and others, to review two ordinances providing for the maintenance and regulation of bathing beaches in the city of Long Branch, and decision of city clerk of that city rejecting prosecutrix' application for a permit or license to use bathing facilities of a certain beach.
Writ dismissed.
Argued May term 1939, before PARKER, BODINE, and PERSKIE, JJ.
Robert S. Hartgrove, of Jersey City, for prosecutrix.
Leo J. Warwick, of Long Branch, for respondents.
The writ of certiorari in this cause brings up for review two ordinances providing for the maintenance and regulation of bathing beaches in the City of Long Branch, and the decision of the city clerk of that city, acting under the challenged ordinances, rejecting prosecutrix's application for "a permit or license" to use the bathing facilities of Beach #1. The first ordinance was passed on June 6, 1933; the second was passed on June 7, 1938.
Both ordinances appear to be innocuous. Generally stated, these ordinances, taken together, provide that the municipally owned or municipally controlled lands of the City of Long Branch, lying east of Ocean Avenue, in that city, are to be maintained and operated as public beaches; that all persons desiring the "use" of the bathing facilities and "access" to said beaches shall "register" in the city clerk's office and upon paying the prescribed fee shall receive from said clerk "a badge, check or other insignia" which must be "worn" by the registrant, or "shown" at the request "of any officer or employee of the city"; that all badges, checks or other insignia issued are not transferable; that the city clerk is authorized and directed "to issue (the) badges, checks and other insignia of distinctive design or color for the use of the respective beaches;" that all permits or licenses issued are subject to such regulations then in force or which may be promulgated during the period covered by the license or permit; that the governing authorities may adopt "additional rules and regulations for the government, use and policing of such beaches and places of recreation not inconsistent with the provisions of the ordinances."
Additionally, the second ordinance provides that it was enacted "for the purpose of avoiding congestion on any of said beaches, and for a proper distribution of patrons, and for the better protection and safety of patrons on said beaches * * * ;" and that all persons violating any provisions of the ordinance shall upon conviction forfeit and pay a fine not exceeding $50 for each offense and upon failure to pay such fine may, in the discretion of the judge hearing the cause, be imprisoned in the county jail for a period not exceeding thirty days.
Pursuant to the authority, under the ordinances, the beach front in Long Branch was divided into four sections; Beach #1, Beach #2, Beach #3, and Beach #4.
How were the provisions of the ordinance administered as to prosecutrix? We turn to the proofs. They disclose, in substance, that prosecutrix, a member of the negro race, registered with the city clerk, tendered her license fee in accordance with the terms of the ordinances in question, and applied for a "badge for bathing facilities for Beach #1." The city clerk refused to issue the permit as requested; he told her that he would issue her a badge which would entitle her to bathing facilities but only at Beach #3.
It seems to be admitted that the true reasons for the clerk's action is that the city clerk was carrying out an agreed and determined policy or plan of the city authorities to segregate all members of the negro race on Beach #3 and no other beach. This policy or plan has no relation as to where such negro person lived with relation to the four beaches; and it had no relation to the proclaimed purposes as set forth in the second ordinance. It is clear that the agreed and determined policy or plan of regulation is based upon the admitted premise that the governing authorities did not want members of the black race to intermingle with members of the white race...
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Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan
...57; 16 Id. § 44.03, p. 9 and § 44.05, p. 13; 38 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 341, p. 29. Defendant cites Bullock v. Wooding, 123 N.J.L. 176, 8 A.2d 273, 274 (Sup.Ct.1939), as expressly establishing the validity of the ordinance in question. We do not consider that case controlling. Th......
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Fred v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Old Tappan
...194 A. 445 (Sup.Ct.1937); Prinz v. Borough of Paramus, 120 N.J.L. 72, 73--74, 198 A. 284 (Sup.Ct.1938); Bullock v. Wooding, 123 N.J.L. 176, 178, 8 A.2d 273 (Sup.Ct.1939); N.J. Good Humor v. Board of Com'rs of Bradley Beach, 123 N.J.L. 21, 23, 7 A.2d 824 (Sup.Ct.1939), and in the opinion rev......
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Seawell v. Macwithey
...whether in this State segregation constitutes unlawful discrimination. Two decisions are deemed controlling. In Bullock v. Wooding, Sup.Ct.1939, 123 N.J.L. 176, 8 A.2d 273, 275, the Court dealt with the complaint of a colored person who sought to be admitted to the facilities of public beac......
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Taylor v. Leonard
...pool), 164 A. 892, 11 N.J.Misc. 179 (Sup.Ct.1933), affirmed 112 N.J.L. 99, 169 A. 690 (E. & A.1934); Bullock v. Wooding (bathing beach), 123 N.J.L. 176, 8 A.2d 273 (Sup.Ct.1939); Seawell v. MacWithey, 2 N.J.Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (Ch.Div.1949). In the latter case Judge Stein enjoined the p......