Bullock v. Young, 1694.
Decision Date | 13 December 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 1694.,1694. |
Citation | 118 A.2d 917 |
Parties | Mattle M. BULLOCK, Appellant, v. George YOUNG and Commercial Credit Corporation, a corporation, Appellees. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Kenneth Wells Parkinson, Washington, D. C., with whom Roger Robb, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee Commercial Credit Corp. No appearance for appellee George Young.
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.
Appellant, plaintiff below, filed suit against defendants for conversion of her automobile. The first count charged that defendant Young, to whom she had entrusted it for repairs, converted it to his own use on March 18, 1955. The second count alleged that defendant Commercial Credit Corporation converted said automobile from the premises of defendant Young on the same date. Trial was held without a jury and this appeal is from a judgment entered for defendants.
On September 4, 1953, plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, entered into a conditional sales agreement for the purchase of an automobile from Old Dominion Motors, Inc. of Alexandria, Virginia. Plaintiff made a down payment and it was agreed that the balance would be payable in twenty-four monthly installments, the vendor retaining title to secure the unpaid purchase price. The contract provided that plaintiff keep the automobile in the District of Columbia; that she obtain and keep in force fire and theft insurance in such amounts as would be satisfactory to the seller or seller's assignee; and that she assign the proceeds of all such insurance to the extent of the unpaid balance. It also provided that if plaintiff defaulted on any obligation or if the holder should deem itself insecure, the balance would, at the option of the holder, become due, and in such case the plaintiff should deliver the automobile to the holder, or the holder could, without notice or demand, enter any premises where the car might be found, take possession, and retain all payments as compensation for its use. By proper assignment, Commercial Credit Corporation became the owner of all the rights of the vendor under the contract. In August 1954, plaintiff defaulted in payment of the installments and the account continued in a delinquent status through January 1955. The automobile was involved in two accidents, the first of which was reported on December 8, 1954, and the second on January 15, 1955. On January 21, 1955, the insurance company canceled plaintiff's policy and refunded to Commercial Credit Corporation the unused portion of the premium. No installment payment was made by plaintiff for February 1955 and a proffer of payment after March 1, 1955, was refused, demand being made at that time for full payment of the balance due under the contract.
About March 1, 1955, Commercial Credit Corporation, in an effort to locate and inspect the car to verify the property damage, ascertained that it had been towed to the garage of defendant Young by plaintiff's son, who, according to the record, "seemed to be the person who principally drove plaintiff's car and arranged for its repairs." A representative of Commercial Credit Corporation conferred with Young and advised him that his company was going to repossess the car for default in monthly installments. There was testimony that following this interview, Young, through an employee, notified plaintiff's son that someone was going to repossess the car and the son is alleged to have stated that "if they want to take it, let them have it." Young thereupon released the car to Commercial Credit Corporation, having collected from it his repair charges.
Based on these facts, the trial court found, and we think correctly, that plaintiff had been in arrears in her payments for a period of months; that her automobile had been involved in two collisions; that she had failed to fully and promptly repair the damage to the automobile, and that under the insecurity clause of the contract Commercial Credit Corporation had a right, at its option, to take possession of the automobile. The court also found that defendant Young had a garageman's lien for repairs to plaintiff's automobile and that having discharged Young's lien, Commercial Credit Corporation, who had paramount title to the automobile, was entitled to take possession.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that there was no conversion by Young inasmuch as he failed to follow the statutory requirements as provided by the District of Columbia Code.1 Congress provided that:
Code 1951, § 38-205, Supp. III.
This Code provision spells out the steps to be taken by a garage keeper to perfect his lien for sale of the automobile. But the record in this case fails to indicate that Young was attempting to enforce his lien by sale and, therefore, it was unnecessary for him to give notice or to take any other affirmative step to perfect or preserve it, since such notice is only required as a prerequisite to detention and enforcement.2 Appellant also argues that defendant Young was not privileged to discharge his lien by accepting the amount thereof from Commercial Credit Corporation, since this would allow the acceptance of the amount of the lien from any person who chooses to pay and...
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