Bully v. General Motors Corp., Docket No. 59153

• Decision Date: 06 January 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 59153
• Citation: 328 N.W.2d 24,120 Mich.App. 165
• Parties: Donna BULLY, Donnie Edenburn, Judith Malenfant, Olly Vera Martin, Joyce Schenk, Dorothy J. Smith, Norma Walters and Norma Wilson, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, A foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellant. 120 Mich.App. 165, 328 N.W.2d 24
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 24

328 N.W.2d 24

Donna BULLY, Donnie Edenburn, Judith Malenfant, Olly Vera Martin, Joyce Schenk, Dorothy J. Smith, Norma Walters and Norma Wilson, et al Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, A foreign corporation Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 59153.

120 Mich.App. 165, 328 N.W.2d 24

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 15, 1982.

Decided Oct. 6, 1982.

Released for Publication Jan. 6, 1983.

[120 MICHAPP 167] Dean, Dean, Segar, Hart & Schulman, P.C. by Robert L. Segar, Flint, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, P.C. by Joseph Kochis, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

[120 MICHAPP 168] Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and T.M. BURNS and McDONALD ^*, JJ.

McDONALD, Judge.

Plaintiffs represent a class of female General Motors employees, all members of the UAW, who were employed at various locations throughout Michigan during the period from November 20, 1970, to March 31, 1977. Their employment was at all times governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement which included provisions for various insurance benefits. By its terms, the agreement provided for sickness and accident benefits and for extended disability insurance up to a maximum of 52 weeks for any one period of disability. However, disability benefits due to any one pregnancy or resulting childbirth or complications was limited to six weeks.

Plaintiffs filed suit on November 20, 1973, claiming that the provision limiting pregnancy benefits constituted sex discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), 1955 P.A. 251, Sec. 3a, as amended by 1966 P.A. 349; M.C.L. Sec. 423.303a; M.S.A. Sec. 17.458(3a), repealed by 1976 P.A. 453, Sec. 804, effective March 31, 1977, and replaced by the Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(101) et seq., effective the same day, as well as the equal protection clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 2. The relief sought is damages in the amount of disability benefits each class member would have received if she had been absent for a disability arising from illness or injury instead of a disability arising from pregnancy. After the case was certified as a class action, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary[120 MICHAPP 169] judgment based on the same court rule. By order entered June 22, 1981, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion, finding that the provision limiting pregnancy benefits constituted sex discrimination in violation of the FEPA. In so holding, the court rejected defendant's alternative contention that pregnancy is not an "injury or sickness" included within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement's disability insurance benefit provisions. Defendant appeals, by leave granted, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.

Initially, defendant argues that the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment contained in the FEPA was invalid under the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 24, because it was not reflected in the FEPA's title until the title was amended on October 5, 1972. Since plaintiffs represented a class of employees who worked for defendant during the period from November 20, 1970, to March 31, 1977, defendant's argument would, in effect, limit the scope of this class by prohibiting all claims arising before October 5, 1972. We do not believe such a limitation on the class of plaintiffs is proper.

The title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution provides:

"No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title." Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 24.

At the time the alleged discriminatory acts [120 MICHAPP 170] herein occurred, the title to the FEPA, effective in 1955, provided:

"An act to promote and protect the welfare of the people of this state by prevention and elimination of discriminatory employment practices and policies based upon race, color, religion, national origin and ancestry; to create a state fair employment practices commission, defining its functions, powers and duties; and for other purposes."

However, the body of the act, having been amended by 1965 P.A. 344 and 1966 P.A. 349, also included within its prohibition discrimination based on age and sex, without an amendment to the title of the act. M.C.L. Sec. 423.303a; M.S.A. Sec. 17.458(3a). Subsequently, on October 5, 1972, the title to the FEPA was amended by 1972 P.A. 267 to include "age" and "sex" discrimination.

Defendant relies on the decision of a panel of this Court in Hudak v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 58 Mich.App. 135, 227 N.W.2d 251 (1975), wherein the Court affirmed a trial court's finding that the age discrimination provisions of Sec. 3a were unconstitutional until its amendment on October 5, 1972, because they were not reflected in its title.

However, at least one judge of this Court, in the context of a sex discrimination claim, has found reason to question the holding in Hudak:

"I do not think that MCLA 423.303a; MSA 17.458(3a), prior to its amendment in 1972, was unconstitutional under the title-object clause, Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. The 1965 amendment to the body of the act was clearly within the title and object of the act. To the extent that Hudak v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 58 Mich.App. 135; 227 NW2d 251 (1975), holds otherwise, I think it mistaken. The title of an act need not serve as an index of all that the act contains. People v. Milton, 393 Mich. 234; 224 NW2d [120 MICHAPP 171] 266 (1974), Hertel v. Racing Commissioner, 68 Mich App 191; 242 NW2d 526 (1976). The title-object clause was not intended to strike down this type of amendment." Barczak v. Rockwell International Corp, 68 Mich.App. 759, 767, 244 N.W.2d 24 (1976) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting.)

This panel agrees with Judge Cavanagh, and plaintiffs herein, that Hudak was based on an unnecessarily broad construction of the title-object clause. As stated in Commuter Tax Ass'n v. Detroit, 109 Mich.App. 667, 671-672, 311 N.W.2d 449 (1981), where the Court rejected the contention that a 1981 amendment to the City Income Tax Act, M.C.L. Sec. 141.501 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 5.3194(1) et seq., was violative of the title-object clause:

"Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 is not offended if the substitute bill or amendment is for the same purpose as the original bill, if the substitute or amendment is in harmony with the objects and purposes of the original bill and germane thereto. United States Gypsum Co v. Dep't of Revenue, 363 Mich 548; 110 NW2d 698 (1961), Moeller v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 279 Mich 505; 272 NW 886 (1937).

* * *

"As the Supreme Court said in Loomis v. Rogers, 197 Mich. 265, 271, 163 N.W. 1018 (1917):

" 'An abridgment of all those sections is not essential to a sufficient title. While it contains various related provisions not directly indicated or enumerated in the title, under the construction of this constitutional requirement, as many times reviewed by this court, if the act centers to one main general object or purpose which the title comprehensively declares, though in general terms, and if provisions in the body of the act not directly mentioned in the title are germane, auxiliary, or incidental to that general purpose, the constitutional requirement is met.' " (Emphasis added.)

See also Midland Twp. v. State Boundary Comm., [120 MICHAPP 172] 401 Mich. 641, 259 N.W.2d 326 (1977), appeal dismissed 435 U.S. 1004, 98 S.Ct. 1873, 56 L.Ed.2d 386 (1978); and Sharp v. Huron Valley Bd. of Ed., 112 Mich.App. 18, 314 N.W.2d 785 (1981).

We believe that the FEPA's title as originally enacted, did focus on one general object or purpose: the prevention and elimination of discriminatory employment practices and policies. The declaration of this single broad purpose was sufficient to meet the requirements of Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 24. The fact that the Legislature in 1965 decided to broaden the scope of the FEPA's anti-discrimination provisions by providing in the body of the act that sex and age were additional types of prohibited discrimination did not result in the body of the act being beyond the scope of the object stated in the title of the act, even though the act's original title enumerated several types of discrimination it intended to prohibit without mentioning sex or age. We find, therefore, that the provision against sex discrimination contained in Sec. 3a of the FEPA did not violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution prior to the title's amendment on October 5, 1972.

Defendant next contends that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between General Motors and the UAW did not establish a classification based on sex which violated the FEPA during the period of November 20, 1970, through March 31, 1977. In support of this contention, defendant places great reliance on General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), reh. den. 429 U.S. 1079, 97 S.Ct. 825, 50 L.Ed.2d 799 (1977), reh. den. 429 U.S. 1079, 97 S.Ct. 825, 50 L.Ed.2d 800 (1977), where the Supreme Court held that an employer's disability plan providing sickness and accidental benefits to [120 MICHAPP 173] all employees, but excluding disabilities arising from pregnancy, would not violate federal equal employment legislation, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII), absent a showing that the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits was a "pretext" for discrimination against women. The Court found that the exclusion did not result in gender based discrimination. Rather, the Court viewed the exclusion as part of an insurance package in which there were no risks from which either men were protected and women were not, or vice versa.

Defendant also points to the Supreme Court's ruling in ...