Bulnes v. Suez WTS Servs. U.S.

Decision Date04 May 2023
Docket Number22-cv-1154-BAS-AHG
PartiesMARTIN BULNES, Plaintiff, v. SUEZ WTS SERVICES USA, INC., f/k/a GE MOBILE WATER, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California

ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION; AND (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 13)

Hon Cynthia Bashant, United States District Judge.

Now before this Court is Defendant Suez WTS Services USA, Inc. (Suez WTS)'s motion to compel to arbitration the individual claims of its former employee Plaintiff Martin Bulnes (Bulnes), and to dismiss claims Bulnes brings on behalf of a putative class (“Motion”). (Mot., ECF No. 13.) Bulnes opposes (Opp'n, ECF No. 15) and Suez WTS replies (Reply, ECF No 17).[1]The Court finds the Motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Suez WTS is a Virginia-based company that designs, installs, and maintains watertreatment systems nationwide. (Declaration of John Couch (“Couch Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-8, Ex. 4 to Mot., ECF No. 13-4.) It is wholly owned by a Pennsylvania-based parent company. (Id. ¶ 7.) Suez WTS has operations in California, including San Diego. (Id. ¶ 2.) Suez WTS employed Bulnes, a California resident, as a Service Technician from approximately December 2019 through March 2021.[2](Id. ¶ 5.) Bulnes worked in San Diego on the company's California projects. (Id. ¶ 2.)

Approximately one year after his employment ended, Bulnes sued Suez WTS in San Diego Superior Court on June 7, 2022, alleging Suez WTS pervasively violated numerous wage-and-hour provisions of the California Labor Code and the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders during his employment. (Compl., Ex. C to Not. of Removal (“Not.”), ECF No. 1-3.) The Complaint contains 10 claims. (Id.) Nine are brought under various provisions of the Labor Code, while the tenth is a claim asserting unlawful business practices under California Business & Professions Code § 17200 predicated upon the alleged Labor Code violations. (Id. ¶¶ 54-124.) Bulnes presses these claims on behalf of not only himself but also a putative class of similarly situated current and former Suez WTS employees. (Id. ¶¶ 13-17.)

Suez WTS removed the action to federal court in August 2022, alleging subjectmatter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). (See Not. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1.) Suez then filed the present Motion, seeking to compel arbitration of Bulnes' individual claims and to dismiss his putative class-action claims.

(Mot.) Approximately two weeks later, Bulnes moved to remand the case back to San Diego Superior Court, contesting Suez WTS' Notice of Removal failed to establish the amount-in-controversy in this action exceeds $5,000,000, as required under CAFA. (Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14.)

In accordance with well-settled law, this Court addressed Bulnes' Motion to Remand first. See, e.g., Petersen-Dean, Inc. v. SolarWorld Ams., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-7326-WHO, 2018 WL 1151731, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018) (“I will first address PDI's motion to remand because I must have jurisdiction before I can address defendants' motion to dismiss or compel arbitration.”). On February 23, 2023, this Court denied the Motion to Remand, finding it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant action pursuant to CAFA. (Order, ECF No. 23.) Having satisfied itself of its subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court now proceeds to the instant Motion: Suez WTS' request to compel arbitration of all 10 of Bulnes' claims and to dismiss Bulnes' putative class-action claims. (Mot.)

Suez WTS argues its Motion should be granted because Bulnes agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of his employment and to waive his right to bring claims on a classwide basis when he accepted Suez WTS' offer of employment in November 2019. (See generally Mem. in Supp. of Mot. (“Mem.”), Ex. 1 to Mot., ECF No. 13-1.) Bulnes contends there is no admissible proof he ever formed an agreement with Suez WTS to arbitrate or to waive class claims and that, even assuming arguendo such proof does exist, any such agreement is either unenforceable or exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act. (See generally Opp'n.)

The parties proffer competing evidence in support of their positions.

A. Suez WTS' Evidence

Suez WTS proffers two declarations from two of its employees: one from John Couch (“Couch Declaration”) and one from Matt Webb (“Webb Declaration”). (See Couch Decl.; Webb Decl., Ex. 3 to Mot., ECF No. 13-3.) Through these declarations, Suez WTS also submits several employment documents for this Court's review.

1. The Couch Declaration and the Solutions Procedure

John Couch (“Couch”) is a Human Resource Manager for Suez WTS' California operations. (Couch Decl. ¶ 2.) Couch attests that, by virtue of his role at Suez WTS, he is “familiar with the [company's] employment policies regarding arbitration agreements.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Specifically, he attests that Suez WTS “uses a procedure called ‘SOLUTIONS: An Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure' to resolve disputes between Suez WTS and prospective, current, and former employees “through binding arbitration” (“Solutions Procedure”). (Id. ¶ 4.) He further attests, “All Suez WTS prospective employees . . . are informed of this condition in their offer letters.” (Id.)

Annexed as Exhibit A to the Couch Declaration is a copy of the Solutions Procedure, which Couch attests “ha[s] been maintained in the ordinary course of business,” and to which he has access as a Human Resource Manager. (Solutions Procedure, Ex. A to Couch Decl., ECF No. 13-4.)

The Solutions Procedure starts with a broad description of its purpose: to “create[e] a binding obligation on Covered Employees”-defined later in the Policy- and Suez WTS “for the resolution of employment disputes.” (Solutions Procedure § I.) The Solutions Procedure creates “a structured dispute resolution procedure that consists of two internal levels of review followed by, if necessary and applicable, outside mediation (Level III) and arbitration (Level IV).” (Id. § II.A.) “The levels of Solutions are in a logical sequence, and [Covered Employees] must complete each level of the process before proceeding to the next level.” (Id.)

The Solutions Procedure provides, in pertinent part:

At Levels I and II, an employee and the management team meet in an attempt to address the employee's concern. If the employee is not satisfied with the outcome of Levels I and II, and the concern is a Covered Claim, the employee may submit the claim to Level III. Similarly, if the Company has a Covered Claim against an employee, it would be submitted initially at Level III [....] At Level III, an external mediator helps the employee and the Company open lines of communication in an attempt to facilitate the resolution.
If there is no resolution at Level III and the party wishes to pursue the concern, the next step is Level IV arbitration. At Level IV, an external arbitrator provides the employee and the Company with a binding decision on the merits of the Covered Claim(s).

(Id. (alteration added).)

The Solutions Procedure defines “Covered Employees” as all “U.S-based . . . current or former employees who left the Company after the effective date of Solutions, not represented by a labor union.” (Solutions Procedure § I.E.) The “effective date of Solutions Procedure” is July 1, 2008. (Solutions Procedure, App. A.) The Solutions Procedure defines “Covered Claims” as:

all claims that arise or arose out of or are or were related to an employee's employment or cessation of employment (whether asserted by or against the Company), where a court or agency in the jurisdiction in question would otherwise have the authority to hear and resolve the claim under any federal, state or local (e.g., municipal or county) statute, regulation or common law.

(Solutions Procedure Policy § II.I.) It goes on to list a non-exhaustive collection of Covered Claims, including [c]laims relating to compensation.” (Id.) It also lists “Excluded Claims” that are exempted from Levels III and IV of the policy, none of which is apposite here. (Id. § II.J.)

The Solutions Procedure explicitly forbids Covered Employees and Suez WTS itself from “litigat[ing] a Covered Claim in any court.” (Solutions Procedure § II.K.) Resolution of such Claims must follow the above-mentioned tiered structure set forth in the Solutions Procedure, which requires mediation and then arbitration. (Id.; see id. § II.E (“Covered Employees continue to be obligated to use Solutions (including Level IV) following termination of their employment with respect to any and all Covered Claims they may have.” (emphasis added)).) The Solutions Procedure also contains a classaction and -arbitration waiver, which states, in pertinent part:

Covered Employees and the Company waive their right to bring any Covered Claims as, or against, a representative or member of a class or collective action (whether opt-in or opt-out) or in a private attorney general capacity, unless all parties agree to do so in writing. All Covered Claims must be brought on an individual basis only in solutions.

(Id.)[3] However, this provision expressly states [a] court shall have the sole authority to determine the enforceability of the waiver.” (Id.) If a court finds the waiver unenforceable, “any claims brought as a putative collective, class or representative (e.g., private attorney general actions) action will be considered Excluded Claims that must be pursued (if at all) in court.” (Id.)

The Solutions Procedure also details the rules and parameters governing arbitration of Covered Claims, including the award of attorneys' fees and...

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