Bumgarner v. Bumgarner
| Decision Date | 04 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 19757,19757 |
| Citation | 124 Idaho 629,862 P.2d 321 |
| Parties | Leslie Kent BUMGARNER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gary D. BUMGARNER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Cooke, Lamanna, Smith & Cogswell, Sandpoint, for defendant-appellant. Dar Cogswell argued.
Michael B. Hague, Coeur d'Alene, argued for plaintiff-respondent.
This lawsuit stems from a property dispute between two brothers, Leslie Kent Bumgarner ("Kent") and Gary Bumgarner ("Gary"). Gary appeals from the judgment, entered against him, quieting title to real property and awarding compensatory, statutory and punitive damages for trespass. He also appeals from the district court's award of attorney fees. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
The circumstances giving rise to this case involve the division and conveyance of approximately three and one-half acres of real property fronting on Lake Coeur d'Alene, in Kootenai County, Idaho. The property, known as the "Cottonwood Bay Property," originally was part of a larger parcel owned by P.P. and Lucile Johnson, who, in 1926, deeded it to A.M. Pratt using the following description:
The north three and one-half acres of the east half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) four, Township Forty-seven (47) North, Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian, less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide on south side of said described land which is reserved for the purpose of giving passage or right of way for a roadway. (Emphasis added.)
By subsequent deeds of conveyance, each containing the identical reservation language, Leslie C. Bumgarner and his wife, Laura Bumgarner, acquired the Cottonwood Bay Property in 1947. Mr. Bumgarner died in 1963, leaving his interest in the property to Laura. In 1970, Laura decided to divide the property equally among her three children, Gary, Kent, and Jean. Laura had deeds prepared conveying the north one-third of the Cottonwood Bay lot to Jean, the south one-third to Gary, and the middle one-third to Kent. Each of the deeds used identical language to describe the lot being divided. Executing these deeds, Laura thus conveyed to Jean:
The North one-third of the following described property as measured along the west line:
The North three and one-half acres of the East half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) four, Township (47) Forty-seven North, Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian, less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide on the south side of said described land which is reserved for the purpose of giving passage or right of way for a roadway.
She conveyed to Gary:
The South one-third of the following described property as measured along the West line:
The North three and one-half acres of the East half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) four, Township (47) Forty-seven North, Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide on the south side of said described land which is reserved for the purpose of giving passage or right of way for a roadway.
And she conveyed to Kent:
[The] South half of the North two-thirds of the following described property as measured along the West line:
The North three and one-half acres of the East half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) four, Township (47) Forty-seven North, Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian, less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide on the south side of said described land which is reserved for the purpose of giving passage or right of way for a roadway.
In 1973, a neighbor questioned the boundaries of the Cottonwood Bay Property and intimated that he might claim a right to use the twenty-five foot strip for lake access. Troubled by this prospect, Jean located P.P. Johnson, the original grantor of the Cottonwood Bay Property. Through Jean's efforts, Johnson, in 1975, gratuitously quitclaimed his interest in the twenty-five foot strip to Jean, Kent and Gary. In 1981, Jean and Kent quitclaimed their interest in the strip to Gary, who held title to the south one-third of the Cottonwood Bay Property.
Laura died in 1981. In that same year, Gary constructed a house on his lot. In the process, he enlarged the already existing turn-around roadway in the middle of Kent's lot. When Kent, who was residing outside the state at the time, noticed the change a year later, he confronted Gary and accused him of "raping" his property. However, reasoning that the damage had already been done, Kent permitted Gary to use the turn-around, but told him not to do anything more to his lot. In June of 1986, Kent wrote to Gary and Jean specifically telling them "not to change my lot in any way; no roads, no tree or firewood removed, no beach cleaning, in short, no activity of any kind." That September, Gary sought permission from Kent to build a new road across Kent's property in order to access the beach. Kent denied permission and again told Gary that he wanted his lot left alone.
In 1987, notwithstanding Kent's requests to leave his lot alone, Gary constructed a roadway across the west end of Kent's lot ("the West Road"). In the process, he destroyed approximately thirty-seven fir trees and several "birch clumps." Gary also constructed a new road to the beach, ("the Beach Access Road"), running in an east-west direction, and in doing so removed two or three pine trees. He also erected a hitching post on Kent's lot, near the shore. The Beach Access Road and the hitching post are located on the south portion of Kent's lot, which, throughout this litigation, both parties have claimed to own.
In May, 1988, Kent filed this action against Gary, seeking quiet title to a seventy-two foot lot which he maintains he received as a result of Laura's division and conveyance of all of the Cottonwood Bay Property, including the twenty-five foot strip, among her three children. He also alleged that Gary's construction of the two roadways across his lot constituted trespasses for which he was entitled to compensatory, statutory and punitive damages. Additionally, he sought to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Gary denied all of Kent's claims and filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title in himself to an eighty-nine foot wide parcel in the Cottonwood Bay Property. He alleged that under the deeds of conveyance, Laura had divided the Cottonwood Bay Property, excluding the twenty-five foot strip, into three sixty-four foot wide lots. He asserted that he later acquired title to the twenty-five foot strip through the quitclaim deeds of P.P. Johnson, Jean and Kent, given to him in conjunction with a proposed, but unconsummated, plan among his siblings to redivide the entire Cottonwood Bay Property. Based upon this factual scenario, he claimed that the Beach Access Road was located on the northern portion of his own lot, and thus he was not liable to Kent for trespass in its construction. Gary also denied Kent's claims for trespass arising from the construction the West Road, which indisputably lies across Kent's lot. He further asserted prescriptive rights to use and maintain the septic tank effluent line he had installed across Kent's property, and to use the turn-around roadway in the middle of Kent's lot. The parties' respective theories of deed construction are illustrated by the following sketch.
Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on the quiet title issue. Gary asserted that Laura never meant to include the strip in the conveyances to her children, and that she intended to divide the property into three sixty-four foot wide lots. To support his assertion, he argued that the grantor of the original deed in 1926 had retained a fee interest in the twenty-five foot strip, not merely an easement. Therefore, he argued, Laura had no interest in it to convey. Kent's position, on the other hand, was that the reservation language was intended to reserve an easement or a right-of-way over the twenty-five foot strip, and that in dividing and conveying the Cottonwood Bay property to her children, Laura had included her fee interest in the strip. 1 After considering conflicting evidence on the matter, the district court denied the motions, holding that the deed language reserving the twenty-five foot strip was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence therefore would be admissible to interpret Laura's intent. Following an eight-day trial before the court without a jury, the district judge found that Laura had intended to convey, and did convey, to Jean, Kent and Gary all of the Cottonwood Bay Property, including the twenty-five foot strip, so that each of the children received a parcel approximately seventy-two feet wide. The court quieted title in Kent and held that the Beach Access Road and the hitching post were located on Kent's property. Based upon these determinations, the court awarded Kent $2,074.60 as the costs to repair and restore the damage caused by the Beach Access Road, plus $201 for the pine trees removed in the process, and $26 to remove the hitching post. The court further concluded that because Gary had believed he owned that portion of the lot, his actions did not rise to the level which would justify imposing exemplary damages.
However, Gary had made no claim of ownership to the west end of Kent's lot over which he had constructed the West Road. Based upon Gary's trespass to that portion of Kent's lot, the court awarded Kent $816.50 to repair and restore the damage caused by the West Road, and $6,190.44 for the value of trees Gary had removed in the process. Pursuant to I.C. § 6-202, the court trebled the damages for the trees to $18,571.37. Additionally, the court awarded $15,000 in punitive damages for the construction of the road, conduct which the district court found to be "malicious, outrageous and unreasonable." The court denied Kent's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court also denied all of Gary's disputed claims, except that it...
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