Bumgarner v. Grafco Industries, Lp

Decision Date07 October 2008
Docket NumberNo. 3:07-cv-00016-JEG.,3:07-cv-00016-JEG.
Citation581 F.Supp.2d 1052
PartiesJennifer M. BUMGARNER, n/k/a Jennifer M. Love, Plaintiff, v. GRAFCO INDUSTRIES, LP, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Mary Leanne Tyler, Tyler & Associates, Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff.

Martha L. Shaff, Amanda Mestan Richards, Betty Neuman & McMahon, LLP, Davenport, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

JAMES E. GRITZNER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendant Grafco Industries, LP (Grafco), which Plaintiff Jennifer Bumgarner (Bumgarner)1 resists. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on September 11, 2008. Attorney M. Leanne Tyler represented Bumgarner, and Attorney Martha Shaff represented Grafco. The matter is now fully submitted and ready for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). The nonmoving party "may not rely merely on allegations or denials in [the nonmoving party's] own pleading; rather, [the nonmoving party's] response must—by affidavits or as otherwise provided [in Rule 56]—set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2).

A. Bumgarner's Injury and Treatment

On June 28, 2006, Bumgarner was working at Grafco's factory in Davenport, Iowa, when she hit her head on a machine while bending over to move some bottles. She received a two centimeter laceration on her forehead and was referred to Grafco's retained company physician, Dr. Camilla Frederick (Dr. Frederick). Dr. Frederick applied seven stitches to close the wound and noted that Bumgarner had suffered closed head trauma and was complaining of having a headache. Dr. Frederick told Bumgarner to take Tylenol to alleviate her headache, advised her of the possible complications that could arise from a closed head trauma, and encouraged her to tell someone at home if she exhibited any symptoms that would indicate a complication. If such symptoms occurred, Dr. Frederick instructed Bumgarner to have someone take Bumgarner back to the clinic or alternatively to the emergency room if the clinic was closed.

Dr. Frederick placed Bumgarner on light duty, including a ten-pound lifting restriction, for the remainder of June 28, 2006. Dr. Frederick then released Bumgarner to full work duty beginning June 29, 2006. Bumgarner made a follow-up appointment with a nurse for June 30, 2006, and scheduled a final appointment with the doctor on July 6, 2008, to have the stitches removed. Dr. Frederick did not certify Bumgarner for FMLA leave "because she was capable of doing work." Def.App. 58, dep. 58-59.

B. Bumgarner's Return to Work and Subsequent Departure

After her visit with Dr. Frederick, Bumgarner returned to Grafco and completed her shift. She arrived for her shift on June 29, 2006, and was placed on regular work duty. During her shift, Bumgarner began to feel ill and told her supervisor, "Look, I'm going home. I don't feel good. I'm sick. My head hurts. I feel dizzy and want to go home and lie down." (Id. at 20, dep. 40). She did not make any request for medical attention, nor did her supervisors offer to send her back to the clinic.2 As Bumgarner left, her supervisor warned her that if she left work, she would "point out" under Grafco's system for preventing employee absenteeism and consequently be terminated. When Bumgarner left, she neither called Dr. Frederick nor sought any other medical attention that night.

C. Grafco's Attendance Policy/Point System

Grafco uses a point system attendance policy. Under this system, if an employee missed a day of work, the employee was assessed one point. If an employee missed a day of work without calling in to alert supervisors, two points were assessed. If an employee was late to work or left work before the end of a shift, the employee was assessed one half point. If an employee went for an entire calendar month without receiving any points, the employee would have one point deducted from the total; however, the total could never drop below zero.

Employees who incur six points under the policy are subject to termination. Grafco made Bumgarner aware of this policy when she started working and had her sign a written copy of the attendance expectations form. As of May 9, 2006, Bumgarner had 5.5 attendance points,3 and Grafco consequently sent her a written warning regarding her absenteeism. Grafco did not assess Bumgarner any points or otherwise penalize her for missing work to receive treatment for her head injury on June 28, 2006. Grafco did assess Bumgarner one half point for her early departure from work on June 29, 2006. As she had already approached the brink with her prior accumulation of 5.5 points under the company policy, that action took her to the termination level.

D. Bumgarner's Termination and Subsequent Actions

On the morning of June 30, 2006, Bumgarner's supervisor called Bumgarner at home to inform her that Grafco was terminating Bumgarner for having six points in violation of the company's attendance policy. Later that morning, Bumgarner went to her follow-up appointment with Dr. Frederick's nurse, who recorded that Bumgarner's stitches were intact and that she showed no signs or symptoms. One week later, Bumgarner met Dr. Frederick to have her stitches removed, at which time Dr. Frederick noted that Bumgarner was finished with her care and had no impairment.

On March 5, 2007, Bumgarner filed this action against Grafco, alleging a violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and bringing state-law claims of retaliatory discharge in violation of Iowa public policy for exercising her rights under the FMLA and Iowa Workers' Compensation Laws. Grafco moves for summary judgment, arguing that Bumgarner cannot maintain these claims because she was not eligible for protection under the FMLA and that Grafco terminated her for a reason unrelated to her exercise of rights under either the FMLA or Iowa Workers' Compensation Laws.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be granted if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In considering a motion for summary judgment the court does not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any factual issue." Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-27 (8th Cir.2007). Rather, the Court focuses "on whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial—an issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury verdict for the nonmoving party." Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

While it is common to recognize that "[s]ummary judgment should seldom be granted in discrimination cases," Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1099 (8th Cir.2000), still, in discrimination cases, the plaintiff is not entitled to survive summary judgment merely by establishing a prima facie case. Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 361, 365 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1111 (1st Cir.1989)). The "plaintiff's evidence must be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant's reason for the employment action taken." Id.; see also Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.1999) ("There is no `discrimination case exception' to the application of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and it remains a useful pretrial tool to determine whether or not any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial.").

The party seeking summary judgment initially bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The substantive law determines what facts are material; "[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.

B. Family Medical Leave Act Claim

Bumgarner alleges that by assigning her one half point for her early departure on June 29, 2006, Grafco violated her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601. Grafco moves for summary judgment on the basis that Bumgarner's injury did not qualify her for FMLA leave, as it did not meet the FMLA's requirements of a "serious health condition." See Beal v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., 972 F.Supp. 1216, 1222-24 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (finding that several plaintiffs' medical ailments failed to qualify as "serious health conditions" under the Act).

The FMLA provides in relevant part that,

an eligible4 employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period ...:

(D) Because of a serious health condition...

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