Bumpus v. Airline Pilots Ass'n
| Decision Date | 10 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21 CV 5557 |
| Parties | William BUMPUS, Plaintiff, v. AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL and United Airlines, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Kerry Evan Saltzman, Patrick Michael Spellman, Williams, Bax & Saltzman, P.C., Chicago, IL, Lee R. A. Seham, Pro Hac Vice, Seham, Seham, Meltz & Petersen, LLP, White Plains, NY, Nicholas Paul Granath, Pro Hac Vice, Seham, Seham, Meltz & Petersen LLP, Bend, OR, for Plaintiff.
James K. Lobsenz, Air Line Pilots Association Legal Department, McLean, VA, Joshua J. Ellison, Thomas N. Ciantra, Pro Hac Vice, Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l Legal Department, McLean, VA, Rami N. Fakhouri, Goldman Ismail Tomaselli Brennan & Baum LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Air Lines Pilots Association, International.
Michele Haydel Gehrke, Reed Smith LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant United Airlines, Inc.
Plaintiff William Bumpus was an employee of United Airlines beginning in 2000. He alleges that United and his union, the Airline Pilots Association, International, miscalculated his window to be recalled to work after a furlough and told him that the window closed much earlier than it actually did. After filing a grievance about his recall rights, he went through two stages of pre-arbitration adjudication, as mandated by the collective-bargaining agreement. He now seeks to compel arbitration in front of the System Adjustment Board, pursuant to Section 204 of the Railway Labor Act. United and the union say he cannot do that without the approval of the union, which has refused to proceed to arbitration on his behalf. They also say that he must at least exhaust all the pre-arbitration stages before compelling arbitration. And because plaintiff has yet to present his grievance to the third and final pre-arbitration adjudicative body, he has not exhausted the preconditions to filing this suit.
There are two questions here: whether the Railway Labor Act gives individual employees the right to compel arbitration and, if so, whether Bumpus exhausted his grievances before compelling arbitration. For the reasons below, I deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, [18], and grant defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, [20], and motion to supplement, [29].
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). I construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs. , 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020). But the moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make "a sufficient showing on an essential element" of his case for which he has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). These standards apply equally to cross-motions for summary judgment, Blow v. Bijora, Inc. , 855 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2017), and I consider evidence from both motions to ensure that there is no material dispute. Torry v. City of Chicago , 932 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2019). I need only consider the cited materials, but I may consider "other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Under the Railway Labor Act, "[a] dispute about the interpretation or administration of a collective-bargaining agreement must be resolved by an adjustment board." Miller v. Sw. Airlines Co. , 926 F.3d 898, 903 (7th Cir. 2019) ; see Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris , 512 U.S. 246, 252–53, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). While I have jurisdiction to interpret the Act itself, I lack jurisdiction to interpret collective-bargaining agreements made under the Act. Ryan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 286 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 2002).
United first hired Bumpus as a pilot on June 11, 2000. [23] ¶ 13.1 He went on military leave in 2001 and was furloughed on March 2, 2002. [23] ¶¶ 15–16. Under the then-existing collective-bargaining agreement, plaintiff had a maximum potential recall window ending March 2, 2009. [23] ¶ 17. In 2013, though, United offered Bumpus a "final" recall with recall rights extending until the end of 2015. [23] ¶ 20.2 The recall package Bumpus received included a copy of a pending furlough mitigation agreement that would extend the new recall window to ten years from the date of furlough. [23] ¶ 21.3 As a result, Bumpus asked United about his employment status. [23] ¶ 22.4 In response, in November 2015, United's furlough return coordinator emailed Bumpus to tell him that his furlough recall window extended until March 2, 2019. [23] ¶ 23.
In January 2019, Bumpus told United and the union that he was in the process of obtaining a Federal Aviation Administration review of his medical flight status and requested an extension of his March 2, 2019, recall date. [23] ¶ 24. Both United and the union told Bumpus that, in fact, his recall rights had already expired. [23] ¶ 25. In February 2019, the union provided more specifics; it told plaintiff that his recall rights expired in 2007 after a mandatory recall. [23] ¶ 26. Amidst confusion about plaintiff's employment history and status, the union got United to toll the clock on plaintiff's recall rights, in the event that they hadn't expired. [23] ¶ 27. The union told plaintiff that, despite the tolling agreement, "there ha[d] been no determination at this point that [plaintiff] ha[d] a right to return to United." [23] ¶¶ 27–28. In early February 2019, United told Bumpus that his recall and seniority rights had expired in March 2012. [23] ¶ 29.
Bumpus continued to pursue FAA certifications. He obtained authorization for special issuance of a medical certificate on February 27, 2020, and a first-class airman medical certification on June 15, 2020. [23] ¶¶ 32–33.5 In August 2020, having obtained the necessary certifications to fly, Bumpus emailed a United official. [23] ¶ 34. He told her he was aware of at least two other pilots who were hired in 2000 and furloughed in 2002 (like him) and who returned to United in the past year with seniority rights intact. [23] ¶ 34 (citing [22-17] at 2). He said, "There is a precedent for others with my same hire and furlough years to return to United with seniority." [23] ¶ 34 (citing [22-17] at 2). In November 2020, Bumpus discovered union statements from 2019 about 2009 furloughees. [23] ¶ 36.6 Bumpus says these communications "encouraged 2009 furloughees to exercise their recall rights," [23] ¶ 36, but defendants rightly note that the October 2019 publication only informed furloughees that they were hitting their ten-year recall limit and, if they wanted to return, had to inform United within a certain time period before their recall expiration. [22-20] at 5. Meanwhile, the January 2019 email said only that United welcomed seventy furlough returns in 2018. [22-19] at 2. The first statement was published on the union's website in 2019, and the second was emailed to Bumpus in 2019. [23] ¶ 36 (citing [22-5] ¶¶ 4–6).
On March 2, 2021, Bumpus filed a written grievance asserting his recall rights. [23] ¶ 40. The grievance requested that the arbitration board be staffed by a single arbitrator unassociated with the union or United "to ensure that the final decision is rendered in a fair and unbiased manner." [23] ¶ 40. In April 2021, pursuant to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, [18-4] at 187, a Level 1 grievance hearing was held. [23] ¶ 43. Later that month, the Denver chief pilot, who had presided over the Level 1 grievance hearing, issued a decision. [23] ¶ 45. Among other things, he found that plaintiff's grievance was untimely filed. [18-6] at 3. Under the collective-bargaining agreement, employees have 180 days from the date they "reasonably would have had knowledge of the facts upon which the grievance is based" to file their grievance. [26] ¶ 5 (citing [18-4] at 187). The Denver chief pilot said plaintiff waited until thirteen months after the grievance expiration date to submit his grievance. [18-6] at 3.
Plaintiff timely appealed the denial. [23] ¶ 46. On May 18, 2021, three days before plaintiff's Level 2 hearing, the union's senior labor relations counsel emailed plaintiff's attorney and said that plaintiff's grievance was "contractually baseless and untimely," and that supporting plaintiff's grievance would be "inconsistent" with the union's duty to "represent all pilots." [23] ¶ 47. The union's lawyer also said that the union would be "presenting this information to United" during the upcoming hearing. [23] ¶ 47. A month after the Level 2 hearing, the United employee who'd presided over the hearing issued a written decision denying plaintiff's grievance for, among other things, untimeliness. [23] ¶ 49. The decision said that if plaintiff was dissatisfied with the outcome, he had the right under the collective-bargaining agreement to appeal to the board of adjustment. [23] ¶ 49.
In July 2021, plaintiff filed with the union a submission to the board of adjustment, seeking to represent himself through his attorney and at his own expense. [23] ¶ 50. Around two weeks later, Joseph Pedata, chairman of the union's Master Executive Council (MEC) Grievance Committee, told plaintiff's lawyer that only the union, and not an individual grievant, had the right to appeal to the board of adjustment. [23] ¶ 51. The union relied on Section 18-C-2 of the collective-bargaining agreement. [18-10] at 2. That section requires the board of adjustment to "consider any dispute properly submitted to it" by the union or airline. [18-4] at 196. The collective-bargaining agreement does not say that individual employees can submit a dispute to the board. [18-4] at 196. Over the next week, Pedata and plaintiff's attorney exchanged emails asserting their positions. [23] ¶¶ 52–53. ...
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