Bumpus v. Warden
| Decision Date | 06 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-CV-1791 (ENV).,97-CV-1791 (ENV). |
| Citation | 702 F.Supp.2d 155 |
| Parties | James BUMPUS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, CLINTON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
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Lawrence F. Ruggiero, Law Offices of Lawrence F. Ruggiero, Charles D. Lavine, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Kings County District Attorneys Office--Generic, Amy Merrill Appelbaum, Office of the D.A., Kings County, Brooklyn, NY, for Respondent.
Petitioner James Bumpus is once again before this Court on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the writ is denied and his petition is dismissed.
On September 6, 2007, the Court found that all but one of Bumpus's federal claims were procedurally barred from habeas corpus review because they had not been “fairly presented” to the New York Court of Appeals. 2 Accordingly, the Court dismissed those claims on exhaustion grounds. In its February 20, 2009 summary order, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of Bumpus's petition and remanded for further proceedings. See Bumpus, 311 Fed.Appx. 400 Specifically, the Circuit held the Court's judgment to be at odds with Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360 (2d Cir.2000), in which the Circuit determined that, where a petitioner's “first letter to the [New York] Court of Appeals seeks leave to appeal all arguments raised in attached Appellate Division briefs, a follow up letter addressing only some of those arguments in more detail does not serve to narrow the scope of the claims ‘fairly presented’ by the first letter.” 311 Fed.Appx. at 401 (citing Morgan, 204 F.3d at 370; Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 122-23 (2d Cir.2001)). The Second Circuit, having found that “nothing in Bumpus's August 8[, 1990] letter ‘affirmatively directed the Court of Appeal's attention away from claims contained in the attached briefs,’ ” id. at 402 (citing Galdamez v. Keane, 394 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir.2005)), rejected this Court's conclusion that the state's high court had been deprived of an opportunity to review the claims now re-presented here in Bumpus's petition for habeas corpus. The silence in Bumpus's pro se letter about these claims while advancing another claim was not tantamount to a withdrawal of all the unmentioned claims that were contained in the briefs to the Appellate Division, which had been attached to his counsel's initial request for leave to appeal. Id. at 401-02. The Second Circuit noted, however, that it expressed no opinion as to the merits of the claims that this Court had dismissed as procedurally barred or as to whether Bumpus had exhausted his challenge to the admission at trial of certain grand jury testimony (mentioned in his brief to the Appellate Division). 3 Id. at 402.
Following remand, Bumpus filed a memorandum of law in support of his petition on July 3, 2009. Relying on the nine claims 4 for relief argued in his previously submitted memoranda, Bumpus further argues now that he was “denied due process and equal protection by the arbitrary denial of his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals,” given that “his identically situated co-defendant was granted such leave and access.” (Brief of Petitioner-Appellant James Bumpus (Doc. # 64 (“Bumpus Br.”)) at 9.) The district attorney answered, arguing, inter alia, that Bumpus's claim that he was deprived of his rights to equal protection and due process does not warrant habeas relief. Following Bumpus's reply, the motion was submitted for decision.
As is well-engrained now, driven by AEDPA, 5 a federal court is not free to issue a writ of habeas corpus under the independent “contrary to” clause of § 2254 unless “the state court arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decide[d] a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O'Connor, J., for the Court, Part II) (citation omitted). Similarly, a federal court cannot issue the writ under the independent “unreasonable application” clause unless “the state court identifie[d] the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. But, a state court's “unreasonable application” of law must have been more than “incorrect or erroneous”: it must have been “ ‘objectively unreasonable.’ ” Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 315 (2d Cir.2001) (). Lastly, claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court are not subject to the deferential standard 6 that applies under AEDPA. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1784, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
In its September 6, 2007 decision, the Court stated that, to the extent that Bumpus claimed that the New York Court of Appeals denied him equal protection on his appeal vis-à-vis its handling of the appeal of his co-defendant Rodney Russ, such claim was baseless because “[t]he disparate outcomes resulted not from an unfair application of a rule, but from the presentation of different issues for review.” See Bumpus, 507 F.Supp.2d at 261 n. 8 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit's holding on the appeal of that decision works a very significant change: the finding of differing issue presentment is no longer supportable. The Circuit has determined that Bumpus, however mercurially, fairly presented to the New York Court of Appeals the very same issues presented by Russ, including the improper admission of the grand jury testimony of witness Gonzalez-the ground on which Russ not only won leave to appeal but reversal. See, e.g., id. at 255-56. Thus, the majority of Bumpus's remaining habeas claims 7 may be addressed on the merits pursuant to AEDPA's deferential standard of review, since they were clearly adjudicated by the Appellate Division. Ultimately, none is meritorious.
In addition to these claims, Bumpus raised an argument in state court (for example, on a pro se motion for reconsideration to the Appellate Division) following the reversal of Russ's conviction that “the due process [and] equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment dictates that each similarly [situated] criminal defendant must receive the same application of the law.” (Memorandum of Law in support of motion for reconsideration to Appellate Division, dated Aug. 29, 1994, at 1.) On the instant remand, Bumpus renews that argument, claiming that he was “denied due process and equal protection by the arbitrary denial of his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals,” given that “his identically situated co-defendant was granted such leave and access.” (Bumpus Br. at 9.) Though vexing, this constitutional claim fails whether reviewed under AEDPA's deferential standard or de novo. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1415, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) ().
Viewed through the AEDPA prism, the denial of Bumpus's applications for leave to appeal by the New York Court of Appeals was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law (pertaining to the due process clause, the equal protection clause, or otherwise). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In such circumstance, given the absence of any holdings from the Supreme Court regarding a due process or an equal protection right to file a discretionary appeal, 8 the Court has no authority, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to grant Bumpus's petition for habeas corpus on this ground. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006); see also Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 402, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 342, 102 S.Ct. 460, 70 L.Ed.2d 530 (1981) (); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) ().
In any event, even reviewing the disparate judicial treatment claim asserted by Bumpus unfettered by AEDPA, the Court finds that the refusal of the New York state courts to accord him the benefit of the Russ ruling as reflected in the denials of his post-judgment motions and of his leave to appeal applications were not violations of equal protection or of due process. In addition, Bumpus's claim regarding the admission of the grand jury testimony of witnesses Lawrence and Gonzalez fails under the exhaustion doctrine, and, further, even if it were not unexhausted, would fail on the merits. A similar fate befalls petitioner's remaining claims, that is, though exhausted, as determined by the Circuit, they are ultimately meritless.
For almost all criminal appeals, the New York Court of Appeals is a court of discretionary appeal and, for coram nobis petitions, the Appellate Divisions are likewise. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 450.90(1), 460.20. The saga of the...
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...or her codefendant's conviction for a reason that was equally applicable to both. See, e.g., Bumpus v. Warden, Clinton Corr. Facility, 702 F. Supp. 2d 155, 164-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); accord Fiore v. White, 149 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding "that neither the Due Process Clause nor the E......