Bunch v. State
Citation | 281 Md. 680,381 A.2d 1142 |
Decision Date | 09 January 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 29,29 |
Parties | Winfield Baker BUNCH v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
W. Timothy Finan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, * SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and ORTH, JJ.
At a bench conference following the presentation of evidence in this criminal case, the trial judge and counsel considered the matter of a note from one of the jurors stating that the juror was biased; the judge overruled the prosecution's motion to excuse the juror and the defense's motion for a mistrial; the judge refused to allow the defendant himself to be consulted about the matter; and the judge ruled that the juror should remain. The issue presented is whether, under these particular circumstances, the conference proceedings constituted a "stage of the trial" at which the defendant himself had a right to be present.
The defendant Bunch was being tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on charges of receiving stolen goods over the value of one hundred dollars, carrying a handgun, transporting a handgun in a motor vehicle, and extortion. After the defense rested and the State indicated that it had no rebuttal evidence, the trial judge directed counsel to approach the bench and the following occurred out of the hearing of the jury:
Neither the prosecuting attorney nor the defense attorney objected, and the trial judge sent to the juror in question a reply note, telling the juror to write down the reasons why he may have to be disqualified.
Thereafter the juror, as requested, presented the trial judge with the following note:
The bench conference resumed, and the judge asked both attorneys whether they objected to the juror's staying. The prosecuting attorney objected to the juror's staying, saying: The defense attorney did not want the juror disqualified but, instead, moved for a mistrial. After some discussion at the bench conference, the judge denied the prosecuting attorney's motion to disqualify the juror and the defense attorney's motion for a mistrial, taking the position that the court's instructions to the jury would cure this particular juror's problems. At that point, the following occurred at the bench conference:
The defendant was subsequently found guilty by the jury of receiving stolen goods and the two handgun charges. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion. The Court of Special Appeals regarded the defense attorney's refusal to agree that the juror should be disqualified as an act of trial tactics during a bench conference, at which the defendant had no right to be present.
This Court thereafter granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari which presented the single question of whether the trial court erred "in not requiring the Petitioner to be present at a bench conference involving the disqualification of a juror from whom the court had received a communication."
The right of a criminal defendant to be present at every stage of his trial is, as we have said many times, a common law right preserved by Art. 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Brown v. State, 272 Md. 450, 457, 325 A.2d 557 (1974); Grohman v. State, 258 Md. 552, 567, 267 A.2d 193 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 982, 91 S.Ct. 1204, 28 L.Ed.2d 334 (1971); State v. Saul, 258 Md. 100, 105, 265 A.2d 178 (1970); Martin v. State, 228 Md. 311, 316, 179 A.2d 865 (1962); Brown v. State, 225 Md. 349, 351, 170 A.2d 300 (1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 960, 83 S.Ct. 1017, 10 L.Ed.2d 13 (1963); Journigan v. State, 223 Md. 405, 408, 164 A.2d 896 (1960), cert. denied sub nom., Gardner v. Maryland, 365 U.S. 853, 81 S.Ct. 818, 5 L.Ed.2d 817 (1961); Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 36-37, 139 A.2d 209 (1958); LaGuardia v. State, 190 Md. 450, 457, 58 A.2d 913 (1948); Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 475, 135 A. 189 (1926). The right, in some measure at least, is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). Finally, the right is guaranteed by Maryland Rule 724, which provides in pertinent part that "the defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial, including the impaneling of the jury . . . ." 1
Of course, not everything that happens in a criminal case after the jury is impaneled is deemed a "stage of the trial" at which the defendant has a right to be present. For example, in Brown v. State, supra, 272 Md. 450, 325 A.2d 557, we held that proceedings in the judge's chambers during a recess in the trial, at which the court and counsel agreed upon a procedure for the introduction of certain photographic evidence, was not a stage of the trial requiring the defendant's presence. And in Martin v. State, supra, 228 Md. at 316-317, 179 A.2d at 868, this Court held that argument in chambers on a motion for a directed verdict was not a "step of the defendant's criminal proceedings which requires his presence." See, in addition, Brown v. State, supra, 225 Md. at 351-354, 170 A.2d 300 ( ).
On the other hand, communications between the trial judge and the jury relating to the jury's verdict are generally considered stages of the trial when the defendant has a right to be present. As Judge Horney stated for the Court in Midgett v. State, supra, 216 Md. at 36-37, 139 A.2d at 214:
See also Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975); Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 47 S.Ct. 478, 71 L.Ed. 787 (1927); State v. Saul, supra, 258 Md. at 104-108, 265 A.2d 178; LaGuardia v. State, supra, 190 Md. at 456-460, 58 A.2d 913; Duffy v. State, supra, 151 Md. at 472-477, 135 A. 189; Young v. State, 5 Md.App. 383, 247 A.2d 751 (1968).
This Court has not previously had occasion to consider whether proceedings, after the commencement of the trial, at which the court determines questions of juror disqualification for bias, are "stages of the trial" requiring the defendant's presence. However, we believe that the answer to this question is dictated by the language of Rule 724 which expressly includes, as a stage of the trial, "the impaneling of the jury."
Long ago the Supreme Court held that proceedings during the impaneling of the jury, and involving challenges to prospective jurors on the ground of bias, constituted a stage of the trial at which the defendant had a right to be personally present, Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4...
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