Bundy v. State

Decision Date13 November 1981
Docket NumberNo. 880S358,880S358
Citation427 N.E.2d 1077
PartiesPaul D. BUNDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Kesler & Stark, Terre Haute, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Janis L. Summers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of burglary and rape. He was sentenced to ten (10) years for the burglary and fourteen (14) years for the rape. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

The record reveals the victim, R.D., was awakened in her upstairs bedroom by a man holding a knife to her throat. He forced her to have intercourse with him and performed cunnilingus. Directing her downstairs, he again forced her to submit to the same offenses. Five days later, appellant attempted to break into another house in the neighborhood. At the scene, the arresting officers noted appellant's resemblance to the composite made by R.D. This led to the instant charge against the appellant.

Appellant claims the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his confession given to the police. He argues the confession was the product of his intoxication and illegal law enforcement tactics. This Court will consider the circumstances surrounding the confession in determining the voluntariness of a statement. Turner v. State, (1980) Ind., 407 N.E.2d 235; Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188.

There is also statutory directive concerning the taking of a confession. See, I.C. 35-5-5-2, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

"... (1) the time elapsing between the arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel, and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession."

On appeal, if the evidence is conflicting, only that evidence supporting the trial court's ruling will be considered. Wollam v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 286, 380 N.E.2d 82; Riggs v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 263, 342 N.E.2d 838.

In Bean v. State, (1975) 267 Ind. 528, 532, 371 N.E.2d 713, 715, this Court stated that it was only when an accused is so intoxicated that he is unconscious as to what he is saying that his confession will be inadmissible. Intoxication of a lesser degree goes only to the weight to be given the statement and not to its admissiblity.

In the case at bar, some witnesses stated they detected a faint odor of alcohol on appellant's breath; five witnesses testified he was not in their opinion intoxicated. At the scene of the arrest, appellant had no difficulty in walking, ascending or descending stairs without assistance while handcuffed behind his back. His speech was not slurred and he was described as being alert. We hold the record is sufficient in this case to support the finding of the court that appellant was not so intoxicated as to make his confession involuntary.

As to appellant's claim that his confession was extracted by illegal tactics on the part of the law enforcement officers, the record shows that he was advised of his rights at the time of his arrest at about 5:30 A.M.; that he was again advised of his rights before processing at the police station at about 6:30 A.M.; and was again advised of his rights including his following of a copy of the written rights form while the same was being read to him aloud by a police officer and his subsequent signing of such written form. There is ample evidence in this record from which the trial court could find that the appellant was not deprived of food, water or sleep to the extent that would render his confession inadmissible.

Detective Utz testified he believed appellant was offered coffee and was given water during the period of time. There is evidence appellant did not sleep between the time of his arrest at 5:30 A.M. and the signing of his formal statement at 1:45 P.M. the same day. During this time period, appellant had been arrested; transported to City Hall and processed; transported to the County Jail and incarcerated; returned to the City Hall for the interview, was interviewed and gave a formal statement. Detective Utz testified that at no time did appellant request the interview cease. Officer Utz testified he prepared typewritten questions from his notes taken during the interview; typed the questions, then typed appellant's verbatim responses. Appellant then signed the confession.

Appellant also claims all interrogation should have ceased when he requested the presence of counsel. However, there is no showing in this record that appellant ever requested an attorney during the period of time involved. The record in this case is adequate to support the trial court's finding that the confession of appellant was not unduly influenced by any illegal tactics by the police officers.

Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim's in-court identification. He argues that the pretrial identification procedure utilized by the police was so impermissibly suggestive as to taint the in-court identification. The victim's composite picture depicted a man having short black curly hair with no facial hair in his late twenties or early thirties. Ten days after the construction of the composite picture, based upon the victim's description of her attacker, and following appellant's arrest, as above described, the victim was again requested to come to the police department where she was shown a series of seven photographs.

Some of those photographs showed a subject with black curly hair above the ear, some with hair below the ears, some with moustaches and some without...

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11 cases
  • Averhart v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 29, 1984
    ...circumstances in support of an enhanced offense or consecutive sentence. Forrester v. State, (1982) Ind., 440 N.E.2d 475; Bundy v. State, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1077. North does not claim the trial court failed to make his findings and state his reasons in sufficient detail to justify givi......
  • State v. Hall
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 22, 1985
    ...v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); People v. Phillips, 110 Ill.App.3d 1092, 66 Ill.Dec. 729, 443 N.E.2d 655 (1982); Bundy v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind.1981); State v. Warner, 237 A.2d 150 (Me.1967); Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 460 N.E.2d 589 (1984); State v. Kimball, 613 S.W......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • January 27, 1992
    ...when the evidence is in conflict, as well as any unrefuted evidence in the defendant's favor. Jackson v. State, supra. In Bundy v. State (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1077, the defendant was under the influence when first arrested and read his rights, but was nevertheless able to walk and climb ......
  • Forrester v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1982
    ...it which require the trial court to make a statement of aggravating circumstances in support of an enhanced sentence. Bundy v. State, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1077, 1080; Sage v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 1286, 1288; Page v. State, (1980) Ind., 410 N.E.2d 1304, 1307-08; Dailey v. State,......
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