Bundy v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
| Decision Date | 27 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | WISCONSIN-EAU,No. 97-2735,97-2735 |
| Citation | 220 Wis.2d 357,582 N.W.2d 504 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. Lawrence S. BUNDY and Margaret Anne Bundy, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNIVERSITY OFCLAIRE, Larry G. Schnack, Sissy Bouchard, Peggy Klein, Debra King, Doug Neitzel, Jeffrey Lutz, Art Lyons, Jeanine Rossow, Jeanine Thull, Karen Welch, Members of the Academic Staff, Complaint, Grievance and Review Committee, and State of Wisconsin, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Eau Claire County: RODERICK A. CAMERON, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded.
Before CANE, P.J., and MYSE and HOOVER, JJ.
Lawrence Bundy appeals a summary judgment dismissing his suit against the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire (UWEC) and the chancellor, Larry G. Schnack. 1 Bundy contends summary judgment is not appropriate because material fact questions exist which preclude summary judgment on his promissory estoppel, misrepresentation, and § 100.18(1), STATS., (fraudulent representation) claims. Margaret Bundy also contends dismissal of her claims was improper. Because we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that Schnack is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the promissory estoppel claim and § 100.18(1) claim, we affirm in part the summary judgment. We conclude, however, there is an issue of material fact regarding the misrepresentation claims and therefore reverse the summary judgment on those claims. We also reverse and remand Margaret's claim.
Bundy claims Schnack made promises to him regarding his employment status at UWEC on two occasions; first, at his initial hiring in 1979 and again on May 12, 1994, after Bundy had received a "notice of intent not to renew" his appointment. 2 Bundy claims that in 1979, Schnack told him that his limited appointment to student academic services, along with his concurrent probationary appointment as a member of Academic Staff, was "as good as" a tenured position. At that time, Schnack was Assistant Vice Chancellor. Bundy also claims that in May 1994 he personally met with Schnack, who told him: (1) the notice of nonrenewal was "just a formality;" (2) Schnack would "find a place for [Bundy] at the university;" and (3) In 1994, Schnack was chancellor of UWEC, a position he had held since 1985.
Bundy sued UWEC under various theories, four of which he addresses on appeal: (1) promissory estoppel; (2) intentional, strict responsibility, and negligent misrepresentation; (3) fraud under § 100.18, STATS.; and (4) Margaret Bundy's claim for damages.
The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether the parties' legal dispute can be resolved without a trial. U.S. Oil Co. v. Midwest Auto Care Servs., 150 Wis.2d 80, 86, 440 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Ct.App.1989). When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we follow the same methodology as the trial court. Section 802.08(2), STATS.; Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis.2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1987). First, we examine the pleadings to determine whether a proper claim for relief has been stated. Id. at 317, 401 N.W.2d at 821.
"If the moving party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment, the court examines the affidavit submitted by the opposing party for evidentiary facts and other proof to determine whether a genuine issue exists as to any material fact, or reasonable conflicting inferences may be drawn from the undisputed facts, and therefore a trial is necessary." Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis.2d 112, 116, 334 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Ct.App.1983). "Summary judgment must be entered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file and affidavits, if any, show that there are no material issues of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Section 802.08(2), STATS. However, if the material presented on the motion is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable people might differ as to its significance, it is improper to grant summary judgment. Kraemer Bros. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis.2d 555, 567, 278 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1979).
UWEC asserts that any promise Schnack may have made to Bundy by way of his 1994 statements was in fact fulfilled because a promise of permanent employment creates a contract for employment at will. See Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis.2d 388, 392, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1967). Bundy contends summary judgment is not proper on his promissory estoppel claim because questions of fact exist regarding whether his reliance on Schnack's 1994 statements, which reaffirmed the 1979 representations, was reasonable and whether Schnack could reasonably expect his statements to induce reliance. We agree with UWEC that Schnack's alleged statements would create a relationship of employment at will. We therefore need not address the issue of reasonable reliance because, based on our conclusion that the promise was one of a contract for employment at will, there exists no promise for this court to enforce.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first adopted in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis.2d 683, 696, 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (1965). Three questions must be answered affirmatively to support an action for promissory estoppel. Forrer, 36 Wis.2d at 392, 153 N.W.2d at 589.
(1) Was the promise one which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee?
(2) Did the promise induce such action or forbearance?
(3) Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement of the promise?
Id. (citing Hoffman, 26 Wis.2d at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275. The first two elements of promissory estoppel are questions of fact; the third element is a policy question to be decided by the court in its discretion. U.S. Oil, 150 Wis.2d at 89, 440 N.W.2d at 828.
In Forrer, the court determined that the employment relationship established as a result of the defendant's inducements and the plaintiff's conduct was properly denominated as permanent employment. 3 Id. The accepted and usual definition of what is meant by permanent employment was set forth in Forrer: "[T]he assumption will be that, even though the parties speak in terms of permanent employment, the parties have in mind merely the ordinary business contract for a continuing employment, terminable at the will of either party." Id. at 393, 153 N.W.2d at 589 (quoting 56 C.J.S. MASTER AND SERVANT § 8 at 78).
In general, a contract for permanent employment, for life employment, or for other terms purporting permanent employment, amounts to an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party where the employee furnishes no consideration additional to the services incident to the employment. Id. at 393, 153 N.W.2d at 589. This rule exhibits a strong presumption in favor of a contract terminable at will unless the terms of the contract or other circumstances clearly manifest the parties' intent to bind each other. Id. at 393, 153 N.W.2d at 589-90.
An exception to the above-stated rule exists, however, where the employee has given additional consideration of benefit to the employer beyond the services of employment. In that case, a contract for permanent employment is valid and enforceable and not against public policy. Id. at 394, 153 N.W.2d at 590. A permanent employment contract is terminable at will unless there is additional consideration in the form of an economic or financial benefit to the employer. Id. A mere detriment to the employee is not enough. Id.
Bundy submits that he has given additional consideration in exchange for Schnack's promise of continuing employment by surrendering his probationary appointment status, which he asserts entitled him to at least two years' standing in the probationary appointment position. He suggests that the surrender of the probationary appointment represents a "considerable benefit" to UWEC. We are not persuaded. Bundy presents no evidence to meet the standard of showing an economic or financial benefit to UWEC. His assertion that he gave up a probationary appointment is vague; he does not elaborate on how UWEC has received an economic or financial benefit as a result of this action. If anything, the assertion merely shows that Bundy suffered a detriment by not pursuing avenues to object to or reinstate the probationary appointment, which is not sufficient to show additional consideration beyond the rendering of services in fulfillment of the employment at will.
We conclude that Schnack's 1979 and 1994 statements to Bundy regarding his employment status at UWEC created a relationship of employment at will. Any promise that was made was fulfilled, and thus promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to enforce the promise. We also conclude that Bundy has not set forth facts to support his claim that Schnack's statements to him created a valid contract for permanent employment because he fails to show that he gave additional consideration in the form of economic or financial benefit to UWEC.
SECTION 100.18(1), STATS .--FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS
Bundy contends that he has a claim against UWEC under § 100.18(1), STATS., for fraudulent representations because the statute prohibits untrue, deceptive or misleading statements relative to employment or services. He argues that § 100.18(1) applies to Schnack's misleading statements that sought to induce him to enter into a contract for employment. 4 We are not persuaded.
Section 100.18(1), STATS., appearing in a chapter...
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