Bungardeanu v. England

• Decision Date: 28 April 1966
• Docket Number: No. 3910.,3910.
• Citation: 219 A.2d 104
• Parties: Laurence BUNGARDEANU, Petitioner, v. George A. ENGLAND, Director, Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

219 A.2d 104

Laurence BUNGARDEANU, Petitioner, v. George A. ENGLAND, Director, Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

No. 3910.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 7, 1966.

Decided April 28, 1966.

Charles H. Mayer, Washington, D. C., with whom Lewis H. Shapiro, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for petitioner.

Hubert B. Pair, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Milton D. Korman, Acting Corp. Counsel, and Donald Santarelli, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for respondent.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.

QUINN, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles revoking petitioner's driver's license. Petitioner had previously been acquitted in the Court of General Sessions of traffic charges arising out of the same incidents which led to the revocation of his license. He does not now challenge the settled principle that "acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based * * *." Silver v. McCamey, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 318, 320, 221 F.2d 873, 875 (1955); Pieri v. Director of Motor Vehicles, D.C.App., 192 A.2d 807 (1963). But he does claim that the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations of the District of Columbia require a conviction or forfeiture of collateral for the offenses with which he was charged before they can be made the basis for revocation proceedings. He also argues that the regulation under which his license was revoked is unreasonable and unconstitutionally vague and that evidence concerning the results of a chemical urinalysis of a urine specimen taken from him was wrongfully admitted into evidence at his hearing. A summary of the facts follows.

On April 15, 1965, petitioner was arrested by an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department and charged with eight traffic offenses — driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, reckless driving, three charges of colliding, two charges of leaving after colliding, and one charge of driving on the wrong side of the street. His driver's license was suspended pending final disposition of the charges by the court and by the Department of Motor Vehicles. At the hearing on the suspension the police officer testified that while investigating a hit and run accident at Nineteenth and Riggs Place, N. W., he was called to investigate another accident on Seventeenth Street, N. W., in which petitioner had been involved. The officer determined that petitioner was the same driver who had struck the parked vehicle at Nineteenth and Riggs Place. Another motorist came upon the scene and stated that petitioner had also struck his parked vehicle and had left without revealing his identity. The officer testified that petitioner had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, that his eyes were bloodshot, and that he was very unsteady on his feet. Petitioner gave a urine specimen approximately one hour after the collisions, and the hearing officer admitted, over objection, testimony about the results of an analysis of the specimen, which was shown to have contained .25 percent of alcohol.

Petitioner testified that he was particularly nervous that day and that he had taken certain medications for an ulcer condition at noon and before leaving work. He then went to a party where he had two drinks, leaving a little before 7:30 P.M. He said that he hit his nose on the steering wheel as he entered his car and that he drove with his handkerchief up to his nose and forehead. He stated that he became dizzy and did not remember much about the collisions. A doctor's letter was admitted explaining that petitioner's reaction to alcohol would be unpredictable because of his ulcer and the drugs he was taking. On the basis of this testimony the hearing officer concluded that petitioner had operated a motor vehicle in such a manner as to show a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons and property in that, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, he had collided with two parked vehicles causing property damage and had left the scene of the accidents without revealing his identity.

Petitioner was subsequently found not guilty of all the charges filed against him in the Court of General Sessions. Certifications of the judgments were filed in the Department of Motor Vehicles and petitioner was granted a second hearing before the same official who had presided at the first. No further testimony was taken, but counsel for petitioner again moved to exclude from consideration all evidence concerning the urine sample. The hearing officer overruled the motion, stating that he would consider all the facts. At the conclusion of the hearing petitioner's license was revoked for the same reasons which led to the temporary suspension. Respondent affirmed the decision of the hearing officer and this appeal followed.

The Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations of the District of Columbia provide in part that following conviction or forfeiture of collateral for certain traffic offenses, including driving while intoxicated and leaving after colliding, points will be assessed against the driver which can lead to the revocation or suspension of his license. Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations of the District of Columbia, Part V, §§ 3, 4. A further provision of the Regulations, Section 5(a), states that:

"Notwithstanding any of the other provisions of this order, the Director of Motor Vehicles, after giving notice and opportunity for hearing, is hereby authorized in his discretion to suspend or revoke the motor vehicle operator's permit or operating privilege of any individual who, in his opinion, * * * has driven a motor vehicle in such manner as to show a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons or property."

It was pursuant to this latter provision that petitioner's license was revoked.

Petitioner contends that since his license could not have been revoked under the point system because he was not convicted of any offenses, respondent lacked the power to order the revocation under Section 5(a) for acts which could have led to the assessment of points if there had been a conviction. He claims that the point system would be meaningless if respondent's action were to be upheld. But we believe that it was precisely for circumstances such as those present in this case that Section 5(a) was promulgated. The purpose of revocation and suspension proceedings is not the punishment of the driver but the protection of the public from those who have demonstrated that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. Tillman v. Director of Vehicles and Traffic of the District of Columbia, D.C.Mun. App., 144 A.2d 922 (1958); Ritch v. Director of Vehicles and Traffic of District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 124 A.2d 301 (1956). Regardless of how many points a driver may have accumulated or whether or not he has been convicted of a traffic offense, he may present such a danger to the community at large that he should not be allowed to continue to use the public highways. The point system was designed to facilitate the determination of who those drivers are, but it is by no means the exclusive method which respondent can use to suspend or revoke licenses. Tillman v. Director of Vehicles, Etc., supra; Ritch v. Director of Vehicles and Traffic of District of Columbia, supra. If a person's driving demonstrates a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons or property, respondent may suspend or revoke his license to drive.

We cannot accept petitioner's argument that respondent could not take such action unless he had been convicted of the offenses with which he was charged. There may be many reasons why a driver cannot or should not be punished criminally for the commission of certain acts. But these same acts may present sufficient evidence for a finding that the protection of the public requires that his driving privileges be taken away from him. In Tillman, supra, the driver was found guilty of speeding in a school zone, an offense for which only three points could be assessed. Although twelve points must be accumulated before a license can be revoked under the point system, we affirmed the revocation of his license under Section 5(a) because the Director of Motor Vehicles had found that he had driven his vehicle in such a manner as to show a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons or property. And in two cases, Pieri v. Director of Motor Vehicles, supra, and Blakey v. Board of Commissioners of District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 177 A.2d 269 (1962), revocation orders based on findings that the motorists had driven while intoxicated were upheld, even though there had been no conviction or forfeiture of collateral for the offense in either case.

Petitioner further contends that the standard set forth in Section 5(a) is unreasonable and that the section is too vague to inform the public of the conduct it prohibits. But the section clearly proscribes conduct which shows such a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons and property that the well-being of the community will be endangered. No mere minor infraction will lead to a suspension or revocation under the section, for as we have stated, "The word flagrant * * * imports behavior which is open, notorious or wilful in nature. It means conduct which is shocking or outrageous."...