Bunting v. Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 03 January 1888 |
| Parties | H. C. BUNTING v. THE PENN. R. CO. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before GORDON, C. J., PAXSON, STERRETT, GREEN and WILLIAMS, JJ., TRUNKEY and CLARK, JJ., absent.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 1 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.
No. 84 October Term 1887, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 760 December Term 1885, C. P. No. 1.
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Mr. Thos. Patterson (with him Mr. Edward Campbell), for the plaintiff in error:
1. The coke road was not a common carrier, nor a lateral railroad, but the private property of Robert Hogsett and as such it had no right to exist: § 7, act of April 15, 1851, P. L. (1852) 722; Edgewood R. Co.'s App., 79 Pa. 257; M. & A. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 49 Ga. 355. It was not entitled to a crossing with the defendant company. Under such circumstances, railroad companies cannot disavow their liability for the negligence of third parties using their tracks and working injury to passengers: M. & A. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 49 Ga. 355; I. C. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90; McElroy v. Railroad Co., 4 Cush. 400; Great Western Ry. Co. v. Blake, 7 H. & N. 986; Birkett v. Railway Co., 4 H. & N. 730; Buxton v. Railway Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 549; Thomas v. Rhymney Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 266; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 42; Redf. Car. 338, § 486; Peters v. Rylands, 20 Pa. 497; 2 Pars. Con. 220; Hutch. Car., §§ 514, 515.
A railroad company is responsible for the negligence of other corporations and individuals, including connecting railways, owners of cars run over their lines, lessee railways, etc.: Patterson's Ry. Acc. Law., 98, 132, 137, 139, 141; M. & A. Ry. v. Mayes, 49 Ga. 355; I. C. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90; C. St. & P. R. Co. v. Dunbar, 20 Ill. 385; O. & M. R. Co. v. Whipple, 22 Ill. 105; Nelson v. Railroad Co; 26 Vt. 717; Singleton v. Railway Co., 21 Am. & E. R. C. 226; P. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Campbell, 86 Ill. 443; Freeman v. Railroad Co., 7 Am. & E. R. C. 410; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445; Pierce Rail., 239; 1 Thomp. Neg., 320. The right of a railroad company to its track is exclusive at all times for all purposes; Cauley v. Railway Co., 95 Pa. 401; P. & R. R. Co. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. 375; Mulherrin v. Railroad Co., 81 Pa. 366.
2. The law is opposed to grade-crossings. They are discouraged as dangerous both by the legislature and by the courts. Therefore, the burden was upon the defendant to explain the necessity of these crossings at the point where the collision occurred: P. & C. R. Co. v. Railway Co., 77 Pa. 186; B. & C. V. R. Co.'s App., 10 W. N. 530; act of April 4, 1868, P. L. 62.
3. The seventh point of the defendant, upon the answer to which the fifth assignment is made, embraced the principle that a railroad company is liable for an injury sustained by a passenger, when in the exercise of the highest care and foresight the danger of such injury might have been foreseen and its occurrence guarded against, the law as laid down in Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 30 Pa. 234. The occurrence of the injury was evidence enough to sustain the point: Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479; P. & R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 358.
4. The act of the defendant company in permitting the grade-crossing of the coke road in the manner shown by the testimony was the true cause of the collision, and the doctrine of proximate cause has no application in relief thereof: Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85 Pa. 293; West Mahanoy Township v. Watson, 112 Pa. 574; M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 4 Otto 469; Hayes v. Railroad Co., 111 U. S. 228; Rauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. 358; Penn. R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. 372.
Mr. John Dalzell (with whom was Mr. John H. Hampton), for the defendant in error.
1. Under the instructions of the court in the general charge and especially in the answer to the plaintiff's eighth point, the jury found that the defendant company had used due and reasonable care, and in the construction and management of the road had guarded, so far as human foresight could guard, against the occurrence of such a collision as injured the plaintiff. The law calls for no higher rule and does not impose on a railroad company the duty of locating its road in such a way as to avoid possible accidents.
2. A carrier is not liable for injuries resulting, either from the negligence of the passenger, or from the misconduct of third parties, when there is no such privity between them and the carrier as to make the latter liable on the principle of respondeat ouster: P. F. W. & C. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512. The principle ruling this case has been expressly decided in Federal St. etc. Ry. Co. v. Gibson, 96 Pa. 85. The defendant's contract with the plaintiff bound it only for the skill and prudence of its own operatives and others under its own control: Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 427; Bridge v. Railroad Co., 3 M & W. 244; Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213; Thoroughgood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115.
This case does not need extended discussion. The jury have found upon abundant evidence that the plaintiff was not injured by the negligence of the defendant company, but by that of a third party. Unless that result was produced by the admission of improper evidence, or by erroneous instructions to the jury upon the law, the plaintiff has no case.
A careful examination of the numerous assignments fails to disclose error of either description. The defendant's road at the point where the accident occurred is crossed at grade by another road belonging to the Lemont Furnace. The track of the latter crosses defendant's road, makes a semicircle and recrosses it at a distance of...
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