Bunton v. City of Mendota Police Chief
| Docket Number | 1:23-cv-00211-SAB |
| Decision Date | 15 June 2023 |
| Parties | BENJAMIN KARL RAY BUNTON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MENDOTA POLICE CHIEF, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS
Plaintiff Benjamin Karl Ray Bunton (“Plaintiff'), a Montana state prisoner (BR-7892) proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 13 2023. (ECF No. 1.) The Court screened the complaint, determined it did not state a cognizable claim, and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) On March 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff's FAC was screened and found to state cognizable claims under the First and Fourth Amendments. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff was ordered to file either a second amended complaint or notice of intent to proceed on the cognizable claims within thirty days. (Id. at 22.) On June 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice stating that he wished to proceed on the cognizable claims. (ECF No. 15.)
Accordingly, the Court recommends that this action proceed on Plaintiff's First and Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Mendota Police Officer Renteria, Building Inspector/City Manager Christian Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), and the City of Mendota Chief of Police (the “Police Chief”), as detailed herein, and that all other claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (citations omitted).
A document filed pro se, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (). Nevertheless, while the special leniency afforded to pro se civil rights litigants somewhat loosens the procedural rules governing the form of pleadings, it does not completely relieve a pro se plaintiff of the duty to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 10, and 12. Rather, as both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have repeatedly recognized, the requirements set forth in Rules 8, 10, and 12 are procedural rules that even pro se civil litigants must follow. See McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“While we have insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners who do not have access to counsel be liberally construed ... we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) ().
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). As for the nature of what is “facially plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
As a general rule, the Court must limit its review to the operative complaint and may not consider facts presented in extrinsic evidence. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Materials submitted as part of the complaint, however, are not “outside” the complaint and may be considered. Id.; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the Court is not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by exhibits to the complaint. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff can also “plead himself out of a claim by including unnecessary details contrary to his claims.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
While he is currently incarcerated at the Montana State Prison, Plaintiff indicates the actions that are the subject of the instant complaint occurred in the City of Mendota (prior to his current incarceration). (FAC at 2, ECF No. 12.) The FAC purports to assert causes of action for: (1) violations of the First Amendment liberty clause/pursuit of happiness; (2) violations of the Eighth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment/illegal search and seizure; and (3) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection clause (id. at 4-6), against Defendants Gonzalez; Police Chief; Mendota Police Officers Workinton, Renteria, Amador, Benitez, and Davis; and City Clerk Mary Lou Hernandez (“Hernandez”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the FAC as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 15, 2012, at around 11:45 p.m., he was walking from the local Fast Trip Gas Station, when Defendant officer Renteria began following him. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff alleges he asked Renteria what he wanted, and Renteria told him, “you need to get out of town.” (Id.) When Plaintiff told Renteria he was being harassed and has lived in Mendota all his life, Renteria replied, “don't [blame] me, I warned you.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that later that night, Renteria followed him to a residence at 1907 Jennings Circle. (Id.) As Plaintiff left that address, Renteria pulled up to the front of the residence, and ordered Plaintiff to put his hands on the hood of the police car. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he continued to walk away, stating, “I'm not on parole anymore, do you have a warrant?” (Id.) Renteria replied, “If you don't turn around and put your hands on the hood, I'm going to blow your fuckin' head off.” (Id. at 13-14.) Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that Renteria falsely arrested him and transported him to the Fresno County jail. (Id. at 14.) When Plaintiff told Renteria he was violating Plaintiff's civil rights, Renteria replied, “I'm actually helping you Benjie, you should find a place to stay in Fresno.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was never charged with any crime as a result of this incident. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, on February 10, 2012, Defendant Building Inspector/City Manager Gonzalez trespassed onto Plaintiff's property with unidentified Mendota police officers, broke into Plaintiff's home while he was at work, and conducted an inspection of the rental property. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gonzalez knowingly filed false information about Plaintiff's residence, which resulted in it becoming condemned. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, on February 12, 2012, Defendant Police Chief banged on the front door of Plaintiff's home at 6:30 a.m., with a gun in his hand and four Mendota officers including Defendant Officer Amador, blocking Plaintiff's driveway. (See id. at 8, 16.) When Plaintiff asked the Police Chief what the visit was about, the Police Chief yelled profanities at Plaintiff and told him he had fifteen minutes to get his belongings and leave. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff stated he had just paid...
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