Buoy v. Soo Hee Kim
Jurisdiction | Oregon |
Parties | Darrel L. BUOY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOO HEE KIM and Enjua Connie Kim, Trustees of the Kim Trust, dba Alder Manor Mobile Homes Park; and Cheralyn Hageman, Defendants-Respondents, and Sandra McGinnis; Jane Doe numbers 1, 2, and 3; and Angela Gay Archuleta, Defendants. |
Citation | 232 Or. App. 189,221 P.3d 771 |
Docket Number | A137017.,062369. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Decision Date | 18 November 2009 |
H. Richard Sause, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Matthew J. Kalmanson, Redmond, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and WOLLHEIM, Judge, and SERCOMBE, Judge.
This case concerns a landlord's liability for harm to a tenant's guest caused by the dangerous condition of a tenant improvement to leased property. Plaintiff was seriously injured when he fell while descending stairs to the entrance of a manufactured dwelling. The dwelling was situated in a leased space in a mobile home park. Plaintiff filed negligence claims against Archuleta, the owner of the mobile home, Soo Hee Kim and Enjua Kim, the mobile home park owners, and Hageman, the park manager.1 The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment under ORCP 47. On plaintiff's appeal challenging both rulings, we view the summary judgment record in a manner most favorable to the party opposing each motion. Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 655, 576 P.2d 356 (1978). We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants.
The following facts are undisputed. Archuleta entered into a "manufactured dwelling space rental agreement" with defendants Kim in April 2004. The month-to-month rental agreement leased a space in the Alder Manor Mobile Homes Park to Archuleta and allowed her to place a manufactured dwelling on the site. The rental agreement obligated Archuleta to complete "skirting, porches, carport and landscaping" improvements by August 1, 2004, and to obtain the lessor's written approval before making improvements to the dwelling or in the space. Those improvements were to comply with "all applicable codes, laws and ordinances." The rental agreement could be terminated if the improvements were not completed in a timely way. Archuleta was further obligated to comply with "Community Rules and Regulations" (park rules) that were attached and incorporated into the agreement, or risk termination of the rental agreement.
A number of the park rules are relevant:
(Emphasis in original.)
Hageman was employed as the park resident manager on July 1, 2004. Hageman's employment contract required her, among other things, to "maintain all the common areas belong[ing] to the park" and to "[e]nforce the park rules, and supervise the tenants to keep the park rules." Archuleta was tardy in constructing her front porch and stairs. Soon after her employment began, Hageman instructed Archuleta to build a permanent porch and stairs by September 1, 2004. Archuleta submitted plans for those improvements to Alder Manor. Archuleta testified that those plans displayed a porch and stairs that complied with applicable building codes.
Archuleta was experiencing financial troubles and did not build the stairs according to the plans. In August or September of 2004, Archuleta built a porch with stairs that did not have a guardrail or handrail. The riser of the top step was less than four inches in height and was shorter than the riser of the other steps. Those features of the steps and the absence of a guardrail and handrail violated applicable building codes and the provisions of the rental agreement and incorporated park rules that required compliance with state and local laws. The lack of a handrail was also inconsistent with the express directive in the park rules that "porches and steps must have hand rails." (Emphasis in original.) Hageman observed the completed stairs but did not instruct Archuleta to add a handrail or otherwise bring the stairs into compliance with park rules or building codes. Hageman stated that she was not familiar with code requirements for the stairs. A city building inspector inspected Archuleta's stairs and instructed her to install a handrail, but Archuleta did not comply.
On August 7, 2005, plaintiff went to Archuleta's home and ascended the stairs to knock on the door and speak with Archuleta. When plaintiff attempted to descend the stairs, he fell and was severely injured. Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Archuleta, the Kims, and Hageman to recover damages for his injuries. All defendants except Archuleta moved for a summary judgment of dismissal of the claims, and plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on liability. In their motion, defendants argued that Archuleta, rather than the park owners or manager, was responsible for the condition of the stairs that caused plaintiff's injury and that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact that could create a jury question on their liability.
In a letter opinion, the trial court granted defendants' motion and gave the following reasons:
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for the same reasons.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants had a duty to protect him from harm for three separate reasons: (1) by entering into Hageman's employment contract, defendants assumed the responsibility to enforce and supervise compliance with the park rules, including the rule requirements to build code-compliant porches and stairs and to construct a handrail for the stairs; (2) defendants were obligated to remedy a known hazard on the leased premises and were negligent in relying on Archuleta to complete and repair the improvements; and (3) defendants exercised substantial supervisory control over the building of the porch and stairs, which were dangerous, and defendants could have made the stairs safe.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that they had no duty to remedy the condition because they did not know that it violated the building code, the condition arose after commencement of the rental agreement, they properly relied on Archuleta to repair the stairs, and they lacked physical control over the stairs. Put another way, defendants argue that they are not liable for harm created by a dangerous condition on the leased premises that arises after commencement of the lease unless: (1) they had or assumed physical control over that part of the leasehold, or knew that the condition was unlawful; and (2) it was unreasonable to rely on Archuleta to remedy the hazard. Defendants assert that those predicates to liability do not exist given the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record. The competing claims of the parties require some sorting of the common-law principles that govern the tort liabilities of landlords to tenants and guests of tenants for harm caused on leased premises.
That sorting is no easy task. The Supreme Court recently recognized that "this court's view of the common law in this area has changed over time and that, even taking that evolution into account, our cases may not have been entirely consistent." Waldner v. Stephens, 345 Or. 526, 535, 200 P.3d 556 (2008).
At common law, with certain exceptions, a landlord was immune from liability to a tenant or the tenant's guests for physical harm caused by a dangerous leasehold condition that came into existence after the tenant took possession of the leased premises. The common-law rules are summarized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 355 (1965):
"Except as stated in §§...
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