Burch v. Reading Company
Decision Date | 08 January 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 11908.,11908. |
Citation | 240 F.2d 574 |
Parties | Lucille H. BURCH, Appellant, v. READING COMPANY. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
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B. Nathaniel Richter, Philadelphia, Pa. (Richter, Lord & Levy, Irwin N. Rosenzweig, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Richard P. Brown, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa. (Henry R. Heebner, Philadelphia, Pa., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARIS and KALODNER, Circuit Judges, and WORTENDYKE, District Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of the defendant in an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. to recover for injuries suffered by the plaintiff while working as a track laborer for the defendant railroad. The plaintiff asserts that the trial judge erred in certain trial rulings and instructions to the jury. All the matters complained of were fully considered by the district court in an elaborate opinion by Judge Van Dusen denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. D.C., 140 F.Supp. 136. Finding ourselves in full accord with what is there said we conclude that the judgment should be affirmed. To what Judge Van Dusen has said we need add merely a few comments with respect to three of the objections raised to the trial judge's charge.
The plaintiff was injured on November 27, 1950 while working as a member of a railroad section gang at Scott's Lane crossing in the East Falls section of Philadelphia. That morning her task was to carry dirt in a shovel from a pile by the side of Scott's Lane below the crossing to fill in holes under the rails of the tracks in the crossing. She had been engaged in this work for about an hour when on crossing Scott's Lane with an empty shovel returning from the tracks toward the pile of dirt she fell and broke her ankle. It was for this injury that she sought to recover damages in the suit before us.
At the time of the trial the plaintiff was a widow 55 years of age. She testified that she had raised two children, not her own, both of whom were then grown and no longer living with her. In his closing argument to the jury, counsel for the plaintiff laid much stress on this fact, appealing for a verdict which would enable her to be "`a mother to little children that needed it'" and to make it possible for her to leave something "`to those who are near and dear to her'".1 To neutralize any possible prejudice resulting from this appeal on behalf of nonexistent "little children" the trial judge felt it was his duty, as he states in his opinion,2 to charge the jury as follows:
""
While this language is perhaps not what this court would have chosen we cannot hold that it was error for the trial judge so to charge under the circumstances. He was not, as the plaintiff argues, bringing into the case for the jury's consideration additional parties who had no place there, as was done in the cases which the plaintiff cites. On the contrary he was obviously seeking to eliminate all such extraneous parties on both sides from the jury's consideration and in this graphic way to make it clear to them that no sympathy of any sort for either side should play any part in their decision. A federal trial judge has the right, indeed the duty, to do this.3 And he has a wide discretion as to the manner of doing it.
We must assume that jurors are intelligent and conscientious individuals, each with a background of knowledge and experience. They are not robots who come to the courthouse with minds tabula rasa and who respond mechanically to every impression they receive in the courtroom. On the contrary they are expected, as by explicit direction of the trial judge this jury were, to use their common sense and their experience in the affairs of life in evaluating the testimony and reaching a verdict. It would be naive to assume that a group of intelligent jurors did not know, what is common knowledge, that a large railroad corporation such as the defendant here is very likely to have among its stockholders widows and orphans who receive income from its dividends. To thus point out that sympathy might enter into the picture on the defendant's side as well as the sympathy for which the plaintiff's counsel had appealed, and to direct that all considerations of sympathy on either side be left wholly out of their deliberations was in our view within the discretionary power of the trial judge in this case.
Another matter calling for additional comment relates to the charge of the trial judge with respect to the plaintiff's burden of proof. In this connection the trial judge said to the jury:
The plaintiff objects to these instructions upon three grounds. One is that it was error, as she argues, for the trial judge to use the words "conviction" and "convince" in explaining to the jury the nature of their fact finding duty in this civil case. Another is that it was equally erroneous to use the word "doubt" for that purpose. The third is that it was error in the two portions of the charge last quoted not to add to each reference to the plaintiff's burden of proof the statement that the proof need only be made by a preponderance of the evidence. We are satisfied that there is no merit in the plaintiff's contentions in this regard and that the portions of the charge which we have quoted, considered as a whole, adequately informed the jury as to their legal duty in the case. The problem involved in the first two contentions, however, calls for a little more searching analysis than is customarily given to it. For we are here dealing with ancient legal phrases, cliches which may have precise meaning for judges and lawyers but which must be far less than clear to lay jurors.4 It is, however, with the success of these statements in illuminating the minds of jurors as to their fact finding duty that we must be concerned.
The classical statement of the burden of proof in an ordinary civil case such as this is that the facts must be proved by a "preponderance of the evidence". But there are obvious difficulties with this metaphorical description of the plaintiff's burden of persuasion. It does not refer directly to the fact finding process itself but merely to the character of the evidence required and even there is less than clear since it refers only to the "...
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