Burch v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 28,28 |
| Citation | 365 A.2d 577,278 Md. 426 |
| Parties | Linda Sue BURCH v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Barry J. Renbaum, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Clarence W. Sharp and Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, on brief, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and ORTH, JJ.
The question presented in this criminal case is whether the District Court's order revoking probation and reinstating previously suspended sentences is a final judgment appealable to the Criminal Court of Baltimore or to the circuit court of a county pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1976 Cum.Supp.), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
The petitioner, Linda Sue Burch, was convicted on November 29, 1973, in the District Court of Maryland, Baltimore City, on one count charging possession of narcotics paraphernalia and four counts charging failure to appear. She was sentenced to four years' imprisonment on the narcotics charge and one year on each of the other charges, all sentences to run concurrently. The execution of the sentences was suspended, and Miss Burch was placed on probation for three years.
Almost two years later, on October 31, 1975, Miss Burch was brought before the District Court on a charge of violation of probation. After a hearing, the district judge revoked the probation and struck out the suspension of the sentences, thereby reinstating the previously suspended sentences. Miss Burch then took a timely appeal to the Criminal Court of Baltimore from the revocation of probation. However, upon the State's motion, the Criminal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no appeal may be taken from an order of the District Court revoking probation and reinstating previously suspended sentences.
This Court granted Miss Burch's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Criminal Court's dismissal of the appeal. Since, in our view, the order of the District Court revoking probation was appealable, we shall reverse.
The basic statutory provision governing the right to appeal from the District Court is § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That section provides in pertinent part:
' § 12-401. Right of appeal generally.
'(a) Civil and criminal cases.-A party in a civil case or the defendant in a criminal case may appeal from a final judgment entered in the District Court. In a criminal case, the State may appeal from a final judgment if the State alleges that the trial judge failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.
1
Subsection (a) of § 12-401 thus grants to a criminal defendant, without qualification, the right to appeal from a final judgment in the District Court. And in Swan v. State, 200 Md. 420, 425-426, 90 A.2d 690 (1952), although decided before the establishment of the District Court and involving an order of a circuit court revoking probation, this Court flatly held that an order revoking probation and reinstating a suspended sentence was a final judgment from which an appeal would lie. The holding of Swan has been reaffirmed on several occasions. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 235-236, 210 A.2d 716 (1965); Coleman v. State, 231 Md. 220, 222, 189 A.2d 616 (1963); Edwardsen v. State, 220 Md. 82, 88-89, 151, A.2d 132 (1959); Knight v. State, 7 Md.App. 313, 317, 255 A.2d 441 (1969); Finnegan v. State, 4 Md.App. 396, 401, 243 A.2d 36 (1968); Welborn v. Warden, 2 Md.App. 351, 354, 234 A.2d 633 (1967).
The plain language of § 12-401(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, authorizing an appeal by a defendant from a final judgment entered in the District Court in a criminal case, coupled with the consistent holdings that an order revoking probation is a final judgment, would seem to compel the conclusion that the statute permits an appeal from a District Court order revoking probation.
In holding that the Legislature did not intend to permit an appeal from a District Court order revoking probation, the court below relied on the last sentence in § 12-401(a) which states: 'In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.' The court below concluded that, because of this language, 'if you are going to appeal from the District Court, even though you may get probation, you have got to appeal within 30 days from the original trial date . . ..' However, as this Court has stated, "(a) statute should be construed according to the ordinary and natural import of the language used . . . without resorting to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of . . . limiting its operation." Balto. County v. White, 235 Md. 212, 218, 201 A.2d 358, 360 (1964). See, in addition, Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 539, 341 A.2d 789 (1975); Grosvenor v. Supervisor of Assess., 271 Md. 232, 237-238, 315 A.2d 758 (1974); Radio Com., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 Md. 82, 93, 314 A.2d 118 (1974); Amalgamated Ins. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 535-536, 212 A.2d 311 (1965); Md. Medical Service v. Carver, 238 Md. 466, 478, 209 A.2d 582 (1965). By its clear terms, the statutory provision permitting an appeal where sentence is suspended does not purport to limit the right of appeal from a final District Court judgment. It merely authorizes an appeal at an earlier stage in the event that the defendant desires review of the guilty verdict or of the sentence announced even though the sentence is being suspended and he is being placed on probation.
The history of the provision authorizing an appeal where sentence is suspended makes it clear that there was no intent to preclude appellate review of orders revoking probation. The identical provision is contained in § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, setting forth the right of a criminal defendant to appeal from a circuit court to the Court of Special Appeals. 2 This provision, permitting an appeal even though sentence was...
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...used without resorting to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of limiting or extending its operation. Burch v. State, 278 Md. 426, 429, 365 A.2d 577 (1976); Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403, 407 (1875). That is, we must confine ourselves to the statute as written, and may not atte......
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