Burcham v. Office of Sergeant at Arms & Doorkeeper of U.S. Senate
| Decision Date | 19 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-cv-2661 (TSC) |
| Parties | Jeanne Burcham, Plaintiff, v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the United States Senate Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Jeanne Burcham alleges two claims against the Office of the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the United States Senate (OSAA): discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) and discrimination based on age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). (ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") at 12-13.) Title VII prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The ADEA prohibits employers from "discharg[ing] any individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] against [any] individual with respect to [] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Title VII and the ADEA are applicable to Defendant OSAA. See 2 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2), (4).
Plaintiff and Defendant have moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion seeks to preclude Defendant from asserting that Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust her age discrimination claim. (See ECF No. 31 ("Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. Summ. J. & Partial Mot. Summ.J.") at 43-45.) Defendant's motion seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of unlawful discrimination based on sex and age. (See ECF No. 20 ("Def. Mot. Summ. J.").) For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's motion will be GRANTED and Defendant's motion will be GRANTED.
Except where indicated, the following facts are undisputed. On April 12, 2017, Defendant terminated Plaintiff, who had worked for Defendant for thirteen years and was a Financial Manager when she was terminated. (ECF No. 20-1 ("Def. SOF" ¶¶ 1-4.) In that capacity, Plaintiff supervised three staff members: Chris Clary, Morgan Peters, and Abigail Naylor. (Def. SOF ¶ 13.) Plaintiff's supervisor was Christopher Dey, who also supervised three other managers within the Finance Department: David Baker, David Salem, and Mary Ann Sifford. (Def. SOF ¶¶ 8, 10.) At the time Plaintiff was fired, Dey reported to Jim Morhard, who reported to Frank Larkin, the Sergeant at Arms. (Def. SOF ¶ 9.) For thirteen years, Plaintiff had a generally positive relationship with her employer; she did not receive any negative performance reviews during that time. (Def. SOF ¶¶ 94, 105; ECF No. 30-4 ("Pl. SOF") ¶¶ 1, 2.).
Approximately two months before Plaintiff was terminated, her three subordinate employees, Clary, Peters, and Naylor, contacted Tammy Buckingham in the Human Resources Department (HR) to report concerns with Plaintiff's comments and conduct, and of potential retaliation for reporting Plaintiff's conduct. (Pl. SOF at ¶¶14, 28, 30.) The employees complained of Plaintiff's poor managerial conduct, and that she made comments that indicated gender, racial, sexual orientation, and religious bias, as well as negative comments about otheremployees. (See Pl. SOF at 15-26, ¶¶ 33, 34, 36, 39.) Plaintiff does not dispute the fact of the allegations, only their veracity. (See id.)
Based on the allegations, Buckingham decided to launch an investigation.1 (Pl. SOF at 27, ¶¶ 42, 43.) The investigatory team consisted of Erica Miller, Ann Lyles, and Brett Swanson. (Def. SOF ¶ 46.) Miller and Lyles worked in HR and Swanson, then-Assistant Sergeant at Arms for Operations, was included per OSAA's "practice of assigning a non-Human Resources investigator" when investigating allegations of potential harassment. (Def. SOF ¶¶ 47-49.) The investigators began by re-interviewing the three complainants and interviewing Plaintiff twice for about 90 minutes each time. (Def. SOF ¶¶ 57, 59.) They also interviewed six additional individuals, although Plaintiff disputes that the investigators interviewed all the people they should have. (See Pl. SOF at 28, ¶ 58.) Plaintiff takes particular issue with the fact that the investigators did not interview two of her co-workers, Salem and Baker, but instead only interviewed Sifford, with whom she had a strained relationship. (See id.)
The investigators conducted "more than ten hours of interviews," and their notes were compiled into "more than 75 total typed pages." (Def. SOF ¶¶ 66, 68.) Defendant claims the investigators "were made aware" of the fact that Sifford and Plaintiff had a "strained professional relationship." (Def. SOF ¶ 64.) Defendant also states that the investigators reviewed written documents prepared by the complainants, witnesses, and Plaintiff. (Def. SOF ¶ 69.) Plaintiff disputes that the investigators "properly considered" her strained relationship with Sifford andthat the investigators "thoroughly and objectively reviewed" the documents or "interview statements." (Pl. SOF at 32, 34, ¶¶ 64, 69.)
At the conclusion of their investigation, the investigators created a "19-page written investigative summary document." (Def. SOF ¶ 77.) In creating the summary, the investigators considered the credibility of all individuals interviewed. (Def. SOF ¶¶ 78-79.) Plaintiff disputes that the investigators "fully and objectively" assessed her credibility and claims that they did not properly consider "whether the complainants or the witnesses had an axe to grind." (Pl. SOF at 35-38, ¶¶ 78-79.) Based on their assessments, the investigators concluded that Plaintiff had engaged in eighteen instances of inappropriate comments and poor management conduct, four of which occurred during the investigation itself. (Def. SOF ¶¶ 82-84.) Plaintiff disputes the investigators' conclusion "to the extent it suggests or is meant to suggest that the accusation was accurate" and to "the extent it mischaracterizes the comments and contexts in which the comments were made." (See Pl. SOF at ¶¶ 38-46.)
The investigators then brought their findings to Buckingham, who assessed their conclusions in light of Plaintiff's position, prior work record, and organizational precedent regarding harassment claims, and recommend Plaintiff's termination to Sergeant at Arms Larkin. (Def. SOF ¶ ¶ 85, 98.) Plaintiff "disputes this fact because if Buckingham had properly considered [Plaintiff's] work record, her work record would have supported a separate conclusion" and disputes that Buckingham "properly considered organizational precedent." (Pl. SOF at 49, 98.)
Buckingham, the three investigators, Morhard, OSAA Chief of Staff Mike Stenger, legal counsel, and Larkin met to discuss the results of the investigation. (Def. SOF ¶ 100.) Larkin believed that the investigative team's conclusions were "based on the reasonable evaluation ofevidence" and "were arrived at fairly and reasonably and were correct." Plaintiff disputes that Larkin could have "reasonably believed the factual conclusions from the investigators." (Pl. SOF at 50, ¶ 103.) Larkin concluded that Plaintiff should be terminated based on the investigators' conclusions, (Def. SOF ¶ 112), and he directed Morhard to terminate Plaintiff. (Def SOF ¶ 117). Plaintiff disputes that Larkin's "decision was based on a thorough and objective review of the evidence." (Pl. SOF at 54, ¶ 112.)
On April 12, Morhard met with Plaintiff and Buckingham and gave Plaintiff a termination memo.2 (Def. SOF ¶¶ 118-19.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she was given the termination memo, nor its contents, but does dispute that the termination decision was "based on a thorough and objective review of the evidence." (Pl. SOF at 55, ¶ 120.) After Plaintiff's termination, Defendant advertised her position internally and externally, interviewed five individuals, and eventually hired Peters, who is under 40. (Def. SOF ¶ 126.)
On June 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Formal Request for Counseling with the Office of Compliance. (See ECF No. 33-10 ("Pl. Req. for Counseling").) On July 27, 2017, she requested mediation, alleging "disparate treatment and termination because of sex and age." (See ECF No. 31-18 ("Pl. Med. Invocation") at 1.) On September 19, 2017, she received an End of Mediation Notice stating that she must either file a formal complaint with the Office of Compliance or file acivil action in this court within 90 days. (ECF No. 31-20 at 1.) On December 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed this suit.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no disputed genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A dispute of fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is "material" only when it involves facts "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . ' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. In response, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify specific facts which show there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must "provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find [in his favor]." Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (...
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