Burckhartt v. Helfrich's Adm'r

• Decision Date: 30 April 1883
• Citation: Burckhartt v. Helfrich's Adm'r, 77 Mo. 376 (Mo. 1883)
• Parties: BURCKHARTT, Appellant, v. HELFRICH'S Administrator.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

77 Mo. 376

BURCKHARTT, Appellant,

v.HELFRICH'S Administrator.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April Term, 1883.

Appeal from Cooper Circuit Court.--HON. GEO. W. MILLER, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

John Cosgrove for appellant.

When the demand accrues after the granting of letters, the statute commences to run from the time the demand accrues. Miller v. Woodward, 8 Mo. 169; Finney v. State, 9 Mo. 227; Chambers v. Smith, 23 Mo. 174; Burton v. Rutherford, 49 Mo. 255; Greenabaum v. Elliott, 60 Mo. 25. Now, by what rule is it to be classified? Is it to be barred from the fifth class because it was not exhibited within one year from the grant of letters? No; for the same reason would bar it from the sixth class. A careful reference to the language of the statute, and to the entire administration law, suggests no more reason for barring a demand exhibited within one year after it accrues from the fifth class, than for barring one from the sixth class, exhibited after one year but within two years after it accrues, for certainly, in the particular class to which he belongs, the rights of a sixth class are as sacred as those of a fifth class creditor. Brewster v. Kendrick, 17 Iowa 479.

Draffen & Williams for respondent.

All demands exhibited after he end of one year from the granting of the first letters upon the estate, must be placed in the sixth class. Gen. St. 1865, chap. 123, § 1; R. S. 1879, § 184; State Bank v. Tutt, 44 Mo. 366; Pfeifferv. Suss, 73 Mo. 245. The question in the case at bar is not when the special statute of limitations began to run against the plaintiff's claim, and the decisions holding that demands arising after the grant of letters, are not barred by the statute of two years have no application to this case. The question of classification depends upon very different considerations. Bank v. Tutt. 44 Mo. 366.

PHILIPS, C.

One Helfrich was appointed by the Howard county court administrator of the estate of Boschert. The appellant was one of the sureties on the administrator's bond. Helfrich died intestate in Cooper county in 1875, and on a settlement of accounts as administrator of Boschert's estate, a deficiency was declared against his estate of $877.69. One-third of this amount was paid by appellant upon a judgment against him as such surety. Sombart was administrator de bonis non of Boschert's estate, and he was the plaintiff in the said judgment of recovery against appellant and the respondent as administrator of Helfrich's estate. This judgment was rendered November 6th, 1876. Said appellant paid off his proportion the same day. He presented for allowance the sum so paid by him against the estate of Helfrich in the probate court of Cooper county, and the same was allowed and placed in the sixth class. From the action of the probate court in placing the allowance in the sixth instead of the fifth class, the demandant appealed to the circuit court, where on trial de novo, the judgment of the probate court was affirmed, and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The record and proofs show that this demand was not presented for more than one year after the grant and due publication of letters of administration on the estate of Helfrich, but was presented within two years thereafter.

1. ADMINISTRATION: classification of demands: probate courts: jurisdiction.

The principal and controlling question presented by this record is: Was the demandant entitled to have his allowance placed in the fifth class? If he was, the judgment or order of the lower courts was wrong; if he was not, the action of those courts should stand.

Section 1, chapter 123, General Statutes 1865, in force when this case was tried, provides that “all demands, without regard to quality, which shall be legally exhibited against the estate within one year after the granting of the first letters on the estate,” shall be placed in the fifth class. “All demands thus exhibited after the end of one year and within two years after letters granted,” go to the sixth class. Section 26 provides that the clerk shall keep an abstract “of all demands * * against such estate, which shall show their amount, date and class,” etc. Section 27 makes it the duty of the court when demands are allowed, “to determine their class, * * and when thus classified, the executor or administrator may satisfy such demand according to such classification.” Section 29 directs that “all demands against any estate shall be paid by the executor or administrator as far as he has assets, in the order in which they are classified, and no demand of one class shall be paid until all previous classes be satisfied.”

Chapter 124 of this statute clearly indicates that it was the legislative intent to prevent tardiness in the administration of estates, and the holding up from creditors the funds due them, an evil often practiced by executors and administrators to their own gain and the oppression of creditors. To this end they are required to make, under penalty, annual settlements with promptness, and at the end of the first year, on the annual settlement, the court may direct an apportionment and payment of the assets among the creditors whose claims have then been allowed, which would cover those of the fifth class. Now, if a claim exhibited after the lapse of one year may be placed in the fifth class, what effect would this have in the contingency that the assets had been exhausted in paying claims allowed in the first year? The classification of such claim would be unavailing, for there is no provision of law for restitution by the preferred creditors.

Appellant's counsel insists with much plausibility that he proposed to show when his claim was allowed that there had been in fact no distribution of assets. As this proof was excluded by the circuit court, we must treat this offer as if the proof had been made, should this judgment be affirmed. To sustain his position we are referred to Brewster v. Kendrick, 17 Iowa 479. It must be observed in considering this case that the statute of Iowa is local and peculiar. It provides, inter alia, that demands shall be paid in the following order: * * 3. Claims filed within six months after the notice given by the executors of their appointment. And then follows this provision. “All claims of the fourth class not filed and proved within one year and a half of the giving of the notice, are forever barred, unless the claim is pending in the district or supreme court, or unless peculiar circumstances entitle the plaintiff to equitable relief.”

The claim presented was admittedly barred unless the circumstances attending its non-presentation within the time were so peculiar as to entitle the claimant to equitable relief. Two of the judges placed some stress on the fact that in addition to the strong equities in favor of the claimant, it appeared that the “larger part of the claims against the estate are held by the relatives of the decedent and the administratrix, that the estate is still unsettled, and that a dividend had been made among creditors, but retaining the pro rata share to which plaintiff would be entitled if his claim should be finally allowed.” It seems the...