Burdyn v. Old Forge Borough
| Decision Date | 11 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | 3:12-CV-2236 |
| Parties | NASTASHA BURDYN Plaintiff, v. OLD FORGE BOROUGH, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE MARIANI)
A seven day jury trial was held in the above-captioned action beginning January 30, 2017. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants Old Forge Borough, Old Forge Hose & Engine Company ("OFHEC"), Lawrence Semenza, and James Krenitsky and against Plaintiff Nastasha Burdyn, but also returned a verdict against Defendant Walter Chiavacci and in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $20,000.00.
Now before the Court is "Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59" (Doc. 444). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the Plaintiff's motion in its entirety.
Because the factual background of this case is thoroughly familiar to all parties and has been discussed at length by the Court before , a detailed discussion of the facts of the case is unnecessary here. Briefly, for purposes relevant to the present motion, Plaintiff filed her complaint (Doc. 1) on November 9, 2012 and subsequently filed an amended complaint on December 3, 2014 (Doc. 125). Plaintiff's amended complaint named as Defendants Old Forge Borough, Old Forge Police Department, Old Forge Fire Department, Old Forge Hose & Engine Company, Lawrence Semenza, Walter Chiavacci, and James Krenitsky, and set forth 22 counts including violations of Plaintiff's rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Old Forge Borough, Old Forge Police Department, Old Forge Fire Department, Semenza, and Krenitsky (Counts I-V); violation of the Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a), by Semenza, Krenitsky, and Chiavacci (Count VI); childhood sexual abuse and vicarious liability (Count VII), negligence (Count VIII), negligent supervision (Count IX), and premises liability (Count X) by OFHEC; negligence by Semenza and Krenitsky (Counts XI-XII); negligence per se by Semenza, Krenitsky, and Chiavacci (Counts XIII-XV); assault and battery by Semenza, Krenitsky, and Chiavacci (Counts XVI-XVIII); negligent infliction of emotional distress by Semenza, Krenitsky, and Chiavacci (Counts XIX-XXI); and punitive damages against the OFHEC, Semenza, Krenitsky, and Chiavacci (Count XXII).
Each Defendant, with the exception of Chiavacci1 and the OFHEC, filed motions to dismiss. On July 1, 2015, the Court ruled on the motions, dismissing Defendants Old ForgeFire Department and Old Forge Police Department, and dismissing Count V (42 U.S.C. § 1983 - violation of substantive due process (actions of person with final authority)), Count VI (18 U.S.C. § 2255(a)), Counts XI and XII (negligence), Counts XIII and XIV (negligence per se), and Counts XIX and XX (negligent infliction of emotional distress). (Docs. 176, 178). The Court also ruled that Plaintiff could not proceed using a pseudonym and ordered Plaintiff to re-file her amended complaint using her legal name. Plaintiff thereafter filed another amended complaint on July 14, 2015 (Doc. 179) wherein the addition of her name, Nastasha Burdyn, constituted the only change.
Defendants Old Forge Borough and OFHEC each filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 165, 186). In October 2016, the Court denied Old Forge Borough's motion for summary judgment (Docs. 209, 210), and granted in part and denied in part OFHEC's motion for summary judgment (Docs. 211, 212).
A jury trial was held from January 30, 2017 through February 7, 2017. After deliberation, the jury found that neither Semenza nor Krenitsky were acting under color of state law when the alleged conduct occurred, thereby finding in favor of Semenza, Krenitsky, and Old Forge Borough on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. With respect to Plaintiff's state law claims, the jury found that Semenza, Krenitsky, and Chiavacci had not committed an assault against Burdyn, but that Krenitsky and Chiavacci did commit a battery against Burdyn. However, the jury found that only Chiavacci's actions were a factual cause of Burdyn's harm, thereby finding in favor of Krenitsky on Plaintiff's state law claims, butagainst Chiavacci on the state law claims. Finally, the jury found that OFHEC was not negligent and was not negligent in supervising Semenza. (See Doc. 429).
The Court entered judgment on February 7, 2017 (Doc. 430) and Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant Rule 59 motion pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 444).
A losing party may move for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.
"The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues - and to any party . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The Court may grant a new trial "purely on a question of law;" or to correct a previous ruling "on a matter that initially rested within the discretion of the court, e.g. evidentiary rulings or prejudicial statements made by counsel" or "because [the Court] believes the jury's decision is against the weight of the evidence", among other grounds. Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1289-1290 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted). While the Court has wide discretion to order a new trial to correct rulings that initially rested in its discretion, it has relatively narrow discretion to overturn a verdict on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Id. However, "[a] motion for a new trial should be granted where substantial errors occurred in admission or rejection of evidence." Goodman v. Penn. TurnpikeComm'n, 293 F.3d 655, 676 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2000)).
The Court may also alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), otherwise known as a motion for reconsideration. See Keifer v. Reinhart Foodservices, LLC, 563 F.App'x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2014). "A motion under Rule 59(e) is a 'device to relitigate the original issue' decided by the district court, and used to allege legal error." United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158-159 (3d Cir. 1988)). A motion to alter or amend "must rely on one of three major grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also, Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). However, "motions for reconsideration should not be used to put forward arguments which the movant . . . could have made but neglected to make before judgment." United States v. Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Reich v. Compton, 834 F.Supp.2d 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993) rev'd in part and aff'd in part on other grounds, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nor should they "be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant." Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F.Supp.2d 212, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Ogden v.Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002)). Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should only be granted sparingly. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992)).
Plaintiff's motion sets forth four principal assertions of error, each asserting a separate basis for the grant of a new trial, three of which relate to rulings made by the Court at trial, and one relating to this Court's memorandum opinion and order granting Old Forge Borough's motion to dismiss Count V of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (See generally, Doc. 444). The Court will address these arguments in turn.
Plaintiff first argues that the "Court erred by permitting Defense counsel to improperly use, publish and admit into evidence a previously undisclosed photograph" at trial. (Doc. 450, at 6). Specifically, at issue is a color photograph of a golf ball upon which is written "Money" with three dollar signs ("$$$") below it. . Next to the photograph is a typed comment from "barbietender05" stating . (Id.). The Court will hereinafter refer to this document as the "money ball" photograph.
To fully evaluate Plaintiff's arguments, the background leading to the Court's decision to allow counsel for Defendant Semenza, Attorney Joseph Goldberg, to questionBurdyn regarding the photo at issue, and the events following this decision, must be set forth.
On January 31, 2017, Plaintiff's counsel called Plaintiff, Nastasha Burdyn, to the stand. That same day, following the conclusion of Plaintiff's direct examination, counsel for Old Forge Borough completed his cross-examination of Plaintiff and counsel for OFHEC began his cross-examination. The following day, prior to the jury being brought into Court and counsel for OFHEC re-commencing his cross-examination, the parties requested a conference with the Court to discuss an issue that had arisen the prior evening with respect to certain photographs that Attorney Goldberg had just provided to Plaintiff's counsel. As explained by Plaintiff's c...
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