Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, No. 82-799

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRENNAN
• Citation: 78 L.Ed.2d 195,464 U.S. 89,104 S.Ct. 439
• Parties: BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, Petitioner v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY et al
• Docket Number: No. 82-799
• Decision Date: 29 November 1983

464 U.S. 89 104 S.Ct. 439 78 L.Ed.2d 195 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, Petitioner

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY et al.

No. 82-799. Argued Oct. 11, 1983. Decided Nov. 29, 1983. Syllabus

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Act) in 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) requires federal agencies to grant to employees representing their union in collective bargaining with the agencies "official time . . . during the time the employee otherwise would be in a duty status." This allows the employee negotiators to be paid as if they were at work, whenever they bargain during hours they would otherwise be on duty. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) in an "Interpretation and Guidance" of general applicability construed § 7131(a)'s grant of official time as also entitling employee negotiators to a per diem allowance and reimbursement for travel expenses incurred in connection with collective bargaining. In this case, the Court of Appeals enforced an FLRA order requiring petitioner federal agency to pay an employee union representative per diem and travel expenses in addition to his salary, finding the FLRA's interpretation of the statute "reasonably defensible."

Held: The FLRA's interpretation of § 7131(a) constitutes an "unauthorized assumption by [the] agency of [a] major policy decisio[n] properly made by Congress," American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318, 85 S.Ct. 955, 967, 13 L.Ed.2d 855. Pp. 96-108.

(a) While reviewing courts should uphold an agency's reasonable and defensible constructions of its enabling statute, they must not "rubberstamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute," NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-292, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988-989, 13 L.Ed.2d 839. Pp. 96-98.

(b) Here, there are no indications in the Act or its legislative history that Congress intended employee negotiators to be allowed per diem and travel expenses on the theory that they are engaged in Government business. The Act's declaration that collective bargaining contributes to efficient government and therefore serves the public interest does not reflect a dramatic departure from the principles which applied prior to passage of the Act pursuant to a program established by an Executive Order and under which employee negotiators had not been regarded as working for the Government. Nor do the specific provisions of the Act aimed at equalizing the positions of management and labor suggest that

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Congress intended employee negotiators to be treated as though they were "on the job" for all purposes. The qualifying language of § 7131(a) under which the right to a salary is conferred only when "the employee otherwise would be in a duty status" strongly suggests that the employee negotiator is not considered in a duty status while engaged in collective bargaining and thereby entitled to all of the normal forms of compensation. Pp. 106-107.

(c) The FLRA's interpretation of § 7131(a) is not supported by the Travel Expense Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5702, which authorizes a per diem allowance for a federal employee "travelling on official business away from his designated post of duty." Neither Congress' declaration that collective bargaining is in the public interest nor its use of the term "official time" warrants the conclusion that employee negotiators are on "official business" of the Government. Pp. 106-107.

672 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.1982), reversed.

Carolyn Corwin, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Ruth E. Peters, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("Act"), Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a), requires federal agencies to grant "official time" to employees

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representing their union in collective bargaining with the agencies. The grant of official time allows the employee negotiators to be paid as if they were at work, whenever they bargain during hours they would otherwise be on duty. The Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA" or "Authority") concluded that the grant of official time also entitles employee union representatives to a per diem allowance and reimbursement for travel expenses incurred in connection with collective bargaining. 2 F.L.R.A. 265 (1979). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced an FLRA order requiring an agency to pay a union negotiator travel expenses and a per diem, finding the Authority's interpretation of the statute "reasonably defensible." 672 F.2d 732 (1982). Three other Courts of Appeals have rejected the FLRA's construction of the Act.¹ We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 459 U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 784, 74 L.Ed.2d 992 (1983), and now reverse.

I A.

Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act, part of a comprehensive revision of the laws governing the rights and obligations of civil servants, contains the first statutory scheme governing labor relations between federal agencies and their employees. Prior to enactment of Title VII, labor-management relations in the federal sector were governed by a program established in a 1962 Executive Order.² The Executive Order regime, under which federal employees had

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limited rights to engage in concerted activity, was most recently administered by the Federal Labor Relations Council, a body composed of three Executive Branch management officials whose decisions were not subject to judicial review.³

The new Act, declaring that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest," 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a), significantly strengthened the position of public employee unions while carefully preserving the ability of federal managers to maintain "an effective and efficient Government," § 7101(b).⁴ Title VII expressly protects the rights of federal employees "to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity," § 7102, and imposes on federal agencies and labor organizations a duty to bargain collectively in good faith, § 7116(a)(5) and (b)(5). The Act excludes certain management prerogatives from the scope of negotiations, although an agency must bargain over the procedures by which these management rights are exercised. See § 7106. In general, unions and federal agencies must negotiate over terms and conditions of employment, unless a bargaining proposal is inconsistent with existing federal law, rule, or regulation. See §§ 7103(a), 7114, 7116, and 7117(a). Strikes and certain other forms of concerted activities by federal employees are illegal and constitute unfair labor practices under the Act, § 7116(b)(7)(A).

The Act replaced the management-controlled Federal Labor Relations Council with the FLRA, a three-member independent and bipartisan body within the Executive Branch with responsibility for supervising the collective-bargaining process and administering other aspects of federal labor relations established by Title VII. § 7104. The Authority, the role of which in the public sector is analogous

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to that of the National Labor Relations Board in the private sector, see H.R.Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 41 (1978), adjudicates negotiability disputes, unfair labor practice complaints, bargaining unit issues, arbitration exceptions, and conflicts over the conduct of representational elections. See § 7105(a)(2)(A)-(I). In addition to its adjudicatory functions, the Authority may engage in formal rulemaking, § 7134, and is specifically required to "provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters" arising under the Act, § 7105(a)(1). The FLRA may seek enforcement of its adjudicatory orders in the United States Courts of Appeals, § 7123(b), and persons, including federal agencies, aggrieved by any final FLRA decision may also seek judicial review in those courts, § 7123(a).

B

Petitioner, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF" or "Bureau"), an agency within the Department of the Treasury, maintained a regional office in Lodi, California. Respondent, the National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU" or "Union") was the exclusive representative of BATF employees stationed in the Lodi office. In November 1978, the Bureau notified NTEU that it intended to move the Lodi office to Sacramento and to establish a reduced duty post at a new location in Lodi. The Union informed BATF that it wished to negotiate aspects of the move's impact on employees in the bargaining unit. As its agent for these negotiations, the Union designated Donald Pruett, a BATF employee and NTEU steward who lived in Madera, California and was stationed in Fresno. Bureau officials agreed to meet with Pruett at the new offices and discuss the planned move. Pruett asked that his participation in the discussions be classified as "official time" so that he could receive his regular salary while attending the meetings. The Bureau denied the request and directed Pruett to take either annual leave or leave without pay for the day of the meeting.

On February 23, 1979, Bureau officials met with Pruett at the proposed new Sacramento offices and inspected the phys-

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ical amenities, including the restrooms, dining facilities, and parking areas. Pruett and the BATF officials then drove to Lodi where they conducted a similar inspection of the new reduced duty post. Finally, the group repaired to the existing Lodi office where they discussed the planned move. After Pruett expressed his general satisfaction with the new facilities, he negotiated with the agency officials about such matters as parking arrangements, employee assignments, and the possibility of excusing employee tardiness for the first week of operations in the Sacramento office. Once the parties reached an agreement on the move, Pruett drove back to his home in Madera.

Pruett had spent 11 and one half hours...