Burgess v. Balt. Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 09 March 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. RDB-15-0834
• Citation: 300 F.Supp.3d 696
• Parties: Sabein BURGESS, Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

300 F.Supp.3d 696

Sabein BURGESS, Plaintiff,

v.BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Case No. RDB-15-0834

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed March 9, 2018

Anthony Balkissoon, Arthur Loevy, Jon Loevy, Sarah Grusin, Steve Art, Theresa Kleinhaus, Gayle Horn, Loevy and Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Colin Patrick Glynn, Daniel W. Goldberg, Hanna Marie C. Sheehan, Michael Patrick Redmond, Michael G. Comeau, City of Baltimore Law Department, Neil E. Duke, Christopher C. Dahl, Kelly M. Preteroti, Thomas H. Barnard, Baker Donelson, James Howard Fields, Fields Peterson LLC, Baltimore, MD, Elizabeth Jane Cappiello, Baker Donelson, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard D. Bennett, United States District JudgePlaintiff Sabein Burgess filed suit against, inter alia, Defendant Gerald Goldstein and other individual officers of the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") alleging various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Human Rights, and Maryland common law. (ECF Nos. 1, 141.) Ultimately, as a result of either Orders of this Court or by agreement between the parties as to some Defendants, only four claims against one Defendant, Mr. Goldstein, proceeded to the jury. (See ECF Nos. 56, 311, 312, 320, 333, 356.) On November 21, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor on all claims and awarded him $15,000,000. (ECF No. 364.)

Presently pending are two post-trial motions: the Renewed Motion of Defendant Gerald Goldstein Under Federal Rule 50 (ECF No. 376) for Judgment as a Matter of Law and his Motion for New Trial and/or to Alter or Amend Judgment Under Federal Rule 59 (ECF Nos. 374, 411¹ ). The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant’s Renewed Motion Under Rule 50 (ECF No. 376) is DENIED, and the Defendant’s Motion Under Rule 59 (ECF No. 411) is also DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Michelle Dyson was murdered on October 5, 1994. The BPD investigated the crime, and Mr. Burgess, Dyson’s boyfriend at the time, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on June 13, 1995. At trial, Laura Brokaw (f/k/a Laura Shach) prosecuted the case as an Assistant State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, and Gordon Tayback represented Mr. Burgess. The trial court sentenced Mr. Burgess to life in prison plus 20 years. While incarcerated, Mr. Burgess was sentenced to five years for rioting. (Def.'s Rule 59 Mot. Ex. M, ECF No. 411-16.) To this day, Mr. Burgess, has maintained his innocence as to Michelle Dyson’s murder.

In February 2014, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted Mr. Burgess' Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence, which the State of Maryland had not opposed, and Mr. Burgess was released after having served almost twenty years in prison. (11/17/2017 Trial Tr. at 305-306.)

Mr. Burgess filed this federal action against, inter alia , Defendant Gerald Goldstein and other individual officers of the Baltimore Police Department on March 23, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Human Rights, and Maryland common law. (Id. ) This case proceeded through discovery and motions practice. As a result of Orders of this Court or by agreement between the parties, only five claims proceeded to trial against two individual Defendants: Gerald Goldstein and Steven Lehman. (See ECF Nos. 56, 311, 312, 320, 332, 333.) Plaintiff’s claims for trial included (1) violations of the principles of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) in the suppression of evidence favorable to Mr. Burgess, (2) fabrication of evidence, (3) malicious prosecution, (4) failure to intervene, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Final Pretrial Order, ECF No. 332.)

At the close of the Plaintiff’s case, this Court granted in part the Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.

Specifically, this Court dismissed all claims against Defendant Lehman, the failure to intervene claim against Defendant Goldstein, and any claim based on Defendant Goldstein’s alleged fabrication of a gas tank test. (ECF No. 356.) This Court ruled that the following claims would be submitted to the jury:

1. Plaintiff’s Brady -based claim that Defendant Goldstein withheld (a) evidence that Brain Rainey was an exculpatory witness and (b) other exculpatory information provided by the FBI as recited in Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits 121 and 122;

2. Plaintiff’s due process claim that Defendant Goldstein fabricated a police report;

3. Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Goldstein maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff through the suppression and/or fabrication of evidence other than the gas tank test; and

4. Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

(Id. ) During the Conference on Jury Instructions, this Court adjusted the description of the first claim to include a reference to Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 372. (11/21/2017 Trial Tr. at 11, 179.)

On November 21, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor on all four claims and awarded Mr. Burgess $15,000,000. (ECF No. 364.) Additional relevant facts regarding the trial are discussed below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment as a matter of law should be granted against a party when that party "has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Coryn Grp. II, LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc. , 868 F.Supp.2d 468, 483 (D. Md. 2012) (citation omitted). Rule 50 permits a litigant to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law even after judgment has been entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). In considering a motion under Rule 50, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Gregg v. Ham , 678 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2012), gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence, Whalen v. Roanoke Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors , 769 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1985), and asks whether there is "substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s findings," Anderson v. Russell , 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). However, "the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ).

A litigant may also challenge a jury verdict and/or judgment under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it is an "extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly." See Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998). First, under Rule 59(a)(1)(A), a court may grant a new trial on all or some issues "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. In the Fourth Circuit, a court "must set aside the verdict and grant a new trial[ ] if ... (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict." Knussman v. Maryland. , 272 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Unlike a motion under Rule 50, when considering a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, "a trial judge may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses." Poynter by Poynter v. Ratcliff , 874 F.2d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1989) ; see also McCollum v. McDaniel, 136 F.Supp.2d 472, 475 (D. Md. 2001).²

Second, under Rule 59(e), a litigant may seek to alter or amend a judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. While Rule 59(e) does not provide a standard itself, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized "three grounds for amending an earlier judgment: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Pac. Ins. Co. , 148 F.3d at 403. To be clearly erroneous, the earlier decision cannot be "just maybe or probably wrong; it must ... strike [the Court] as wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish." TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot , 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bellsouth Telesensor v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. , Nos. 92-2355, 92-2437, 1995 WL 520978 at *5 n.6 (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 1995) ). Whether to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) is within the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g, Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 555 (4th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 50 Motion

Under Rule 50, the Defendant asks this Court to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the jury’s findings on each claim were not supported by "substantial evidence in the record." Anderson , 247 F.3d at 129.

A. Brady -based Withholding

Defendant asserts that this Court should grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict "as to Burgess' Brady - based claims related to Brian Rainey" and "as to Mr. Burgess’s Brady - based claims related to communications with the FBI." (Def.'s Rule 50 Mem. 5, 15.) A Brady - based withholding claim against a police officer requires that the plaintiff show that "(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to him; (2) the Officers suppressed the evidence in bad faith; and (3) prejudice ensued." Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396-97(4th Cir. 2014). A police officer generally "suppresses" evidence by not disclosing it to the prosecutor, id. at 396, but suppression does not occur when a criminal defendant is already aware of the exculpatory information. See Barnes v. Thompson , 58 F.3d 971, 975-76 (4th Cir. 1995) ; Stockton v....