Burgess v. Grondolsky

• Decision Date: 13 January 2012
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-12293-NMG
• Parties: JEFFERSON BURGESS, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY GRONDOLSKY, Warden of Federal Medical Center-Devens, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

JEFFERSON BURGESS, Petitioner,

v.JEFFREY GRONDOLSKY, Warden of Federal Medical Center-Devens, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-12293-NMG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Dated: January 13, 2012

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GORTON, D.J.

For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a writ of habeas corpus, and DISMISSES this action. Additionally, the Court ORDERS that in any future § 2241 habeas petition filed in this Court, Petitioner must submit a statement certifying that he is not asserting claims challenging his conviction and/or sentence which have previously been raised by him in any collateral attack either under § 2255, § 2241, or in other prior motions for relief.

BACKGROUND

On December 21, 2011, Jefferson Burgess ("Burgess"), a prisoner incarcerated at FMC Devens, filed a self-prepared petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ("§ 2241") for a writ of habeas corpus, along with an incorporated memorandum of law in support. The petition itself is entitled "Motion 28 U.S.C. 2241(C)(2)(C)(3) For a Constructive Amendment of the Indictment and Structural Error in Trial, Also See, 28 U.S.C. § 2243." Pet. (Docket No. 1). In this action, Burgess challenges both his criminal conviction and his criminal sentence imposed in the Eastern District of Michigan almost 20 years ago.

Burgess is a frequent habeas filer. The background of his criminal case and subsequentproceedings has been summarized by this and other courts. Culling out the recitations from those opinions, and more particularly from an appellate decision,¹ the salient history is as follows.

I. The Criminal Case: United States v. Burgess, Cr. No. 87-80739 (E.D. Mich.)

On September 25,1987, special agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") arrested Burgess in connection with an undercover investigation which resulted in the seizure of 10 kilograms of cocaine exchanged for $220,000. Thereafter, Burgess was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. After a detention hearing in the District Court, Burgess was detained without bond based on the danger he presented to the community. On October 5, 1987, a federal grand jury charged Burgess in a three-count Indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1); distribution of cocaine and aiding and abetting the distribution of more than 5,000 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and unlawful use of a communication facility, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). United States v. Burgess, Cr. No. 87-80739 (E.D. Mich.).

The course of Burgess's criminal prosecution did not run smoothly. Initially, Burgess entered into a plea agreement which was later withdrawn; thereafter he was tried three times by a jury, the first two ending in mistrials based on juror taint, and later, based on delay in proceedings as a result of Burgess's competency evaluation and attendant treatment. Ultimately, Burgess was convicted, but his sentencing also was delayed due to the death of the presiding trialjudge and reassignment to another judge.

Specifically, the chronology is as follows. On December 2, 1987, Burgess entered a Rule 11 plea agreement with the government. Pursuant to that agreement, Burgess entered a plea of guilty to count one of the Indictment. On February 1, 1988, the government filed a motion to set aside the Rule 11 plea agreement due to Burgess's failure to cooperate in other investigations as agreed.² On April 19, 1988, the motion to withdraw the plea agreement was granted, and a trial date was set.

On June 7, 1988, the first trial began; however, on June 28, 1988, the District Court declared a mistrial because of juror taint which occurred when members of the jury read newspaper articles about the case. The District Court found that the jurors' reading of an article in the Detroit News relating to Burgess's withdrawn guilty plea was prejudicial.

A second trial was set. During this second trial, on August 15, 1988, Burgess alleged that he suffered various physical problems that prevented him from attending the remainder of his trial and undermined his ability to properly assist in his defense. The next day, the government filed a motion for a competency evaluation. On September 13, 1988, after a one-week evaluation at the Federal Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan, the District Court entered an order finding Burgess mentally incompetent to continue with the trial. Burgess was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for evaluation and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 et seq. He was treated for four months at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota.

On January 17, 1989, the warden of the Federal Medical Center filed a certificate ofrecovery and requested that Burgess be discharged from psychiatric hospitalization. Dr. Daniel Foster, chief of psychology at the medical center, testified at Burgess' competency hearing held on March 23, 1989. Dr. Foster opined that Burgess was malingering based on his inconsistent symptoms and behavior throughout the evaluation.

On March 17, 1989, the District Court conducted a voir dire of the jurors out of Burgess's presence. The jurors indicated that they could proceed with the case despite the delay and their inability to recollect certain witnesses. The trial was scheduled to continue on June 26, 1989.

On June 16, 1989, Burgess filed a motion for a mistrial. The District Court granted Burgess's motion on the same day based on the lapse of time since jurors last heard testimony.

On June 21, 1989, Burgess filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the Indictment. The District Court denied the motion on November 30, 1989. Burgess then filed a timely notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ("Sixth Circuit").³

On appeal, Burgess contended that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the Indictment, because his prosecution after two mistrials violated, inter alia, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit rejected Burgess's arguments and affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss the Indictment. See United States v. Burgess, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir.1991).

The third trial against Burgess began on January 23, 1990. On February 23, 1990 he wasconvicted on all three counts of the Indictment. On March 29, 1990, before sentencing, the trial judge, the late Honorable Ralph M. Freeman, died, and the case was reassigned on April 4, 1990, to United States District Judge Paul V. Gadola.

On June 29, 1990, Burgess filed five motions, including a motion to adjourn sentencing until full review of the trial transcripts by the new sentencing judge. Burgess eventually was sentenced on January 2, 1992, after the resolution of numerous additional motions filed between June 29, 1990 and December 30, 1991. The District Court sentenced Burgess on Counts I and II to concurrent terms of forty-five (45) years and to a five year term of supervised release. On Count III, Burgess was sentenced to a term of four years to run concurrently to the sentences imposed on Counts I and II.

Thereafter, Burgess filed a direct appeal with the Sixth Circuit. United States v. Burgess 986 F.2d 1423 (Table), 1993 WL 48845 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished decision). He raised six grounds challenging both his conviction and sentence. First, Burgess claimed that the District Court's refusal to suppress certain inculpatory statements made during his interrogation after arrest violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. He also contended his confession was involuntary. Additionally, Burgess contended that he never received Miranda warnings. The Sixth Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that the police conduct was not coercive.

Second, Burgess contended that during his third trial, the District Court improperly denied him the right to cross examine DEA Special Agent Gregory Anderson concerning an internal investigation of Anderson. The Sixth Circuit found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.

Third, Burgess challenged his sentence, arguing that the 45 year sentence he received on Counts I and II was disproportionate to the crime, and therefore constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument as well, stating that:

Contrary to defendant's assertion, he was not sentenced under the Sentencing Reform Act, whose effective date was November 1, 1987. The pre-Guidelines sentencing range for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), was a mandatory minimum custodial sentence of ten years imprisonment and a maximum possible sentence of life imprisonment.

With respect to pre-Guidelines sentences, once it is determined that a sentence is within the applicable statutory limitations, appellate review is at an end. United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 773 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting Dorszy v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976)). This court has stated that "[i]t is axiomatic that the imposition of sentences within the statutory limits lies almost entirely within the discretion of the trial judge." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, we have routinely rejected such Eighth Amendment challenges in similar drug cases. See, e.g., United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1236 (6th Cir.1991) (rejecting as "patently meritless" defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to a 360-month sentence where there was evidence that defendant had dealt in over 55 kilograms of cocaine; guidelines offense), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1505 (1992); United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir.) (forty-year sentence for conspiracy to distribute in excess of 80 kilograms of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment where defendant received maximum statutory sentence; guidelines offense), cert. denied, 111

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