Burgess v. Henderson, Civil Action No. 99-1840 (NHP) (D. N.J. 6/2/2000)
| Decision Date | 02 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 99-1840 (NHP) |
| Parties | Re: Alvin L. Burgess v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment of defendants William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, and the United States Postal Service. This matter was resolved without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons explained below, the motion for summary judgment of defendants William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, and the United States Postal Service is GRANTED.
Alvin L. Burgess ("plaintiff"), a pro se plaintiff, filed a Complaint on April 27, 1999, alleging that William J. Henderson, as Postmaster General, and the United States Postal Service (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Postal Service" or "defendant") fired him because of his race and gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In addition, plaintiff charges that the Postal Service filed negative evaluations concerning his work performance in retaliation for plaintiff seeking counseling for discrimination with the Postal Service Equal Employment Office ("EEO"). Plaintiff sues for back pay, compensation for emotional distress, and punitive damages.1
Plaintiff, an African-American male, was hired by the Postal Service facility in Hackensack, New Jersey, as a temporary employee/casual mailhandler on October 16, 1994, for a period not to exceed one year. On December 31, 1994, plaintiff was terminated from that position. Plaintiff then applied for a similar temporary position in the Paterson, New Jersey, Post Office on March 2, 1995. On May 31, 1995, the Postal Service denied plaintiff's application for employment at the Paterson Post Office. Apparently, plaintiff was denied the position based on the negative evaluations submitted by his superiors in the Hackensack office. On July 17, 1995, plaintiff accepted an offer from the Postal Service for a temporary position in Edgewater, New Jersey.
On or about August 30, 1995, plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint with the EEO alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The EEO accepted plaintiff's claim for investigation by letter dated October 20, 1995. On August 13, 1997, the EEO issued a Final Agency Decision, in which it denied plaintiff's claim as untimely for failure to contact an EEO counselor within forty-five days of his discharge. Plaintiff filed an appeal of the Final Agency Decision to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Office of Federal Operations ("EEOC").
Plaintiff then filed a Complaint in federal court on November 12, 1997. On February 2, 1999, plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to effect service of process. On November 17, 1998, the EEOC affirmed the Postal Service Equal Employment Office's Final Agency Decision denying plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff filed a request to reconsider with the EEOC on December 17, 1998, which was denied on March 18, 1999.
Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of race and gender discrimination because he failed to prove that employees of a different race or gender received more favorable treatment. Defendant further argues that even if plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of race and gender discrimination, he cannot show that defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff were pretextual. Plaintiff counters that the defendant has not proffered any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may only be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir. 1987). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, for which that party will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Moreover, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323; Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 896. Once that burden has been met, the nonmoving party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmovant must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. An issue is "material" only if the dispute "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To defeat "a properly supported summary judgment motion, the party opposing it must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in its favor." Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). If the record, as a whole, cannot "lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
Because plaintiff has not presented direct evidence of discrimination, his race and gender discrimination claim under Title VII requires application of the familiar burden-shifting framework the Supreme Court articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Simpson v. Kaye Jewelers, Div. Of Serling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1998). Under McDonnell Douglas's burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 1999 WL 1134576, *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 1999). If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. Finally, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (citations omitted).
In order to defeat a summary judgment motion where the employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, "the plaintiff must point to evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). While the burden of production may shift, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id.
The issue of whether a prima facie case has been made out by a plaintiff is a legal one for the Court to determine. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 348 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999). To prove a prima facie case, the plaintiff must establish each of the following: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was discharged under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 3356-57 (3d Cir. 1999); Leung v. SHK Management, Inc., 1999 WL 1240961, *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1999); Brogan v. LaSalle University, 70 F. Supp.2d 556, 563-64 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Contrary to the assertions of defendant, plaintiff's prima facie case is not undermined by the fact that he was replaced by another African-American male. In the recent Pivirotto decision, the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff claiming discriminatory firing need not prove that she was replaced by someone outside the protected class to make out a prima facie case. See 191 F.3d at 347. Rather, the Third Circuit concluded that McDonnell Douglas requires only "evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion." Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at356 (quoting O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996)). Reiterating prior Supreme Court precedent, the Court emphasized that the "central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is always whether the employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Id. at 352 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978)).
Plaintiff has met the first two prongs of the prima facie case. He is an African-American male who had experience as a casual mailhandler.2 Plaintiff cannot, however, point to any evidence that creates an inference that his discharge was based on the fact that he is an African-American male. Likewise, there exists no circumstantial evidence that similarly situated white and/or female employees were treated more favorably than plaintiff. The only evidence plaintiff provides is that he is an African-American male. Indeed, despite the Court's holding in Pivirot...
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