Burgess v. Robinson

Decision Date01 March 1901
Citation95 Me. 120,49 A. 606
PartiesBURGESS v. ROBINSON.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

(Official.)

Report from supreme judicial court, Waldo county.

Action by Ida L. Burgess against Reuel Robinson. Case reported, and judgment for defendant.

Writ of entry, brought to recover possession of certain real estate situate in Searsmont, Waldo county. Plea, the general issue. The plaintiff claimed title under a tax deed. The defendant claimed title under a sheriff's deed, dated November 5, 1890, and under which he took possession. The tax was assessed in April, 1895. The tax sale was on December 8, 1896.

Argued before WISWELL, a J., and EMERY, WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, FOGLER, and POWERS, JJ.

R. F. & J. R. Dunton, for plaintiff.

Reuel Robinson, pro se.

WHITEHOUSE, J. This is a writ of entry to recover possession of certain real estate situated in Searsmont, in the county of Waldo, bounded as therein described, and alleged to contain 187 acres, more or less.

The plaintiff derives her title to the land by a deed from the inhabitants of the town of Searsmont, to whom the land was sold by its collector of taxes December 8, 1896, for nonpayment of the tax assessed thereon for the year 1805, as the property of Joseph S. Burgess, the plaintiff's husband. The defendant derives title under a sheriff's deed dated November 5, 1896, given in pursuance of a sale thereof on an execution against Joseph S. Burgess, which passed to the defendant all the interest Burgess had at the date of the attachment on the original writ, June 8, 1895.

It is contended in behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff's attempt to set up a tax title cannot prevail: First, because the requirements of the statutes were not observed by the town officers either in assessing the tax or in conducting the sale of the land for nonpayment of the tax; and, second, because he says that, if the town did acquire a valid title under its tax deed, the plaintiff acquired no title under her deed from the town, for the reason that the purchase was in fact made by the husband, and the consideration furnished by him, and the deed taken in the name of the wife, this plaintiff, for the manifest purpose of defeating the rights of the attaching creditor.

In support of the plaintiff's tax title it is suggested that the amendatory act of 1895 (chapter 70), relating to sales of land for nonpayment of taxes (made applicable by chapter 137 to taxes assessed that year), affords relief from a rigid compliance with some of the requirements of the statutes to which many of the adjudications of this court have hitherto related; and it is contended that the proceedings in this case show a strict adherence to the mode prescribed by the statutes as amended by the act of 1895.

But a careful examination of the provisions of that act fails to disclose any attempt or purpose to modify the rule established in Greene v. Lunt, 58 Me. 518, and reaffirmed in all the subsequent decisions down to Green v. Alden, 92 Me. 177, 42 Atl. 358, that in the assessment which establishes the lien on land and forms the basis of all subsequent proceedings there must be a definite and distinct description of the land upon which the tax is intended to be assessed. Indeed, it may fairly be said that a contrary intention affirmatively appears, for in Rev. St. c. 6, § 193, as amended by the act of 1895, above cited, is still found the provision authorizing the collector to post notices of the sale, "designating the name of the owner, if known, the right, lot and range, the number of acres as nearly as may be, the amount of tax due, and such other short description as is necessary to render its identification certain and plain."

This identical language is found in the original act of 1844 (chapter 123), and has been retained in all subsequent revisions. It is also cited by the court in Greene v. Lunt, 58 Me. 518, in confirmation of the view there taken respecting the necessity for a definite description of the land in the assessment list; for the list of assessments committed to him is the source from which the collector must obtain the information to enable him to give such "short description as necessary to render its identification certain and plain" in the notices of sale to be posted by him, and in the returns which he is required to make to the town clerk and treasurer.

It further appears that section 197 of the same chapter, though amended by the act of 1895, still declares that within 30 days after making such sale the collector "shall make a return, with a particular statement of his doings in making such sales, to the clerk of Ms town, who shall record it in the town records; and said return * * * shall be evidence of the facts therein set forth in all cases where such collector is not personally interested." The amendment then provides that this return shall be in substance like the form there prescribed, and by this form he is required to "set forth each parcel of the estate so offered for sale" in the schedule outlined, under the caption "Description of Property." Nor is there any provision in the act of 1895 to relieve the collector from the duty of making this return to the clerk in accordance with the strict requirements of the statute. True, the amendment to section 193 provides that "no irregularity, informality or omission in giving the notices required by this act, or in lodging copy of any of the same with the town clerk as herein required, shall render such sale invalid," but this obviously has no reference to the formal return of his doings which the collector...

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8 cases
  • Inhabitants of Town of Warren v. Norwood
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 20 December 1941
    ...to the enforcement of the lien which that tax creates must rest. This issue is fundamental. Greene v. Lunt, 58 Me. 518; Burgess v. Robinson, 95 Me. 120, 49 A. 606. It represents a requirement which even legislative action cannot waive. Blackwell on Tax Titles, Par. 223. The assessment shown......
  • Wood v. Schwartz
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 5 May 1931
    ...owner, but the vendee's deed will be treated as void from the beginning.' See, also, Varney v. Stevens, 22 Me. 331, and Burgess v. Robinson, 95 Me. 120, 49 A. 606. In other jurisdictions many other cases to the same are found. It is unnecessary to cite them. Several such authorities are col......
  • Solis v. Williams
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 1 March 1910
    ... ... and in law was a fraud upon the plaintiffs. Varney v ... Stevens, 22 Me. 331, 334; Burgess v. Robinson, ... 95 Me. 120, 127, 49 A. 606 ...          By Pub ... St. c. 124, § 16, re-enacted in Rev. Laws, c. 185, § 1, an ... ...
  • City of Old Town v. Robbins
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 3 August 1936
    ...what portion of his land, if any, has been sold for taxes, and * * * to learn what he is required to redeem." Burgess v. Robinson, 95 Me. 120, 126, 49 A. 606, 608. All provisions of the statute (Rev. St. 1930, c. 14, § 72 et seq.), whether they relate to proceedings before or subsequent to ......
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