Burgess v. United States, 09-242L
| Decision Date | 07 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-242L,09-242L |
| Parties | LOUIS A. BURGESS, et al., For themselves and as representatives of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Takings case; Cross-motions for partial
summary judgment; Rails-to-Trails Act;
Determination of claimant's property
interests; Preseault; Iowa law construed;
Easements for railroad purposes; Railroad
relocation - fee simple deeds; Deeds
executed under threat of condemnation;
Deeds with reverter clauses - application of
Iowa Code § 614.24, Stale Users and
Reversions Act (SURA); Dedication of alley
to public use; Questions of fact precludes
rulings as to certain parcels; Recreational
trail and railbanking not encompassed within
"railroad purpose"; Scope of takings; Trial.
OPINIONThomas Scott Stewart, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, L.L.C., Kansas City, MO, for plaintiffs.
Frank James Singer, Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom was Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Cruden, for defendant.
Plaintiffs are landowners in Iowa, who allege that their property was taken as a result of actions taken by defendant under the National Trails System Act (the Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51. The court certified a class on September 14, 2009. Pending are cross-motions for partial summary judgment regarding defendant's liability as to the 148 parcels at issue. For the reasons that follow, the court renders a split decision, concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant is liable with respect to some of these parcels and not as to others. For still other parcels, the court determines that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precludes aruling as to liability. The court's determinations are summarized in the appendix that follows this opinion.
A brief recitation of the underlying facts sets the context for this decision.
The class of plaintiffs in this case owns real estate that assertedly underlies or adjoins a 23.61 mile railroad corridor that runs through Franklin and Butler Counties, Iowa (the Railroad Line). The Railroad Line was originally created by the Iowa Pacific Railroad Company (the Railroad),1 , which in the 1870s, established the corridor through a combination of various forms of conveyance and transfer. In many instances, the Iowa Pacific (and its successors-in-interest, including the Dubuque and Dakota Railroad Company and the Mason City and Fort Dodge Railroad) frequently used a standard form of right-of-way deed. Although these deeds varied slightly, they generally stated, in critical part:
That in consideration of the sum of [dollar amount] . . . , and the benefit [the grantors] expect to derive from the construction of their road, [grantors' name] . . . hereby grant, convey, and confirm unto the said THE IOWA PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, their successors and assigns forever, the RIGHT OF WAY for their Railroad, to-wit: A strip of land for that purpose one hundred feet wide across [legal description of land involved].
In other instances, the Railroad relocated the rail corridor and obtained new deeds. These deeds typically recited the following language:
That [grantors], in the consideration of the sum of [dollar amount] . . . , do hereby Grant, Bargain, Sell and Convey unto [the railroad company], its successors and assigns forever, all that tract or parcel of land lying and being in the County of Butler and State of Iowa, described as follows, to-wit: [legal description of land involved].
The Iowa Pacific and its successors-in-interest also negotiated various other forms of conveyance in establishing the rail corridor.
Eventually, Union Pacific Railroad (Union Pacific) became the successor-in-interest to the Railroad. On June 9, 2003, Union Pacific filed a petition for exemption with the SurfaceTransportation Board (STB),2 seeking permission to abandon a segment on the eastern portion of the Railroad Line, specifically, that between milepost 318.36, near Hampton, Iowa, and milepost 294.75, near Allison, Iowa - a distance totaling 23.61 miles. On June 9, 2003, the Iowa Trails Council, a non-profit trail operator, filed a petition with the STB expressing interest in negotiating a trail use agreement with Union Pacific. Union Pacific subsequently responded that it was willing to negotiate such an agreement with the Council. Based on this mutual expression of interest, on September 26, 2003, the STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU)3 for the portion of the Railroad Line identified above. On August 4, 2008, the Iowa Natural Heritage Foundation, on behalf of the Conservation Boards of Franklin and Butler Counties, and the Iowa Trails Council, notified the STB that it and Union Pacific had entered into a trail use agreement.
On April 20, 2009, plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court seeking just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for property they claim was taken when the STB issued a NITU pursuant to the Trails Act. As mentioned, on September 14, 2009, the court certified a class that eventually grew to include 148 individual parcels and 77 individuals or entities. On September 22, 2009, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On September 8, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on liability as to some of the parcels in the class. On October 29, 2010, the court granted the parties' joint motion to stay briefing on plaintiffs' motion pending settlement discussions. On June 21, 2011, after those settlement discussions appeared to have run their course, the court lifted the stay and resumed briefing of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. On July 8, 2011, defendant filed a response to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and its own cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Briefing and argument on these cross-motions, which now involve all 148 parcels, has now been completed.
We begin with common ground. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See RCFC 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Disputes over facts that are not outcome-determinative will not preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248. However, summary judgment will not be granted if "the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Becho, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 595, 599 (2000).
When making a summary judgment determination, the court is not to weigh the evidence, but to "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Agosto v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978) (); Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 154 (2004). The court must determine whether the evidence presents a disagreement sufficient to require fact finding, or, conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-52; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) . Where there is a genuine dispute, all facts must be construed, and all inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Stovall v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 336, 344 (2010); L.P. Consulting Grp., Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 238, 240 (2005). Where, as here, a court considers cross-motions for (partial) summary judgment, it must view each motion, separately, through this prism.4
In Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc), the Federal Circuit held that a threshold issue in rails-to-trails cases is who owned the land involved, with particular focus on whether the railroad in question acquired only an easement or instead obtained fee simple title to the corridor. "Clearly, if the Railroad obtained fee simple title to the land over which it was to operate, and that title inures, as it would, to its successors," the court observed, a plaintiff "would have no right or interest in those parcels and could have no claim related to those parcels for a taking." Id.; see also Sutton v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 436, 438 (2012). The Federal Circuit went on to explain that if an easement is found, the court must then determine whether it was subject to limitations, particularly, one "limited to use for railroadpurposes." Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1533; see also Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
As to the wide majority of parcels at issue, both parties focus on the legal import of the same deeds, which effectuated the conveyance of a property interest from plaintiffs' predecessors to the Railroad. Under Iowa law, deeds are interpreted according to the ordinary rules of contract construction. See Weigmann v. Baier, 203 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Iowa 1972); Maxwell v. McCall, 124 N.W. 760 (Iowa 1910); Jackson v. Benson, 7 N.W. 97 (Iowa 1880); see also Douglas R. Bigelow Trust v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 490, 493 (2012); Sutton, 107 Fed. Cl. at 440. As to these parcels, both parties largely agree that there are no questions of fact and that the issue of how these deeds should be construed presents a question of law, suitable for...
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