Burka v. New York City Transit Authority, 1419
| Decision Date | 07 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 1419,1419 |
| Citation | 32 F.3d 654 |
| Parties | Thomas BURKA; Eugene Avent; Frank Doe; Tracey Devlin; Fitzgerald Cumberbatch; and Felix Arce, Plaintiffs, James Salazar, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY; David L. Gunn, individually and in his official capacity as President of the New York City Transit Authority, and his successors in office; Robert F. Kiley, individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of the New York City Transit Authority, and his successors in office; Brian Frohlinger, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Vice President, Labor Relations for the New York City Transit Authority, and his successors in office; and Monica Benjamin, individually and in her official capacity as the Medical Director of the New York City Transit Authority, and her successors in office, Defendants. John GRAY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Respondent-Appellee. ocket 93-9075. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
James B. Fishman, New York City, for petitioner-appellee.
Richard Schoolman, Office of Albert C. Cosenza, General Counsel, New York City Transit Authority, Brooklyn, NY, for respondent-appellee.
Before: LUMBARD, OAKES, and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-appellant John Gray appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Patterson, J.), upholding a determination by respondent-appellee New York City Transit Authority ("respondent" or the "Transit Authority") that Gray was not an eligible class member under the terms of an Order on Consent ("Consent Order" or "settlement"). Under the Consent Order, which settled a class action challenging respondent's drug testing policy, a claimant can collect only if he has not brought a prior claim that by virtue of res judicata would preclude him from again challenging the drug testing or any adverse employment action taken on the basis thereof. After reviewing an earlier challenge by Gray to respondent's drug testing policy brought in state court, the district court determined that Gray now essentially argues that the district court erred in determining what relief was sought in the class action, and consequently incorrectly determined that his subsequent action would be barred by res judicata. This argument is based on Gray's belief that, for purposes of res judicata analysis, the relief sought in the subsequent proceeding should be gleaned from the terms of the Consent Order rather than from the complaint in the action underlying the Consent Order. Because we disagree, we affirm the district court's decision.
Gray would have been barred by res judicata from individually pursuing the claims for relief sought in the class action. Accordingly, under the terms of the Consent Order, the district court found Gray ineligible to collect on his claim for relief.
Beginning in 1983, Gray was employed by the Transit Authority as a Signal Maintainer's Helper. On October 31, 1984, in connection with an application for a promotion, Gray was required to undergo a urinalysis. After testing positive for marijuana use, Gray was eventually dismissed from his position pursuant to Transit Authority policy.
Other employees of respondent, having similarly been required to undergo drug testing, brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Transit Authority's marijuana testing policy ("Burka " action). On September 4, 1985, subsequent to the filing of the complaint in Burka, Gray brought an action pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law & Rules challenging his dismissal. Gray claimed that his discharge, which was automatically imposed pursuant to Transit Authority rules, was arbitrary and capricious because other employees in similar positions who had tested positive for marijuana use had not been discharged. Gray was initially successful in the Supreme Court, Kings County, which overturned respondent's determination firing him. This decision, however, was later overturned by the Appellate Division, Second Department. See Gray v. New York City Transit Auth., 128 A.D.2d 528, 512 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1987).
Subsequently, on September 27, 1991, the parties in the Burka action executed the Consent Order settling the class action claims. The Consent Order was approved by the district court on December 19, 1991. It provides for various forms of relief to seven subclasses of employees who were terminated, suspended, or denied promotions because of positive urinalysis results. The relief includes reinstatement, expungement of references to positive marijuana test results from employees' records, and monetary payments. The Consent Order specifically excludes from the definition of eligible class members any individual who was a party to any other proceeding against the Transit Authority that resulted in a judicial determination that would by reason of res judicata preclude the individual from challenging the validity of the urinalysis or any adverse employment action taken on the basis of the test.
The Consent Order also provides for an appeal of an eligibility determination by the Transit Authority to a United States Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is reviewable, upon motion, by the assigned District Judge. An individual who successfully challenges the respondent's denial of relief is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in such challenge.
Thereafter, Gray made a claim for relief under the Consent Order which was rejected by the respondent. The respondent contended that Gray's claim was barred by res judicata because he was party to another lawsuit against the Transit Authority relating to his drug testing claim.
Gray challenged the respondent's decision contending that res judicata did not bar his claim under the Consent Order because that claim involved relief that the state court in his prior Article 78 proceeding was powerless to award. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis rejected Gray's argument, finding that the relief sought in the class action underlying the Consent Order could have been sought in Gray's Article 78 proceeding, and that Gray therefore would have been barred by res judicata from pursuing the relief sought in the Burka action. The Magistrate
Judge's report was affirmed by the district court for essentially the same reasons. For the reasons discussed below, we agree.
On appeal, Gray challenges the district court's determination that he was not an eligible class member under the terms of the Consent Order. We review the court's interpretation of the settlement agreement de novo. See Huertas v. East River Hous. Corp., 992 F.2d 1263, 1266 (2d Cir.1993). As noted above, according to the terms of the Consent Order, whether Gray is an eligible class member turns on whether principles of res judicata would require a finding that Gray's initial Article 78 proceeding challenging his dismissal from respondent's employ for testing positive for marijuana would preclude Gray from...
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