Burke v. Board of Review

• Decision Date: 01 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-170,84-170
• Citation: 132 Ill.App.3d 1094,477 N.E.2d 1351,87 Ill.Dec. 823
• Parties: , 87 Ill.Dec. 823 Patrick BURKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, Illinois Department of Labor, Defendants-Appellants (McCartin, McAuliffe, Mechanical Contractors, Inc. Defendant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1351

477 N.E.2d 1351

132 Ill.App.3d 1094, 87 Ill.Dec. 823

Patrick BURKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, Illinois Department of Labor, Defendants-Appellants

(McCartin, McAuliffe, Mechanical Contractors, Inc. Defendant).

No. 84-170.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

May 1, 1985.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Thomas P. Marnell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, John Steven Cole, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Elmhurst, for defendants-appellants.

Kathleen P. Konicki, John P. Ridge, Hinsdale, for plaintiff-appellee.

SCHNAKE, Justice:

The defendants, the Board of Review (Board), and the Illinois Department of Labor (Department), appeal from an order of the circuit court, entered in an administrative review proceeding, that reversed the Board's determination that the plaintiff, Patrick Burke, was not qualified for unemployment insurance benefits under the provisions of section 601 A of "An Act in relation to a system of unemployment insurance" (Unemployment Insurance Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 431 A). The Board argues that the trial court's order must be reversed for two reasons: (1) that the court below improperly considered and relied upon evidence outside the administrative record; and (2) that the Board's determination--that the plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits--was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

The plaintiff had been employed by McCartin, McAuliffe Mechanical Contractors, Incorporated (McCartin), as a pipefitter at the Dresden nuclear power station for three months prior to November 1, 1982. Subsequently, Burke applied for unemployment compensation benefits. In his application Burke stated that he left his job with McCartin "to take another job because he felt that conditions were hazardous at Dresden due to a lack of safety precautions."

On December 15, 1982, an Illinois Department of Labor claims adjudicator determined that the plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The adjudicator found that the claimant voluntarily terminated his job to take another position that did not materialize. The adjudicator decided that the termination was not attributable to the employer and concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff was not qualified for unemployment insurance benefits under the provisions of section 601 A of the Unemployment Compensation Act.

Approximately two weeks later, the plaintiff filed a timely appeal from this determination with the appeals section of the Unemployment Insurance Division of the Department, and on January 8, 1983, he was granted a formal hearing before a Department hearings referee. At this hearing Burke stated that he felt he had another job (with Amoco Oil) when he quit his position with McCartin at Dresden, but the new job with Amoco Oil did not materialize. He related, also, that he orally notified his supervisor of his intention to quit, but admitted (1) that he failed to provide any reason for his leaving, and (2) that he did not report the allegedly unsafe conditions to his employer so that they could be rectified. He testified, in addition, that he feared he would be branded a troublemaker if he complained about the purportedly hazardous conditions. Also, he remarked that his supervisors were already cognizant of the unsafe conditions. Finally, Burke claimed that before he quit two fellow employees were found to be contaminated with radiation upon departing the facility. As a result, his co-workers lost some clothing and had to take a shower. However, he himself was not found to be contaminated.

The referee was also presented with evidence, in the form of a letter from the plaintiff's supervisor at McCartin, that the plaintiff did not mention to him that he was leaving due to hazardous working conditions; rather, Burke merely mentioned that he was quitting.

On January 31, 1983, the hearings referee denied the plaintiff's claim for benefits under section 601 A. In his findings of fact, the referee stated that the plaintiff left his job "because he considered that areas of radiation were still unknown and as such the work areas were hazardous." The referee found, also, that the claimant hoped to start a new job at the time of his departure from McCartin, but the new position did not materialize. Lastly, the referee found that Burke "did not discuss the reasons for his dissatisfaction with his work with his supervisor before leaving."

In reaching his decision to affirm the determination of the claims adjudicator, the referee concluded:

"Since the claimant failed to discuss the reasons for his dissatisfaction with his work with his supervisors in an effort to try to remedy them before leaving [,] he failed to use all reasonable means to remain employed as he was obliged to do [,] and therefore his leaving must be held to be without good cause attributable to the employer and subjects the claimant to the disqualification for benefits * * * [under] Section 601A of the Act."

The plaintiff appealed to the Department's Board of Review, which affirmed the referee's decision on April 29, 1983, stating that the referee's findings of fact and decision found support in the record and the law.

On June 3, 1983, the plaintiff filed the present action for judicial review of the Board's decision. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 3-101 et seq.) Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint for administrative review, appending as exhibits to it certain news releases and letters from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Board and the Department moved to strike the exhibits on the ground that they had not been made a part of the administrative record previously.

The trial court reviewed the amended complaint and all the exhibits attached to it. On June 24, 1984, the court below denied the motion to strike, remarking that the materials were relevant to the proceedings and, therefore, should be part of the record. After determining that the plaintiff had reasonable cause to terminate his employment, the court reversed the Board's decision. The Board and the Department appealed in timely fashion (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 3-112).

The Board's first contention is that the trial court erred when it admitted and considered the exhibits, in the form of news releases and letters from the NRC, the plaintiff appended to his amended complaint for administrative review. The Board concludes that the trial court's improper reliance on evidence outside the administrative record amounted to reversible error.

The trial court reviewed the appended exhibits, denied the motion of the Board and the Department to strike them, stated that the materials were relevant to the proceedings, and then made them part of the record.

Section 3-110 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, with respect to administrative review, that "[n]o new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 3-110). (Village of Western Springs v. Pollution Control Board (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 864, 870, 63 Ill.Dec. 527, 438 N.E.2d 458.) During an administrative review proceeding, the circuit court is confined to a consideration of the evidence submitted during the administrative hearing and may not entertain additional evidence or conduct a hearing de novo. (Pipe Trades, Inc. v. Rauch (1954), 2 Ill.2d 278, 291, 118 N.E.2d 319; Northwest Hospital v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 221, 227, 17 Ill.Dec. 43, 375 N.E.2d 1327; Lamar v. Illinois Racing Board (1977), 55 Ill.App.3d 640, 647, 13 Ill.Dec. 214, 370 N.E.2d 1241; Monsanto Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 333, 336, 350 N.E.2d 289, rev'd on other grounds (1977), 67 Ill.2d 276, 10 Ill.Dec. 231, 367 N.E.2d 684; see Tri-America Oil Co. v. Department of Review (1982), 117 Ill.App.3d 774, 777, 73 Ill.Dec. 257, 454 N.E.2d 1, aff'd (1984), 102 Ill.2d 234, 80 Ill.Dec. 93, 464 N.E.2d 1076.) Because the exhibits were not offered into evidence before the administrative agency, the trial court could not properly consider them. (Cf. Kellenbenz v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1983), 71 Pa.Commw. 468, 454 A.2d 1202, 1202 n. 2 (a court of review may not consider evidence that was not presented before the administrative agency).) The court's consideration of these exhibits was not harmless error. See, e.g., Lamar v. Illinois Racing Board (1977), 55 Ill.App.3d 640, 647, 13 Ill.Dec. 214, 370 N.E.2d 1241.

Rather than hearing or considering new evidence, thereby attempting to correct any alleged deficiency in the evidence presented to the administrative agency, the trial court should have remanded the matter to the Department for a hearing to take additional evidence (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 3-111(a)(6), (7)). Rock Island Metal Foundry, Inc. v. City of Rock Island (1953), 414 Ill. 436, 439-40, 111 N.E.2d 499; see Strohl v. Macon County Zoning Board (1952), 411 Ill. 559, 104 N.E.2d 612; Appel v. Zoning Board of Appeals of City of Mattoon (1970), 120 Ill.App.2d 401, 404-05, 257 N.E.2d 9.

The defendants' additional contention is that the manifest weight of the evidence supports the Board's decision that the plaintiff was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his job without good cause attributable to his employer. Therefore, they concluded that the trial court improperly reversed the decision of the Board. More specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to establish either that a health hazard existed or that he had a firm job offer.

The cardinal purpose of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 300 et seq.) is to provide compensation benefits to unemployed individuals in order to alleviate their economic distress that was occasioned by involuntary...