Burke v. Mesniaeff

Citation220 A.3d 777,334 Conn. 100
Decision Date17 December 2019
Docket NumberSC 20062
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Parties Elizabeth BURKE v. Gregory MESNIAEFF

334 Conn. 100
220 A.3d 777

Elizabeth BURKE

SC 20062

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 19, 2018
Officially released December 17, 2019

220 A.3d 780

Gregory Jacob, pro hac vice, Washington, with whom were Mishima Alam, pro hac vice, and Anne C. Dranginis, Bridgeport, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Charles S. Harris, Norwalk, with whom was Stephanie C. Laska, Norwalk, for the appellee (defendant).

Joseph D. Jean, New York, filed a brief for the Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.


220 A.3d 781
334 Conn. 102

The plaintiff, Elizabeth Burke, appeals from the Appellate Court's affirmance of the trial court's judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Gregory

334 Conn. 103

Mesniaeff, after a jury returned a verdict finding that, although the defendant had perpetrated an intentional assault and battery on the plaintiff, his use of physical force was justified because, first, the plaintiff was trespassing at the time of the incident, and, second, he was acting in the defense of others. The plaintiff claims on appeal that (1) the jury should not have been instructed on the special defense of criminal trespass because the parties were married at the time of the assault and battery, and a spouse cannot, as a matter of law, trespass on marital property, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant was acting in defense of others. We conclude that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on criminal trespass and defense of premises as part of the jury charge on justification but that the instructional impropriety was harmless because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's independent finding with respect to the special defense of defense of others. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.


The evidence regarding virtually every material aspect of the underlying events was the subject of vigorous dispute at trial. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, as we must; see, e.g., Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 262 Conn. 433, 442, 815 A.2d 119 (2003) ; the jury reasonably could have found the following facts relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1989. In 1998, the defendant, who is interested in the historic preservation of old homes, purchased a historic house in Sharon (Sharon house), which he titled solely in his name. Although the Sharon house was not the parties' primary marital residence, they both had Connecticut drivers' licenses listing the Sharon house as their residential address. The defendant spent more time at the Sharon house than the plaintiff, but the plaintiff had keys to the home, spent two weeks there in 2002 with

334 Conn. 104

the defendant, stayed there occasionally at other times, and stored personal possessions on the premises.

The Sharon house is subject to a historic preservation easement, which requires the home occasionally to be opened to the public for viewing. To fulfill this requirement, the defendant invited members of The Questers, a historical preservation organization, to tour the Sharon house on December 5, 2009, between the hours of 2 and 4:30 p.m. The defendant did not invite the plaintiff to attend the tour because she was not a member of The Questers, they were not "on the best of terms at that time," and he was "afraid that there could be some problems if she was there."

On the morning of December 5, 2009, the plaintiff went online to find out the date and time of the annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Sharon, only to discover

220 A.3d 782

that a tour of the Sharon house was scheduled for that afternoon. The plaintiff was "shocked and puzzled" because the defendant had not mentioned the tour, and she believed that he was at work that day. She called the defendant at his office but was unable to reach him. The plaintiff decided to go to the Sharon house and talk to the defendant because she was convinced that he would deny the existence of the historic house tour, and she "couldn't take the lying anymore ...."

Due to the snowy weather that afternoon, only three members of The Questers other than the defendant were present for the tour: Anne Teasdale, Suzanne Chase Osborne, and Lauren Silberman. When the plaintiff arrived at the Sharon house, the defendant was in the kitchen, Osborne was in the television room, and Teasdale and Silberman were in the living room. Rather than park her car in the driveway of the Sharon house, the plaintiff parked at an adjacent guest cottage and entered the house through the back door that leads into the television room. Osborne walked midway across

334 Conn. 105

the television room to greet the plaintiff, whom she believed was another guest arriving for the tour. The defendant entered the television room from the kitchen to greet the new arrival but, upon realizing it was the plaintiff, immediately instructed Osborne to go into the living room.

When the plaintiff opened the door and saw the defendant and Osborne alone together in the television room, she flew into a rage, screaming, "Who is that woman?" and "What are you doing in my house?" Osborne testified1 that she was afraid of the plaintiff, who "came in like a raging bull, screaming," and who "was aggressively attempting to enter the house." The defendant testified that the plaintiff was "angry," "enraged" and "shrieking ... hysterically high." The defendant stated: "There was body language that I recognized from previous such incidents, where I was terrified.... I was scared. I was scared of her demeanor and what she was saying and what I thought she could do, given the fact that we have been married for twenty years and, you know ... I was afraid, but I was also embarrassed in front of the guests [who] were in the house, that this is my wife." Although the plaintiff did not verbally threaten to harm Osborne, the defendant believed that her out of control behavior posed a risk of harm to his guests.

The defendant approached the plaintiff and asked her to leave. He then took hold of the plaintiff's upper arm and "escorted" her out the door and down the driveway toward the Sharon town green, where he believed her car was parked. The plaintiff kept turning around, trying to return to the house, but the defendant would not permit her to do so. The defendant testified that the plaintiff was shrieking, "over and over, ‘who's that woman in my house, what's going on here, what are

334 Conn. 106

you doing?’ " The plaintiff continued shouting, "[W]ho's that woman? What's going on between the two of you?"2 The defendant "felt at that moment [that the plaintiff] was trying to run back into the house and confront the guests ... and [he] was terrified of that."

Osborne and Teasdale watched through the windows as the defendant escorted the plaintiff to the end of the driveway. Teasdale testified that she was "very concerned

220 A.3d 783

for everybody, so I watched out of the side window and I saw ... [the plaintiff] coming by, and she was screaming, and she was really mad. She was just out of control. Mad screaming ...." Teasdale continued: "I could hear the screaming and screaming, that same ‘Who is that woman?’ .... When I saw her in the side window, her face, she was screaming; she was shaking, [en]raged, screaming." Teasdale testified that she "felt in danger—[like] my life was in danger with what was going on by [the plaintiff's] showing up and screaming like that," and "I didn't know if [the plaintiff] had a gun .... I didn't know what was going on out there, and I was really worried about our safety, my safety, everyone's safety."

Although the plaintiff testified that the defendant "dragged" her down the driveway by her arm, head, and neck and repeatedly "flung" her to the ground and yanked her back up again, Osborne, Teasdale, and the defendant testified to a very different version of events. Teasdale explained that it "looked like [the plaintiff and the defendant] were walking as a couple. At that point, it looked like they were—he had his arm on her—around her elbow, like, you know, like a gentle—like a man would walk with a woman ...." Teasdale further explained that "it was snowy, and ... it looked like [the plaintiff] was slipping, but [the defendant] ...

334 Conn. 107

kept her steady ...." Osborne testified that the defendant escorted the plaintiff away from the house by putting "his arm around her" and that the level of force used by the defendant was "appropriate for the occasion" because it was "[e]nough to keep her from getting back into the house and to move her down the driveway ...." The defendant...

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9 cases
  • State v. Hughes
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 23, 2021
    ... ... the first requirement, which is the focus of the parties' ... arguments in the present case. See Burke v ... Mesniaeff , 334 Conn. 100, 128, 220 A.3d 777 ... (2019) ... [ 7 ] Although the self-defense statute also ... ...
  • State v. Hughes
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 23, 2021
    ...equally applicable to the first requirement, which is the focus of the parties' arguments in the present case. See Burke v. Mesniaeff , 334 Conn. 100, 128, 220 A.3d 777 (2019).7 Although the self-defense statute also permits this defense when the defendant reasonably believes that he is at ......
  • Kos v. Lawrence + Mem'l Hosp.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 10, 2020
    ...error did not affect the jury's verdict, courts of this state have found the error to be harmless. See, e.g., Burke v. Mesniaeff , 334 Conn. 100, 121–22, 220 A.3d 777 (2019) (holding that improper instruction was harmless when it did not taint jury's verdict); State v. Acklin , 9 Conn. App.......
  • Chugh v. Kalra
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 12, 2022
    ...impropriety is harmful if it is likely that it affected the verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burke v. Mesniaeff , 334 Conn. 100, 121, 220 A.3d 777 (2019). It is true, as the trial court stated, that Chugh was not required to prove lost profits to recover compensatory damages. I......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • 2019 Appellate Review
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 93, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...pointed out in a concurrence that if the State had claimed the error was harmless, they would have so held. [71] 332 Conn, at 241. [72] 334 Conn. 100, 131, 220 A.3d 777 (2019). [73] See supra note 11. [74] See supra note 21. [75] See supra note 7. [76] 333 Conn, at 549. [77] 332 Conn. 510, ......

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