Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court No. S-16137 |
| Citation | 420 P.3d 1196 |
| Parties | Marianne E. BURKE, mother of Abigail E. Caudle (deceased), Appellant, v. RAVEN ELECTRIC, INC. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Marianne E. Burke, pro se, Anchorage, Appellant.
Nora Barlow and Constance Livsey, Barlow Anderson, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellees.
Dario Borghesan, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for Amicus Curiae State of Alaska.
Eric Croft, The Croft Law Office, Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae Eric Croft.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, and Carney, Justices.
After an apprentice electrician was killed on the job, her mother sought workers’ compensation death benefits or other damages related to her daughter’s death. Acting on the advice of attorneys but representing herself, she brought a claim before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. She argued in part that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act was unconstitutional because it inadequately compensated for her daughter’s life, particularly given the circumstances of her daughter’s death, and because it failed to consider her future dependency on her daughter. The Board denied her claim, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. The Commission also ordered the mother to pay the employer’s attorney’s fees and costs. We hold that the mother’s constitutional rights are not violated by the Act. We reverse the Commission’s award of attorney’s fees but otherwise affirm the Commission’s decision.
Abigail Caudle was a 26-year-old apprentice electrician when she was electrocuted on the job while working for Raven Electric, Inc. According to a "Fatalgram" by the Alaska Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Division of Labor & Safety Standards, Occupational Safety & Health (AKOSH), it was Caudle’s first day on that particular job, which involved the remodel of an Anchorage building.1
On the day of the accident Raven Electric initially planned to "rough[ ] in ... three offices as far as outlets and switches," but the general contractor2 changed the scope of work after Raven Electric’s crew arrived, asking the electricians to tear out old light fixtures instead because the contractors "had already taken out the grid ceiling" and could not proceed with their work while the old fixtures were in place. Raven Electric did not have temporary lights set up, so the crew was "using some of the lights that were on while the construction was going on." The light switches for the light fixture Caudle was working on had been turned off, but no one had turned off the power at the electrical panel or otherwise disconnected power to the lights. Caudle used a noncontact voltage meter to check for power, and witnesses told AKOSH the meter showed a green signal, indicating no voltage.
Caudle began to remove the wire nuts and then "disconnected the neutral wire and was electrocuted between the load side neutral conductor and either the grounded conduit junction box, or the conduit to the left side of the neutral conductor." Coworkers heard her cry out, rushed to her aid, called emergency services, and began CPR. The efforts to assist her were unsuccessful, and Caudle was pronounced dead at the hospital less than an hour later. The electricians interviewed during the AKOSH investigation thought there had been a "back feed on the neutral" wire and suggested that the circuit had been wired incorrectly at some time in the past. AKOSH cited Raven Electric for several safety violations and ultimately agreed through an informal settlement to fine Raven Electric a total of $11,200 for those safety violations.
Raven Electric filed a report of injury with the Board and paid funeral expenses required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act (Act). Because Caudle was unmarried and had no dependents at the time of her death, the Act limited Raven Electric’s liability to funeral expenses up to $10,000 and a $10,000 payment to the Second Injury Fund.3
Two years after Caudle’s death, her mother Marianne Burke filed a written workers’ compensation claim seeking death benefits. Burke was listed as a beneficiary on the claim form, and she attached a two-page addendum setting out some of her concerns about safety at the work site. She alleged that following Caudle’s death she had "gotten the run around from all the lawyers on this," had "not been able to work," and had "been sick often due to [her] daughter’s death."
Raven Electric filed an answer saying it had paid all workers’ compensation benefits due and denying further benefits were owed. It also raised two affirmative defenses: Burke’s claim was untimely under AS 23.30.105(a), and she was not a beneficiary because she was not dependent on Caudle at the time of Caudle’s death as required by the Act.4 Raven Electric later petitioned the Board to dismiss Burke’s claim on those grounds.
In the course of pleadings and proceedings before the Board, Burke clarified that she was trying "to get justice for [her] daughter" and said the Board was "the only place that been allowed to get any source of justice." She did not want to produce tax records to show dependence on Caudle, and she asserted that she would have depended on Caudle for care in the future, even if she did not do so at the time of Caudle’s death. Burke argued that simply because Caudle "was single ... [did] not make her life worth nothing, as the current laws imply" from the low amount of compensation benefits. Burke contended that both her own and Caudle’s constitutional rights were violated by the limited compensation available for Caudle’s death, particularly because of what Burke called Raven Electric’s gross negligence. Burke filed a document entitled "Notice of Intent to Rely" which contained a copy of the AKOSH file on which Burke had made written comments.
The parties stipulated to a limited hearing in February 2014 to resolve disputes about procedure. Burke raised constitutional arguments about the Act at the hearing and explained her position on the procedural questions. The Board issued an interlocutory order resolving the procedural disputes and informing Burke that it did not have jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues. In its interlocutory order the Board "excluded" Burke’s "Notice of Intent to Rely" as not relevant to the issue of Burke’s entitlement to additional death benefits.
Raven Electric then requested a hearing on its petition to dismiss the claim; Burke opposed setting a hearing because she wanted more time to research the law and prepare her case. Burke’s understanding was that she would have two years from the date she filed the claim to prepare for a hearing. Burke also argued in opposing the substance of Raven Electric’s petition to dismiss that workers’ compensation was the only legal remedy available to her and that the purpose of workers’ compensation was "to protect workers, give value to their lives, [and] create safer work conditions, none of which occurred for [her] daughter." (Emphasis omitted.) She did not think the death benefits available for Caudle’s death achieved these ends.
The Board set a hearing in July on the petition to dismiss. About 20 days before this hearing, Burke filed a clean copy of the AKOSH file along with a notarized statement from an agency representative that the copy was "from [the] State of Alaska Occupational Safety & Health records." Raven Electric objected to this evidence because it had been "excluded" in the Board’s interlocutory order.
At the beginning of the July hearing, Raven Electric again sought to exclude the AKOSH file as irrelevant; Burke contended that it should be part of the record for purposes of appeal. The Board hearing chair told Burke the Board was "not going to stop [her] from filing anything," that the AKOSH file was "not being ... stricken from the record," and that it was "part of the record of the case no matter what." The Board panel decided to "exclude[ ] [the file] for the purpose of [the July] hearing."
The hearing consisted mainly of argument. As relevant to this appeal, Raven Electric argued that Burke was seeking some type of compensatory or punitive damages that were not authorized under the Act because workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy available for a work-related death. Raven Electric pointed out that the workers’ compensation system had been in existence even in territorial days and that the Act represented a trade-off. It cited precedent holding that the low level of death benefits for single workers with no dependents did not violate equal protection. Burke reiterated her position that the Act provided inadequate compensation for her daughter’s death, especially in light of what she considered Raven Electric’s negligence and its failure to provide a safe workplace. She asked the Board to consider awarding the full amount of permanent partial impairment benefits under the Act, stating that something beyond funeral expenses should be paid to families of single workers who die on the job. Burke explained that she had suffered emotional harm and financial hardship due to Caudle’s death because she had difficulties working after the death, and that Caudle’s aunt Betty, from whom Caudle rented living quarters, had also suffered hardship. Burke again explained that she had brought the claim to the Board because it was "the only place [she could] get justice": the case had been "pigeonholed ... into workers’ comp," and the family "couldn’t go through civil court." And she restated her arguments that the compensation scheme violated her constitutional rights.
At the end of the July hearing, the hearing chair clarified Burke’s status in asserting the claim:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Seal v. Welty
...(Alaska 1994) (referring to "exclusive remedy" when discussing AS 23.30.055 ).36 Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(k)(4).37 Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc. , 420 P.3d 1196, 1202 (Alaska 2018).38 Wolff v. Cunningham , 187 P.3d 479, 482 (Alaska 2008).39 Benson , 725 P.2d at 490-91.40 Id. at 491.41 658 P.2d 133......
-
State v. Adams
...the employer's nor the employee's failure to follow safety rules takes an accident outside of the Act. See Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc. , 420 P.3d 1196, 1207 (Alaska 2018) (affirming Board decision not to consider Alaska Occupational Safety and Health report that documented employer's failure......