Burke v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 July 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:15–cv–75.
• Citation: 113 F.Supp.3d 863
• Parties: Gene Martin BURKE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THOR MOTOR COACH, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

113 F.Supp.3d 863

Gene Martin BURKE, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.THOR MOTOR COACH, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:15–cv–75.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

Signed July 8, 2015.

Filed July 9, 2015.

John Cole Gayle, Jr., The Consumer Law Group, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff.

Danielle Deanna Giroux, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Willman, Martin Andrew Conn, Madelaine Amanda Kramer, Moran Reeves & Conn PC, Richmond, VA, Susan Leigh Kimble, Goodman Allen & Filetti PLLC, Glen Allen, VA, for Defendant.

OPINION

JOHN A. GIBNEY, JR., District Judge.

In 2014, Gene and Virginia Burke bought a brand new RV made by THOR Motor Coach, Inc. ("Thor"), with a chassis manufactured by Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation ("FCCC"). The RV turned out to be a lemon, according to the Burkes. After several unsuccessful attempts to resolve various mechanical and aesthetic problems, the Burkes sued both Thor and FCCC under both federal and state warranty enforcement laws. Thor filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that Virginia's lemon law excludes from liability all motorhome manufacturers except those that make the vehicle's chassis.

Case law on this point conflicts, so Thor asks this Court to certify the question to the Supreme Court of Virginia. After considering the statute's language, the Court concludes that Virginia's lemon law attaches liability to motor home defects only with respect to the motor home's "self-propelled motorized chassis." Because Thor did not manufacture the chassis in question, Thor cannot be held liable under Virginia's lemon law. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to certify and grants the motion to dismiss Count II as against Thor.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On February 26, 2014, Gene and Virginia Burke purchased a brand new 2014 Thor Palazzo RV motor home from Safford RV, LLC, a Thor-authorized dealer. (Compl. ¶ 6.) According to the Burkes, Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation ("FCCC") manufactured the motor home's chassis, and Thor Motor Coach, Inc. ("Thor"), manufactured the remainder of the vehicle. (Compl. ¶¶ 3–4.) Almost immediately after the purchase, problems arose with the vehicle, including mechanical issues with the engine, brakes, heating, and water system, aesthetic blights in the interior, and overall shoddy workmanship throughout. (See Compl. ¶ 11–14.) The Burkes took the vehicle to FCCC's South Carolina facility for inspection and repairs, but the fixes did not last. (Compl. ¶ 14–16.) After the vehicle continued to have problems, the Burkes took it to Thor's manufacturing facility in Indiana, but three weeks' worth of repairs did not solve the problems. (Compl. ¶ 18.) The Burkes then hired an attorney and tried to get their money back, to no avail. (Compl. ¶ 21–25.) The Burkes then filed this action against Thor and FCCC under the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (Count I), and Virginia's lemon law, the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, Va.Code § 59.1–207.9 et seq. (Count II).

Thor filed two motions in response, both related to Count II. First, Thor seeks dismissal of Count II under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Virginia's lemon law does not apply to manufacturers of the non-chassis portions of a motor home. Case law on this issue points in opposite directions, however, so Thor filed a second motion asking the Court to certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Virginia:

Does the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act ("lemon law") apply to a "final stage manufacturer" of a motor home who does not manufacture the self-propelled motorized chassis of the motor home?

The Burkes oppose both motions and contend that the lemon law applies to all portions of a motor home, and, therefore, Thor may be held liable for the defects in their RV.

II. DISCUSSION

In Count II, the Burkes' complaint alleges a violation of the Virginia's lemon law, Va.Code § 59.1–207.9 et seq. The lemon law allows a purchaser of a vehicle to file suit against the vehicle manufacturer, its agents, or authorized dealers if the vehicle does not conform with "any applicable warranty." Va.Code § 59.1–207.14.¹ According to Thor, the law does not cover entire motor homes, but only a motor home's self-propelled motorized chassis. Because Thor did not manufacture the chassis, it asks the Court to dismiss Count II as against Thor.²

Thor points out that two federal cases from the Western District of Virginia addressed the exact issue in this case, but came to opposite conclusions. In light of this disagreement, Thor thinks the issue should be certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia for conclusive clarification.

A. Motion to Certify Question to the Supreme Court of Virginia

Under Rule 5:40 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, a federal district court may certify a question of Virginia law, so long as that question "is determinative in any proceeding pending before the certifying court and it appears there is no controlling precedent on point in the decisions of [the Supreme Court of Virginia] or the Court of Appeals of Virginia." The decision to certify a question remains entirely within the district court's discretion. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974). As a part of this discretion, the district court considers not only the "imposition on the time and resources of the Supreme Court of Virginia," but also the effect on the time and resources of the parties, the protraction of the proceedings, and judicial efficiency. W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Isle of Wight, 673 F.Supp. 760, 764 (E.D.Va.1987).

Although no binding decision of the Virginia law answers the question posed in this case, and although two decisions from the Western District of Virginia collide, the question does not merit certification to the Supreme Court of Virginia. This Court regularly interprets Virginia law and must "decide questions of state law, even if difficult and uncertain, when necessary to render judgment."³ Legard v. EQT Prod. Co., 771 F.Supp.2d 607, 609 (W.D.Va.2011). Here, neither complexity nor efficiency counsels in favor of certifying the question to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The parties have adequately briefed the issue, and the Court has spent significant time and energy considering the state-law question; certification would create an unnecessary detour. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to certify.

B. Motion to Dismiss⁴

1. Statutory Definitions

Because this case turns on statutory definitions, any analysis begins with the language of the relevant statutes.

The lemon law applies to "motor vehicles," which it defines as:

only passenger cars, pickup or panel trucks, motorcycles, self-propelled motorized chassis of motor homes and mopeds as those terms are defined in § 46.2–100 and demonstrators or leased vehicles with which a warranty was issued.

Va.Code § 59.1–207.11. The definitions section from Virginia's motor vehicle title, located at § 46.2–100, provides the following relevant definitions of the vehicles listed in the lemon law⁵ :

"Passenger car" means every motor vehicle other than a motorcycle or autocycle designed and used primarily for the transportation of no more than 10 persons, including the driver.

"Motor home" means every private motor vehicle with a normal seating capacity of not more than 10 persons, including the driver, designed primarily for use as living quarters for human beings.

Va.Code § 46.2–100. Because both "passenger car" and "motor home" include the word "motor vehicle," the definition of that term from § 46.2–100 should also be highlighted:

"Motor vehicle" means every vehicle as defined in this section that is self-propelled or designed for self-propulsion except as otherwise provided in this title. Any structure designed, used, or maintained primarily to be loaded on or affixed to a motor vehicle to provide a mobile dwelling, sleeping place, office, or commercial space shall be considered a part of a motor vehicle. Except as otherwise provided, for the purposes of this title, any device herein defined as a bicycle, electric personal assistive mobility device, electric power-assisted bicycle, or moped shall be deemed not to be a motor vehicle.

Id. The problem comes from the incorporation by reference of the definitions in § 46.2–100.

The lemon law definition of a motor vehicle explicitly includes passenger cars and other motor vehicles but only covers the "self-propelled motorized chassis of a motor home." Read alone, this indicates a simple solution to this case: the manufacturer of parts of a motor home other than the chassis is not covered by the lemon law. But the lemon law then incorporates by reference § 46.2–100, which defines a passenger car to be a motor vehicle, and defines a motor vehicle to include any attached mobile dwellings and sleeping places—precisely what makes a motor home a motor home. The statute does not define a self-propelled motorized chassis as a separate component of a vehicle.⁶ Relying on these definitions, the plaintiffs argue that the manufacturer of the "dwelling" or "sleeping space" has manufactured part of a motor vehicle, that the definition of a motor vehicle includes a passenger car as a motor vehicle, and therefore the manufacturer of all the motor home is covered by the lemon law.

2. The Parks and Reynolds Cases

Construing these definitions, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia reached opposite conclusions in two cases. The first case, Parks v. Newmar Corporation, 384 F.Supp.2d 966 (W.D.Va.2005), did not dwell on whether the lemon law covered the entire motor home, but focused instead on whether the defendant had "assembled" any portion of the chassis. See Parks, 384 F.Supp.2d at 970. Implicit in that holding, however, was the assumption that the limiting language of the lemon law's definition of "motor vehicle" (i.e., "only ... self-propelled motorized chassis of motor homes") necessarily excluded every part of the motor...