Burke v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dea, Civil Action No. 95-D-642-N.
| Decision Date | 24 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-D-642-N. |
| Citation | 968 F.Supp. 672 |
| Parties | Willie E. BURKE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Willie E. Burke, Jr., pro se.
Redding Pitt, U.S. Atty., John T. Harmon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Montgomery, AL, for defendant.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court is Defendant United States of America's motion for summary judgment filed on May 23, 1997.1 Plaintiff Willie E. Burke ("Burke") filed a response on June 9, 1997. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is due to be denied and that judgment in this matter is due to be entered in favor of Plaintiff.
This action arises from the seizure of a 1993 Chevrolet Silverado pick-up truck ("Truck") by the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA").2 The Truck was seized on or about February 15, 1994, as the result of the arrest and prosecution of Terry Mitchell ("Mitchell") for a drug-related offense. Mitchell was subsequently convicted and imprisoned. Mitchell allegedly purchased the Truck from Burke on or about July 16, 1993. Burke claims that Mitchell paid only a portion of the total price of the Truck and that he maintained a security interest in the Truck at the time it was seized by the DEA. In pursuit of that interest Burke filed a lienholder petition on February 9, 1995,3 seeking recovery of his interest in the vehicle.4
In a letter dated April 10, 1995, Susan M. Carracino ("Carracino"), a Senior Attorney for the DEA, informed Burke that his Lienholder Petition had been approved and that the forfeiture would be completely remitted without cost or penalty to Burke. Burke was directed to reclaim the Truck by contacting the United States Marshall Service ("USMS"). Burke then allegedly took the letter to the secure facility at Gunter Park in Montgomery, Alabama, in an effort to reclaim the Truck. Burke alleges that he presented the letter to DEA Agent Marshall Simmons who told Burke that he had not yet received a copy of the remission letter. Burke did not receive possession of the Truck during this visit to the secure facility.
Burke alleges that this visit to the secure facility touched off an effort by the DEA to reverse the earlier remission decision. Burke claims that DEA agents and officials from the IRS began to harass him in an effort to prevent him from retrieving the Truck. On May 18, 1995, William J. Snider ("Snider"), DEA Forfeiture Counsel, wrote Burke to inform him that DEA's complete remission decision of April 10, 1995, was temporarily rescinded pending investigation of allegations that Burke's documentation had been falsified. On March 22, 1996, Carracino wrote to Burke to inform him that his Lienholder Petition had been denied following a complete investigation. Carracino informed Burke of the "facts" supporting the DEA's decision: (1) the Alabama Department of Revenue had no record of either Burke's lien or vehicle registration on the Truck's Certificate of Title, (2) a Forensic Document Examiner determined that the sales contract provided by Burke shows evidence of tampering including evidence that two different signatures were made by the same person, and (3) Burke's refusal to cooperate in an interview scheduled for April 18, 1995. Burke wrote a letter dated April 5, 1996, requesting reconsideration of this denial. However, Snider wrote Burke on October 8, 1996, and explained that Burke was entitled to only one reconsideration of the DEA's denial of Burke's Lienholder Petition in accordance with the provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 9.4(i). In this same letter, Snider wrote that the DEA had decided to deny Burke's request for reconsideration and that the decision on Burke's Lienholder Petition was now final.
On May 15, 1995, Burke filed a complaint requesting the court to order the DEA to release the Truck, pay conversion damages, and enjoin any further investigations directed at him. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on September 13, 1995. In a Memorandum Opinion and order entered April 9, 1997, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss. The court found that Burke's claims dealing with the criminal investigation targeted against him were due to be dismissed. The court also found that it had limited jurisdiction to review Defendant's actions regarding the Truck's forfeiture. See Matter of $67,470.00, 901 F.2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir.1990).5 However, the court found that the portion of Defendant's motion to dismiss dealing with Burke's request for the return of the Truck was due to be denied.6 The court based this finding on the DEA's reversal of its earlier decision granting complete remission of the Truck's forfeiture.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions in the file, together with affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
The Defendant continues to insist that this court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. This decision, however, articulates two separate bases for asserting jurisdiction in this matter: (1) the court may review whether the Defendant violated its regulations when it rescinded its remission grant and (2) the court may assert jurisdiction where a lienholder petitioner's due process rights have been violated.
Those individuals contesting forfeitures have a choice to proceed either by seeking a judicial determination of the forfeiture or by allowing the item to be administratively forfeited and then seeking administrative review of the forfeiture through a petition for remission or mitigation. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1608, 1609, 1613 (West Supp. 1997); see also Ezennwa v. United States, No. 93-CV-2789, 1997 WL 63318, at *1-*3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.12, 1997) (). In order to secure judicial review of a forfeiture action, an interested party must file a notice of interest in the seized item as well as the "giving of a bond to the United States in the penal sum of $5,000.00 or 10 percent of the value of the claimed property." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1608 (West Supp.1997). If no "such claim is filed or bond given within twenty days," then the item shall be declared forfeited and shall be sold at a public auction. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1609 (West Supp.1997).
However, even though the item is considered to have been administratively forfeited, an interested person may seek administrative review of the forfeiture by petitioning the Secretary of the Treasury for remission or mitigation of the "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" prior to the sale of the item. 19...
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