Burkeen v.
| Decision Date | 25 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-CV-00017-GNS-LLK |
| Parties | DEANA BURKEEN and TIMOTHY BURKEEN PLAINTIFFS v. A.R.E. ACCESSORIES, LLC; and GENERAL MOTORS, LLC DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of General Motors, LLC ("GM") (DN 21). For the reasons outlined below, the motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs Deana and Timothy Burkeen brought suit against A.R.E. Accessories, LLC ("A.R.E.") for negligence and strict products liability, and loss of consortium, respectively, for injuries sustained by Deana Burkeen ("Burkeen") on January 12, 2015, when she lost control of her husband's GMC pickup truck and collided with an oncoming vehicle in Graves County, Kentucky. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11, DN 18). This initial collision caused the other vehicle to spin around and strike the back of the Burkeen's truck. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11). As a result of the crash, the truck bed cover on the back of Burkeen's truck, manufactured by A.R.E., detached and entered the cab of the truck; a "D-ring" protruding from the cab of the truck allegedly hit Burkeen in the head causing serious injuries. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11).
Plaintiffs amended the Complaint adding GM as a defendant on October 19, 2016. In GM's Motion to Dismiss, it argues that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is barred by the one-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims and that the Amended Complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to support the claims of negligence and strict liability. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, DN 21). The subject motion has been briefed and is ripe for decision.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (c)(1). Both parties are citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limit of this Court. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 15).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and is subject to dismissal if it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., 615F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim becomes plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The statute of limitations applicable to Burkeen is the extended two-year period provided in the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act ("MVRA"). KRS 304.39-010. Generally, an action for personal injury in Kentucky must be brought within one-year after the action accrued. KRS 412.140(1)(a). However, where the injured party is a motor vehicle accident victim, the MVRA extends the limitations period to two years. See Troxell v. Trammell, 730 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Ky. 1987). In particular, the statute provides that "[a]n action for tort liability not abolished by the KRS 304.39-060 may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the injury, or the death, or the last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation obligor whichever later occurs." KRS 304.39-230(6). This extended statute of limitation allows victims of motor vehicle accidents adequate time "to look first to their no-fault benefits and then pursue a tort claim if necessary . . . regardless of whether the tort claim to be pursued is against a motorist or a nonmotorist." Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. 1984).
In applying the statute, three conditions must be met: the liability must sound in tort, the accident must occur within this commonwealth, and the accident must arise out of the use of a motor vehicle. See Cooke v. Bd. of Claims, 743 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Ky. App. 1987). "'Use of a motor vehicle' means any utilization of the motor vehicle as a vehicle including occupying,entering into, and alighting from it." KRS 304.39-020(6). "It is sufficient if the injury is a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle . . . ." W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 865 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1993). All three conditions are met in the present case. Plaintiffs have brought suit alleging negligence and strict products liability, the accident occurred within this Commonwealth, and the accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle.
GM advances three arguments in opposition. First, it argues that the MVRA is inapplicable to "enhanced injury cases," as recognized in Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 41 (Ky. 2004).1 (Def.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6). To the contrary, in Worldwide Equipment, Inc. v. Mullins, 11 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. App. 1999), the court held that the two-year statute of limitations in the MVRA applied when a product defect led to an enhanced injury. See id. at 59. In Worldwide, Mullins brought a claim against Worldwide for strict liability, claiming that the absence of a rear "underride guard" or bumper on a vehicle enhanced his injuries. Id. The court explained, "[w]e have a duty to accord statutory words their literal meaning, unless a verbatim connotation would lead to a wholly unreasonable or absurd conclusion." Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
Prior to the Mullins decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court had reasoned with respect to the MRVA that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended exactly what it said when it made the two year statute for 'an action for tort liability' prescribed in KRS 304.39-230(6) part of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, that two years applies to all tort actions not abolished by the Act." Goodin v. Overnight Transp. Co., 701 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Ky. 1985) (). Thus, the two-year statute of limitations in the MVRA applies to Burkeen's tort claims.
Second, GM argues that the MVRA's two-year statute of limitations should not apply to this products liability action because it is not within the purview of the MVRA. The defense focuses on the purpose of the statute being "to provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused the accident in order to eliminate the inequities which fault based determination has created." (Def.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6 (quoting KRS 304.39-010(2))). Although, the statute clearly created a no-fault system, it did more than that. In Crenshaw v. Weinberg, 805 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court held:
[T]he purview of this Act was automobile insurance reform, not just to make the no-fault option available, and not just to benefit automobile liability insurance carriers by limiting the scope of liability claims where no-fault applied. The primary purpose of the Act is to benefit motor vehicle accident victims by reforming, and in some areas broadening, their ability to make and collect claims. One of these areas is by extending the statute of limitations in all actions for tort liability involving a motor vehicle accident victim "not abolished by KRS 304.39-060.
Id. at 131 (quoting KRS 304.39-230(6)). Thus, GM's argument that the purview of the MVRA excepts products liability claims is rejected. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rains, 715 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Ky. 1986).
GM next argues that applying the MVRA to this case would lead to a potential double recovery for Burkeen. (Def.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6). However, when an action is brought within the MVRA the person receiving personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits from an insurer on behalf of a person injured in a motor vehicle accident "has no right of tort recovery for [the] same from any alleged tort feasor." Lafferty v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (citations omitted). Thus, this provision eliminates the possibility of doublerecovery. For instance, in Dudas v. Kaczmarek, 652 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. App. 1983), a tortfeasor driver was entitled to have the judgment against him reduced by $10,000, which was the maximum amount of basic reparation benefits payable under KRS 304.39-020(2), rather than by $8,008.85, which was the amount of basic reparation benefits actually paid by the injured passenger's insurer. See id. at 870-71. Potential double recovery is not a valid reason to avoid application of the MVRA to this case.
Conversely, the two-year statute of limitations does not extend to Timothy Burkeen's claim for loss of consortium because his claim is not within the purview of the MVRA. "Rather, the two year statute of limitation applies only to the institution of a suit by an injured person or in the event of injury resulting in death, by those entitled to...
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